McMullen Naval History Symposium 2019


This was an impressive international conference, held once again at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. The flagship US Navy (USN) history symposium, held every two years, this year brought together a record number of scholars and participants, 400 in total, to present and learn from panels of world-class researchers and naval thinkers.


Dawn’s early light over an F/A-18 display.

The weather on September 19 and 20 was beautiful, the sky was summer blue and warm, as the scholars awoke with the dawn to bus over to the US Naval Academy (USNA) from their hotels. Future USN lieutenants were starting classes on Thursday morning. The fall term had began on 19 August, with the conclusion of Plebe Summer for the new class of 2023 freshmen.


Your intrepid narrator arrives & registers for the conference.


After registering and picking up the conference booklet (which very helpfully included a small notebook, to be completely filled over the course of the following 48 hours), I headed down from the Hart Room reception and publishing exhibit at Sampson Hall (ie, the book store), making my way to the Mahan Hall Auditorium, to hear the symposium introductory remarks.



Mahan Hall & the Auditorium

After a quick appraisal of the conference administrative details, we were on our way to the first panels. As usual with a conference of this size, one must selectively decide which panels to attend, and although it is certainly tempting to skitter in and out of rooms (as the midshipmen tend to do throughout the conference – preparing notes for assigned reports before heading to scheduled classes), I prefer to stick through with each panel and get a feel for the full discussion.


Commander Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong covering conference administration and introductions

Although I was tempted to attend the session on the legacy of Jutland for the first panel, I decided instead to attend the panel on naval aviation and air power history, which I figured would complement my own research, to be presented in the afternoon on day two. As such, I was soon listening to Commander Andrew Moulis introduce the naval aviation panelists.


Panel One: Session A6, Commander Stan Fisher (commentator), John Orr, Jonathan Chavanne and Bruce Perry

Bruce presented first, summarizing the history of pre-1941 Anglo-Japanese naval cooperation, notably the 1921 mission of the proto-fascist Lord Sempill, who was focused on advancing Japanese naval aviation. Bruce highlighted the infamous Frederick Rutland (“of Jutland”) controversy, in which the legendary naval aviator became a Japanese double agent, comparable to the Cambridge Five who later spied for the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Although much of this ground is covered by Arthur Marder’s now almost totally forgotten Old Friends, New Enemies, Bruce was able to take advantage of his impeccable pronunciation of Scottish names to enliven his paper, a strong opening to the conference proper.


Jonathan was up next, presenting on the interwar history of the USN’s rigid airship program. Although the surviving First World War Zeppelins were destroyed by their crews rather than face internment, vis-a-vis the High Sea Fleet at Scapa Flow, they had in fact been promised as war reparations to the Americans. Rear Admiral Moffett, in particular, was keen to acquire rigid airships for the USN to act as long-range fleet scouts in the Pacific, a theatre where a Zeppelin’s endurance and operational radius, prior to the invention of radar, could have been useful. Towards this end Moffett, together with Lt. Commander Charles Rosendahl, arranged for the purchase of rigid airships from the Zeppelin works in Germany, of which the first for American service, LZ126, was completed in 1924. This Zeppelin entered American service as USS Los Angeles. Although the debate about the ongoing utility of rigid airships continued into the 1930s, the death of Moffett in the USS Macon disaster of 5 February 1935, like the demise of Britain’s R101 on 5 October 1930, as with the death of Germany’s Peter Strasser in LZ112 in 1918, generally put an end to the rigid airship program.

Lakehurst, Luftschiffe ZR-3 und ZR-1

Los Angeles (right) and Shenandoah in 1924

Third, John presented on the US naval air station (NAS) based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, for anti-submarine purposes during the First World War. Proposed with support from former Wing Commander J. T. Cull (RNAS and then RAF) in April 1918, the air station was activated in August 1918. Although not mentioned by John in his presentation, the USN had plenty of experience establishing stations in Ireland and at Dunkirk, the former in particular immensely important for Captain Hutch Cone (USN), who was leading the American naval aviation deployment to Europe for Admiral William Sims. By September 1918 Halifax was operating H12 flying boats, but this late in the submarine war, there was little activity in the area of operations

Arthur_Lismer_-_Minesweepers,_Halifax_CWM_19710261-0342 (1)

John’s presentation included splendid nautical art by Group of Seven painter Arthur Lismer.

Lunch at the Alumni Hall was next, and as I had not formerly registered for the conference until a few days prior, my chances of making it into the assigned seating dining hall were slim. However, as luck would have it, a number of guests did not take their seats and thus I was thankfully ushered inside.



Alumni Hall on the waterfront, in front of Mahan Hall, with the somewhat triumphalist display “Winning The Cold War”.


The enormous model of USS Forrestal (CV59) outside the dining hall.

Inside the dining hall I quickly made my way to an open table and sat down to devour my salad entree and creamed chicken, followed by a satisfying carrot cake dessert. The sparse table I was sitting at turned out to be occupied by some of the ancient warfare presenters. This was in fact a significant bit of luck, as I had earlier sworn to Jesus, on Twitter, that I would attend more pre-1700 naval history panels at this years’ McMullen.


I soon found myself conversing with a group including Jorit Wintjes, and John Hyland amongst others. Our discourse ranged from Greco-Roman amphibious operations to flagrant historical inaccuracies in Hollywood cinema and New York broadway, notably in Zack Snyder’s tortuous quasi-pornographic adaptation of Frank Miller’s 300, in the opening battle sequence of Ridley Scott’s Gladiator (artillery accurately represented; cavalry and shouting Zulu warriors less correct), and the portrayal of Lafayette alongside an apparently sympathetic Aaron Burr in the pop-cultural adaptation of Ron Chernow’s Hamilton.




Refreshed, it was time to attend the afternoon panels. Feeling an irrepressible desire to break-out from my specialization, and no doubt influenced by the classical conversation at lunch, I decided to attend what turned out to be a fascinating session chaired by Gene Smith on the War of 1812




Panel Two: Session B8, Samantha Cavell, Kevin McCranie and Kenneth “Kenny” Johnson.

Samantha presented on the distribution of Royal Navy forces during the 1812-13 phase of the American war, providing a useful update on Nicholas Rodger’s figures which unfortunately do not go beyond 1804 in The Command of the Ocean. Samantha demonstrated that Admiral Sir John Warren, C-in-C North American Station, based at Bermuda, was essentially conducting a holding operation: Warren’s tasks included carrying out a naval blockade, capturing American trade, and protecting the West Indies, while the war in Europe wound down. As soon as the threat from Napoleon was contained the British Admiralty shifted its focus from Europe to North America, and appointed the aggressive Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane in Warren’s place, resulting in the defeat of the United States through a lightning maritime campaign that included Rear Admiral George Cockburn’s burning of Washington DC in 1814.


Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren in 1799

Kevin followed up, employing the methodology of organizational and command analysis, eg, Roger Knight’s Britain Against Napoleon, to explore the administrative details at the Admiralty, where a minute staff of not much more than 30 individuals were running a global naval conflict. Kevin’s most interesting point was addressing the relative geospatial-time dynamic necessary when selecting commanders and drafting orders: the farther a naval station was from Whitehall, the more abstract the Admiralty orders by necessity had to be, and thus, the more discretion given to the local commander.


While I was listening to the panel I was struck by the similarity of Britain’s 1812 strategy with that of the William Pitt – George Anson theatre strategy of 1756-63: concentrate in the decisive theatre while securing command of the sea, fight containment actions elsewhere, before shifting focus and eliminating the enemy’s overseas bases.

Kenny concluded the panel with a brilliant narration of Napoleon’s post-Trafalgar naval strategy, really a kind of “anti-strategy” as I saw it, in which the central objective was to confuse the British as much as possible regarding the Emperor’s objectives. This included fantasy operations to capture the Channel Islands with 10,000 men, another non-campaign in Egypt with 30,000, combined with a violent but generally ephemeral guerre de course intent on burning British merchants supplying Wellington’s Peninsular army. The extent of Napoleon’s effort to tie down British warships with deception included the comical case of blank orders and a brief effort during the American war to pay the United States to fight the privateering campaign on Bonaparte’s behalf.


Sir Charles Oman’s multi-volume history of Wellington’s Peninsula campaign.

It was time to make my way to the next session, for which I knew I was going to have to make some tough choices. I was drawn to the Cold War Naval Strategy panel chaired by Nicholas Prime, but also to the US Naval Aviation during the Pacific War panel chaired by Randy Papadopoulous. Tempting as these sessions were, I ultimately decided I just could not miss the all-star panel on Leyte Gulf that was being chaired by Thomas Cutler.


Panel Three: Session C7, Thomas Cutler introduces Trent Hone, Paul Stillwell, and K. J. Delamer, with comments by Craig Symonds.

Trent Hone, Guadalcanal and USN doctrine specialist, presented first, establishing the narrative basis for the Philippines’ campaign, known as Campaign Plan Granite. Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura’s South Force was pulverized as it attempted to run the gauntlet at Surigao Strait, leaving only Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s Central Force to operate against the American invasion force. A group of Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) carriers (without planes) are moving as a distraction north of USN Third Fleet, and although Task Force 38 under Admiral Mark Mitscher and his Chief of Staff Captain Arleigh Burke want to convince Admiral Halsey to concentrate against Kurita, Mitscher ultimately defers to Halsey and the entire force goes north after the Japanese decoy force. Trent argued that Halsey’s command process had become complacent, and when combined with fatigue and inexperience operating as a fleet commander, meant that Halsey’s subordinates did not feel confident to correct what they could see was clearly a mistake.


Trent Hone presenting on Admiral William “Bull” Halsey’s (in)famous command decisions at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.


“Halsey acted stupidly” – Tom Clancy’s Marko Ramius played by Sean Connery in John McTiernan’s Hunt For Red October.

Paul presented next, examining the question of Task Force 34 under Admiral Lee, who by all expectations should have fought a decisive action against Kurita at the San Bernadino Strait, but was instead committed north in the goose chase against the IJN decoy force. At this point in the panel the thought foremost in my mind was that this entire situation sounded so very similar to the Battle of Jutland and the confusion and command indecision that surrounded that battle, perhaps best described by Andrew Gordon in The Rules of the Game.

USS Iowa1944b.jpg

Iconic photograph of USS Iowa, as featured on the cover of Life magazine, 30 October 1944

K. J., at this point, did everyone a service by deconstructing an obscure statement from Samuel Eliot Morison, the legendary American naval historian appointed by Franklin Roosevelt to write a “fighting” history of the war. S. E. Morison’s otherwise brilliant front-line quasi-official history is certainly an easy target for revision, but K. J. raised an interesting case by examining Morison’s seemingly bizarre comparison of Leyte Gulf to the Athenian Syracuse expedition. The thrust of K. J.’s counter argument was that American victory in the Pacific was clearly guaranteed by the geostrategic situation in 1944, and thus the tactical and operational details of Leyte, while interesting, were unlikely to produce a strategically significant result regardless of the what-if variables. Craig Symonds’ comments built off this analysis, flipping the Morison analogy on its head, and detailing the core controversies in the Leyte Gulf scenario that to my way of thinking clearly make this the American Jutland.




S. E. Morison’s renowned multi-volume history of the US Navy in the Second World War, and Thomas Cutler’s introduction to Volume 12 of Morison’s history.

So ended the panels for day one, September 19, and the scholars retired to the US Naval Museum at Preble Hall for cocktails and decompression. After a few drinks and hors d’oeuvre we returned to Mahan Hall for the Symposium keynote. This year, unlike 2017’s conference, a roundtable event was arranged, the idea being to hear comparisons of King, Burke and Zumwalt, generally geared towards the freshmen plebes, some evidently more interested than others.


Vice Admiral (retired) Frank Pandolfe chaired the panel that included scholars David Kohnen, David Rosenberg and Edward Marolda, with comment provided by Admiral (retired) Jonathan Greenert, former Chief of Naval Operations (2011-15).

David Kohnen highlighted Admiral King’s comprehensive service experience and technological mastery, while emphasizing King’s role as a naval educator, having co-authored the famous Knox-King-Pye report and later in his career established the Naval War College Command Course. David Rosenberg emphasized Captain Arleigh Burke’s role as Mitscher’s Chief of Staff during the war, a foundation that served Burke throughout his career, including planning the Inchon landings during the Korean War, aiding in the negotiation of the eventual ceasefire, and advancing to CNO under the Eisenhower administration where he helped develop high-frontier concepts such as NASA and ARPA. Edward brought the narrative into the post-Vietnam era with his discussion of Elmo Zumwalt, whose Project 60 concept led to the development of Harpoon missiles, the Sea Control Ship and other technologies that collectively created the foundation for the US Navy as it exists today.


This was an interesting overview of three very different, but immensely influential, American naval leaders, that unfortunately had to be wrapped up during the Q&A as it had run overtime – clearly the discussion between these scholars could have continued indefinitely, but 8:30 pm on Thursday evening was late, and only a few lieutenants and fewer midshipmen remained. With that, I returned to the conference hotel to catch dinner and get some sleep in preparation for an event filled second day.

The conference restarted at 8 am sharp on Friday, 20 September (an hour earlier than on Thursday!) and, blurry eyed, I decided to attend the session that seemed to me to be thematically structured around the vastly important concept of maritime blockade. Little did I realize that, from my perspective, this would actually turn out to be the most interesting panel of the conference.




Panel Four: Session D4, Cori Convertito, Hans Christian Bjerg, Nicholas Prime, with comment by Sharika Crawford.

Cori introduced the history of Key West in the context of the American Civil War. Key West was a hugely important fortified naval base and federal district court that became a decisive base of operations for both executing the blockade against the Confederate States of America (CSA), and in 1862 under Admiral David Farragut, the staging ground for the capture of New Orleans. Heavily fortified beginning in 1845, Key West became known as the American Gibraltar, the controlling point for access to the greater Florida southern United States. General Winfield Scott’s Anaconda Plan for strangling the CSA with riverine and coastal blockade relied on USN bases, including Boston and New York, with Key West playing a comparable role, the blockade forces there in fact responsible for capturing more Confederate blockade runners and merchants than either of the larger continental ports (although with cargos of less total value). Crucially, as the blockade forces seized Confederate supplies and ships, the Union’s merchants grew stronger – captured supplies could be put back into use during amphibious operations against the CSA.


Farragut’s flagship USS Hartford forcing Fort Jackson during the New Orleans operation, April – May 1862

Hans presented next, likewise examining the role of a small Caribbean island that loomed large in the history of the Monroe doctrine. The Danish Virgin Island of St. Thomas was of great interest to the reconstruction era United States as a possible naval base, and following the Alaska purchase of 1867, had been considered for purchase at the cost of $3 million in 1868, although not followed through. Renewed interest by the United States following consideration by the unified German Empire to purchase the island once again brought St. Thomas into American consideration, in particular after the Spanish-American War and then the decision to construct the Panama Canal in 1904. St. Thomas was finally purchased, at cost of $25 million in March 1917 – just prior to the US entry into the First World War – over concern that Germany might have acquired the island had Denmark been occupied during the war. This case study, like Cori’s presentation on Key West, highlighted the outsize significance of small but strategically located island bases which had the potential to provide sea-lane control, amidst frequent clashes between perceived strategic imperatives and political decision-making.

St. Thomas

Needless to say, St. Thomas is no longer the contested strategic location it was during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Nicholas brought the conversation into the nuclear era, presenting the findings from his research into Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, later well known as a military strategist, who in fact played an important and indeed astonishing role in the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Wylie was the naval planner who, as early as mid-September 1962, had first proposed the plan to blockade Cuba. Wylie’s intention was to prepare a means of pressuring Castro, but his plan was however coopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and Robert Kennedy’s Mongoose planning group, into an off the shelf invasion plan aimed at removing Castro from power altogether. Utilizing Freedom Of Information (FOI) requests, Nicholas gained access to the Wylie plan, and dissected the document to demonstrate that the Pentagon had certainly been aware of the blockade strategy well before it was proposed during the Excomm meetings in October 1962. Furthermore, like the previous papers, Nicholas encountered the interplay between strategic planners and the political and service priorities that actually shaped policy.


New York Times front page for 23 October 1962, recording JFK’s announcement of the Cuban quarantine, a watershed moment in the history of the Cuban Revolution and the first phase of the Cold War.


As the panel wrapped up I headed back upstairs to scour the publishing stalls for fresh material. Amongst the cornucopia of free coffee, pop, danish and fruit platters, I discovered that the proceedings for the 2013 conference had at last (!) been published and were now available, free of charge. I chatted with the people manning the booths, but I was beginning to realize that I was confronted with a dilemma: on the one hand I was having fun with these panels, and no historian can resist collecting free books, but on the other hand I was rapidly exhausting any plausible storage space for the flight home. Furthermore there were only two panels remaining that I would have a chance to attend, considering that my own presentation was scheduled to follow in a few hours.



They will be mine, oh yes, they will be mine

With these deep thoughts on my mind, and my arms straining under the burden of dense volumes, I paced the halls of the history department, chugging coffee as my Oxfords clicked across the floor. The time between sessions was counting down, and I had to make a decision. Presentations were starting as I ducked into the session chaired by Mark Folse.




Panel Five: Session E2, Kelsey Power, Joy Carter, and Heather Haley, with comment by Lori Bogle.

Kelsey was presenting on the subject of how class shaped identity amongst POWs during the Napoleonic War. Officers captured during the war were sent to the Verdun Citadelle where they were treated relatively well, their class consciousness as gentlemen being generally respected. The overthrow of traditional 18th century European class norms during the French Revolution made Royal Navy officer POWs more liable for exploitation, and they were thereafter routinely subjected to search and seizure, including confiscation of their personal goods (and money). The prisoners in response utilized creative methods to hide their valuables, and were not unknown to have employed cross-dressing to orchestrate escape attempts.


The Verdun Citadelle today

Heather’s presentation focused on the case of Ensign Vernon Berg, who was discharged from the Navy over a homosexual scandal aboard USS Little Rock. Berg later successfully sued the Navy for unfair dismissal in a landmark legal case. Heather’s presentation focused on the Cold War cultural mentality in the navy during and after the Eisenhower era, when a particular version of masculinity was codified in which homosexuality was perceived as deviant and threatening. Perceptions of homosexuality changed over time, being perceived during the 1970s primarily as a psychiatric issue effecting the “character” of the naval officer in question. Modernization, manpower retention policies, and legal challenges such as those pursued by Ensign Berg eventually mandated greater tolerance for homosexuality towards the end of the Cold War.


E. Lawrence Gibson’s book about Berg’s legal suit.

Joy’s presentation surveyed her career as a civilian hydrographer, contracted by the navy to conduct spot hydrographic surveys in what were invariably future combat zones, including Somalia and Kuwait during the 1990s. This was a very revealing presentation that apparently did not involve the CIA, although it certainly could have, and demonstrated an immense blindspot in the land power approach to naval operations that often seems to dominate US Navy doctrine. The United States Hydrographic Office, originally a part of the Navy, was transferred to the Department of Defense in 1949, and then abolished and replaced by the Naval Oceanographic Office in July 1962. I was not entirely surprised that the USN had been terribly short-changed by these events, leaving Defence Department civilians to manage the essential hydrographic mapping functions, alongside competitor mapping agencies such as the National Geospatial Agency, formed out of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in November 2003. The result of this bureaucratic centralization was that the USN routinely encountered scenarios for which it was woefully unprepared, notably for example during the rushed planning of the 1983 Grenada operation (Urgent Fury), during which nobody knew how dangerous the condition of the shoals were around Grenada. The resulting “just in time” reliance on civilians proved inadequate during the numerous littoral and special operations forces missions that followed 2001 as part of the War on Terror. The lesson that Joy’s experience emphasized is that the unglamorous and often dangerous work of hydrographic study is critical to naval operations and good order at sea, and is ignored at the peril of land powers with significant navies.


It was time for lunch, and I had to check in with my panel prior to our session.


The weather was gorgeous and hot as we marched down to Dahlgren Hall, where a free pizza lunch was being provided in part by the International Maritime History Association. Comically, we started off eating the wrong free pizzas (which had been provided to a different group), an error we only discovered after having munched our way through at least several pizzas. After resolution of this SNAFU, I spent most of lunch discussing Admiral Jellicoe’s empire mission of 1919-21 with Tim Moots, the two American Barbary conflicts, 1802-05 and 1815 with Abby Mullen, and amphibious capabilities within the Royal Marines with John Bolt. I encouraged a USNA midshipman, and history major, to utilize his written work on social media, say, in a blog format similar to this one, so as to establish a good foundation with the historical research he was doing – being very interested, as he explained, in comparative combat cultures in the ancient world.

At last it was time for my panel, so I hurried back to Mahan Hall.


Panel Six, Session F7, Chaired by Tim Benbow, presenters Alex Howlett, David McMeekin and Nicolas Blackman.

I recorded my presentation on naval aviation development with the Grand Fleet, visible here, also available in long form. I was impressed to see the room packed with midshipmen, giving me the impression someone had instructed them to write a report on my presentation – a belief that was reinforced as most of the cadets excused themselves from the room immediately after I finished presenting. Unfortunately for them, this meant that they missed the excellent work of my colleagues.


Converted escort carrier HMS Audacity

David discussed the introduction of the escort carrier as a trade defense measure in Britain and the US, ultimately a wildly successful measure for convoy protection and anti-submarine warfare that is not as well recognized today as it really should be. David related the Royal Navy’s ongoing interest in naval aviation for a number of roles, citing the significant Holland report of September 1938. Ultimately, no surprise from my perspective, the Royal Navy fully endorsed naval aviation for trade protection, despite ministerial opposition criticizing the conversion of merchant ships to escort carriers – fallacies that had in fact been employed before, during the First World War.


Cierva C30 autogyro

Nick described the development of the helicopter, a slow evolution of the non-rigid airship and catapult amphibian aircraft utilized by the Navy from 1915 to the 1920s, and beyond. Surprisingly, the Spanish were ahead of the technological curve in terms of helicopter development, the Cierva C30 autogyro being licence built by a number of countries during the 1930s, including the Cierva Autogiro Company established by the British. Weir and Hafner models followed, eventually succeeded during the Second World War by the very successful American firm of Sikorsky.

There was only time for one more panel, and I knew I wanted to catch the powerhouse session on British naval technology, covering the hundred years between 1860 and 1960.


Panel Seven: Session G5, chaired by Jesse Tumblin, featuring John Beeler, Duncan Redford and Tim Benbow, with comment by Matthew Seligmann.

John’s paper focused on late 19th century Royal Navy strategy and the network interplay between senior Admiralty personnel, notably Sir John Fisher, and newspaper and literary critics including W. T. Stead and Spencer Wilkinson, who were collectively responsible for shaping public opinion and swaying Admiralty decision making. The Clausewitzian tripod was in full display, actually a recurring theme throughout the conference, I began to notice: strategic principles, once articulated, could be forgotten, obscured, or indeed reinforced in the minds of the public, by skillful use of media to create false realities, invasion scares, or jingoism.


Duncan’s presentation precisely addressed these themes, examining the air power mania that swept Britain after the creation of the Air Ministry in January 1918. Invasion rhetoric drummed up by the Daily Mail, combined with total war predictions about the utility of bombing within the Royal Air Force, stressed the future of the Empire as an aerial entity, with imperial defence increasingly the responsibility of a vast air establishment, sidelining the Royal Navy. After the Washington Treaty of 1923 the future of the Empire as a seapower was in question, with the RAF’s own bombing rhetoric – magnified by the Northcliffe and Beaverbrook press – coming to dominate predictions about the future war.


Press baron Alfred Harmsworth, Lord Northcliffe, perhaps the greatest exponent of air power in Britain until his death in 1922.

Tim Benbow had the honor of closing out the panel, tackling in his presentation the thorny question of the role of the battleship after the Second World War. Beyond simply weapons systems, battleships were forms of naval diplomacy, and also aspects of national prestige, important cultural aspects of naval power that were often overlooked in the functionalist nuclear age. Increasing skepticism about nuclear warfare after 1945 began to emphasize the need to fight “broken backed” warfare – that is, in the post-attack environment – wherein survivability would be the preeminent currency, something the battleship retained well into the second half of the 20th century. The belief that the Air Ministry had become the final imperial institution was challenged, if the Cold War remained cold, and in fact the limited war concept offered by the Royal Navy became more important during the nuclear stalemate, not less.


HMS Vanguard, the Royal Navy’s last battleship

Matthew Seligmann’s comments extrapolated the central questions of the panel and indeed the entire conference to a certain extent: what will the future of naval war be like? Can deterrence continue to function amidst increasing uncertainty? What will the technology of the future mean for naval strategy? Political and fiscal reality had to be matched with the proper technological timing, otherwise organizations trying to introduce revolutionary technology could very well end up fighting themselves, sister services, or their own governments (and treasuries), more than any foreign enemy. The only protection against misguided strategic theorization is careful study of the fundamentals, coupled with a resourceful but historically grounded imagination.


The conference wraps up, two years of hard work and preparation producing a compelling two days of insight.


Reflections on the 2017 McMullen Naval History Symposium


This year’s biennial McMullen Naval History Symposium, hosted by the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, was a total success. This world-class conference featured a plethora of fascinating panels on subjects ranging from contemporary Canadian naval policy to Julius Caesar’s appreciation of naval power. As always, with a conference of this scale involving hundreds of historians and participants, any one person is only able to see a fraction of the total panels, so individual experience does matter. The conference was not generally digitized, thus, reflections from the participants provide the only method for intersubjectively preserving the experience itself, and there have already been (David Morgan-Owen) several (Trent Hone) contributions (Matthew Eng) in that regard.

The conference was organized by the vigilant Commander Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong, one of the “New Young Turks” relentlessly in pursuit of greater historical appreciation amongst the cadets and midshipmen of the growing United States Navy, not to mention a senior editor with the all-star blog, War on the Rocks. The major themes at this years conference were the First World War (naturally enough considering the centenary), global and imperial history, seapower in the Age of Sail, the Asian and the Pacific theatres, the Second World War, naval education, and the evolution of naval technology in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Day One: September 14, 2017


From left to right: Panel Chair John Beeler, Louis Halewood, Alex Howlett, and David Kohnen (photo credit, Tim Choi)

I was a presenter on one of the first panels, along with Louis Halewood and David Kohnen. My paper on the Royal Naval Air Service and the development of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 1917-1918, examined the impact of changing administration during wartime, and the organizational learning that took place in an unprecedented and high-technology environment. Louis Halewood described his research on the development of the Anglo-American theory of geostrategy, raising the prospect of the pre-1914 “Imperial Superstate” concept, notably diagnosed by historians such as Carroll Quigley, and Ramsay Muir. Louis Halewood introduced the influential work of luminaries such as Hartford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, Spencer Wilkinson, and Lord Milner, theorists of naval and military power, strategy and imperial defence, who would all reappear with regularity in the politically charged panels and discussions to follow. Ultimately, the unity of the Wilsonian Anglo-American alliance broke down in the interwar period, in no small measure due to the challenge to British naval supremacy from the United States, in the process destroying the Anglo-Japanese alliance, with profound implications for Britain’s role in the Second World War.

David Kohnen discussed his research on the Knox-Pye-King report, a significant paper published in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings in 1920, bringing to the US Navy (USN) the strategic focus which had been raised in the British school, in particular, by the pre-war historians John Laughton, Julian Corbett, and Captain Herbert Richmond. Captains Ernie King, Dudley Knox and William Pye had been influenced by the irresistible force of Admiral William Sims, one of the significant contributors to the argument in favour of introducing trans-Atlantic convoys, a deciding factor in the victory over the U-boats in 1917-1918. David Kohnen argued that the modern USN had a worrying predilection for defaulting to technological dogma, with the result of the Navy utilizing the acronym saturated language of the Defense Department to stress uncritical “warfighting” instead of historical engagement and peacekeeping as the basis for doctrine.


Right to left: Panel chair Caitlin Gale, presenters Anna Brinkman, David Morgan-Owen, Paul Ramsey, and commentator Andrew Lambert (photo credit, Tim Choi)

With turn of the century grand strategy on my mind, I moved to the panel specifically examining British foreign policy, with the first paper given by Anna Brinkman (of Imperial Entanglements fame), on Britain’s strategy for managing Spain during the Seven Years War, a complex subject that relied on the interaction between significant stakeholders, Britain and Spain’s differing conceptions of the law of the sea, and the emerging balance of power in Europe. David Morgan-Owen, the brains behind the Defence-in-Depth blog, next brought the discussion into the 19th and 20th centuries by examining Britain’s evolving European and global situation, a subject that hinges on the the sticky topic of imperial and homeland defence, explored further in David’s new book. The creation of the Committee for Imperial Defence by Prime Minister Arthur Balfour in 1902 was a watershed moment, ultimately leading to the development of conflicting army and naval strategies during the government of Herbert Asquith. Lastly, Paul Ramsey examined Spenser Wilkinson’s debate with historian Julian Corbett about the proper relation of Britain’s foreign and military policy to national strategy, a historically and politically charged sparring played out in the popular press. Professor Andrew Lambert, who was the panel commentator, observed the intricate connections between the papers, with Corbett, a scholar of the Seven Years War and Russo-Japanese War, visualizing Britain’s naval role as a component of an integrated system that only made sense once the land dynamic, with a debt to Clausewitz and Jomini, was integrated.


Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson announces the winners of the CNO’s inaugural Naval History Essay Contest (photo credit, Tim Choi)

With this auspicious start, the conference was on a sound footing. I enjoyed lunch in the beautiful Bo Coppedge Room, at the Alumni Hall, where I had an enjoyable conversation with a young officer and naval scholar on the fascinating subjects of Athens versus Sparta, US Marine Corps culture, and the recent Graham Allison book, The Thucydides Trap, concerning the possibility of American conflict with China in the 21st century. I was impressed with the student’s insight, candor, and breadth of knowledge, all of which I found refreshing (as was the key-lime cheesecake). Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson then presented the awards to the winners of the inaugural Naval History Essay Contest, which promised to raise the bar for scholarly research amongst historians and practitioners alike.

After lunch we headed to the final panel for the first day, again focused on British naval policy in the 19th century. By this point the conference was beginning to resemble a choose your own type of adventure. This was both an advantage and disadvantage of the conference’s scale and international reach. Breaking out of my own area of interest was certainly possible, with simultaneous panels taking place on American, South American, and Second World War naval history, all of which would have been fascinating to attend, if not especially related to my research focus. The conference organizers did the attendees a service by arranging the panels in such a manner that overlap was minimal and it was a fairly straightforward process to figure out which panel was the best choice for my own preferences.

This panel was chaired by John Mitcham, and the first paper was presented by John Beeler, the editor of the Navy Record Society’s Milne papers, on the subject of the Liberal party’s naval policy during the late 19th century. Beeler, who literally wrote the book on the subject, argued that the questionable choices of the Liberal party in terms of naval policy were an indication of a lack of clear strategic thinking, compared to Salisbury’s vision. The nuances of the political situation was emphasized by Peter Keeling, who followed this thread by specifically expanding on the Liberal party’s 1889 Naval Defence Act with original research that examined who voted for and against the Act, and why. Presenting the last paper of the day, Rebecca Matzke, in a fascinating paper reminiscent of the work of Michael Neiberg, discussed the efforts of British propagandists to influence American public perception of the Royal Navy’s war effort, in particular, as it related to the Royal Navy’s blockade and Germany’s counter-blockade (the unrestricted U-boat campaign). Taken together, this panel explored the interrelation of optics, how public support is galvanized by policymakers and NGOs, and the realities of budgetary and geostrategic constraints, firmly recognizing that military policy is never formed in a vacuum, and more often than not, is the result of a complex patchwork of influence.


James Goldrick delivers the 2017 McMullen Sea Power address in Mahan Hall, (photo credit, Tim Choi)

Thus we adjourned for day one. The next event was the McMullen Sea Power address to be held later that evening in the appropriately named Mahan Hall. Taking advantage of the warm evening air while moving between buildings, I stopped the always approachable James Goldrick for a brief discussion that touched on wide-ranging concepts such as Britain’s anti-submarine defence in the First World War, Germany’s strategic bombing campaigns in two world wars, and the origins of aircraft carrier strike doctrine. I was impressed as always by Professor Goldrick’s erudition. In this spirit of historical reflection, the conference participants made their way over to the fantastic US Naval Academy Museum. After touring amongst the excellent warship models and artifact displays, discussing defence policy with friends, I was stunned into a moment of clarity by news which spread like fire between the attendees that North Korea had launched yet another long-range missile, dramatically bringing home the importance of the subjects we had discussed, in otherwise academic detachment, throughout the day.

Not much more than an hour later I was sitting on the balcony of Mahan Hall watching Rear-Admiral (retired) Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy, deliver the formal 2017 Sea Power address. Professor Goldrick delivered his keynote directly to the young midshipmen sitting across from me on both wings of the balcony, and strove to reconcile the need for thorough professionalism within military education, transcending technological determinism, while also avoiding the other end of the spectrum, ivory tower detachment, a synthesis rare enough amongst long-time scholars yet also essential to the future of service culture: the next generation of young scholar-officers.

Day Two: September 15, 2017


From left to right: Trent Hone, Wes Hammond, and John Miller, USN.

With three excellent panels on Anglo-American and imperial naval history behind me, I decided to start off day two on a slightly different tact. There would be four panels to see, and I felt it was time to broaden the discussion by revisiting some areas of interest from my previous academic work. Easing into things I visited the panel highlighting some of the winners of the CNO’s essay contest, starting with Trent Hone’s analysis of operational learning by the USN at Guadalcanal in 1942. Hone argued that the Navy, with a strong foundation in historical education and doctrine, derived from the inter-war period and First World War, was well situated to adapt to operational disasters such as the Battle of Savo Island, enabling the Navy to reverse-course and ultimately out think the Imperial Japanese Navy. Lieutenant John Miller then read his case-study analysis of training failure, notably looking at the USS Stark, USS Panay, and USS Chesapeake incidents, concluding that readiness can only be achieved by a thorough understanding of not only ship and crew capability, but also, significantly, environmental awareness, the multifaceted elements of which can only be mastered through carefully cultivated experience and preparation, frequently missing in a high-tempo, rapid deployment situation. Wes Hammond then expanded on this subject by observing the importance of mobile basing, stressing the element of fleet logistics, repair and salvage, upon which all other elements are reliant. An important theme uniting these papers, explored in the panel discussion, was the recognition that contemporary naval affairs are defined by questions with historical antecedents. The notion of having, “been here before” was startling, and a clear reminder of the importance of historical investigation prior to framing naval policy.


From left to right: Dr. Nicholas Lambert, Alan Anderson, James Smith and G. H. Bennet

The fifth panel was chaired by the Naval Academy’s own Dr. Nicholas Lambert and featured papers by G. H. Bennet, Alan Anderson and James Smith. This panel took a sweeping look at the Admiralty as a political and educational organization in the 20th century. Plymouth University’s Bennet presented on the unique subject of ship and naval station libraries, a critical component in naval education that at first glance might appear parochial, yet, like many of the papers presented, once explored in detail provided rich insight. Bennet’s research explored the organic knowledge networks that developed aboard ships as crew and officers traded and circulated books, while providing a warning evidenced by the decline of these networks during the transformation of the Royal Navy as budgets tightened in the 20th century. Alan Anderson followed up by examining the seemingly bizarre decision of the Admiralty to promulgate the Declaration of London in 1909, and the implications this would have for Britain’s blockade strategy in 1914. Anderson, who has been critical of Nicholas Lambert’s work on British blockade theory, argued that in fact the Admiralty gained significant concessions from the Declaration, notably including affirmations on the illegality of shipping “absolute contraband” in times of war, while simultaneously shoring up neutral shipping rights, essential components of the Royal Navy’s historical mission as safeguard of the seas. James Smith (of the Seapower Thinker blog) built upon these papers with his criticism of the introduction of the Ministry of Defence by the Earl Mountbatten, who was Chief of the Defence staff for six years, starting in July 1959. Smith argued that Mountbatten’s personal ambitions led him to undermine Britain’s traditional maritime focus, relegating the senior service to equality with the RAF and Army, thus stripping the Navy of its institutional power, which had been carefully built up over hundreds of years.


The Battle of Virginia Capes, 1781

Controversy continued to abound in the two finals panels, both of which I attended out of interest. The first was focused on the Battle of Virginia Capes, 5 September 1781, and second on Japanese naval policy in the 20th century. This was a trip back in time for me, as I had previously written my Masters thesis on the culminating naval battle of the American Revolution, as well as my undergraduate thesis on the only decisive naval battle of the ironclad age, the Battle of Tsushima, 27 May 1905. The first of these panels was known colloquially as the Naval War College panel, featuring papers drawn entirely from that fine institution. Chaired by the College’s John Hattendorf, James Holmes presented the first paper, an insightful strategic analysis of Britain’s naval policy during the Revolutionary War. Holmes argued that Admiralty decision-making ultimately led to the abandonment of the American colonies in favour of protecting the more profitable imperial territories in the Caribbean and India, and seen from the perspective of grand strategy, was reflective of the concept of “antifragility” which helped to explain the Admiralty’s thinking. Holmes provided a broad framework that was then detailed by Jim McIntyre’s paper, examining the egodocuments of Hessian mercenary Johann Ewald, who witnessed the siege of Yorktown. The presentation of Stanley Carpenter flowed naturally from this point, providing a thorough analysis of the Royal Navy’s tactics at the Battle of the Capes itself, with particular attention to the Graves-Hood controversy that emerged. I was pleased to see, eight years after completing my thesis on the subject, Lord Hood receiving the criticism he rightly deserves for failing to bring battle decisively against the Comte de Grasse’s fleet when ordered so by Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves. The discussion after this panel was particularly insightful, with John Hattendorf moderating a lively debate about the vagaries of timing, strategic movements, and the many “mistakes” made, for example, by Lord Cornwallis, who should have known better than to allow his Carolina offensive to become locked up in a position from which the only possible escape was by sea.


Dr. Alessio Patalano presenting on Japan’s Cold War submarine policy, (photo credit: Tim Choi)

The final panel I attended was presented by Andrew Blackley, covering the lessons of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, in particular the Battle of the Yalu, followed by presentations from Masashi Kurarni, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, looking at the Japanese contribution to the Mediterranean in 1917, and finally, by Alessio Patalano, who introduced the Self Defense Force’s submarine policy during the early Cold War. Andrew Blackley argued that Japan’s naval doctrine of rapid-fire close attack proved decisive in two major naval wars, indeed, demonstrating significant flexibility when faced with technical faults or warship losses. Flexibility was further indicated by Masashi Kurarni’s paper, showcasing Japan’s significant international alliance contribution to the anti-submarine war in 1917-1918, providing insight into the under-examined U-boat campaign in the Mediterranean. In keeping with these themes, Alessio Patalano presented the final paper, kindly aware of his duty to move quickly prior to the conference’s conclusion. Patalano observed that Japan’s strategy of core-competency paid dividends when the submarine began to take on a more significant role in Japan’s defence planning. The JMSDF was able to retain capability despite political, budgetary, and strategic transformation on an unprecedented scale.

The conference concluded back at the official symposium hotel where the 2017 Knox Awards Banquet was held, during which Dr. Edward J. Marolda, Commander Paul Stillwell and Dr. Jon T. Sumida were presented with Lifetime Achievement Awards for their stellar and dedicated contributions to naval history.

In conclusion, I was struck by the inspiring collegiality of this professional, academic conference. It serves the historians well to leave their monk-like confines to engage with the free-flow of ideas that historical symposiums inculcate. Between the brilliant and inspiring papers it was a real pleasure to be included in debate that frequently involved world-class subject experts and naval practitioners. In short, this was a transformative experience I highly recommend to anyone considering attending the next Symposium in 2019.


Bunker Hill, 17 June 1775: Amphibious and Infantry operations

Bunker Hill: Amphibious and Infantry operations


The Seven Years War ended with Britain ascendant in North America. Almost immediately, difficulties arose in administering this vast territory. Economic factors necessitated reform: in 1750 the population of British North America was 1.2 million, nearly doubling to 2.3 million in 1770.[i] New England’s growing population had outstripped its domestic wheat production. In 1763, Britain’s national debt totaled £130 million. Military costs in American spiraled, from £70,000 annually in 1748, to £350,000 at the close of the Seven Years War.[ii]


America at the end of the Seven Years War, 1763.[iii]

To offset these costs the Grenville government reformed Britain’s policy on trade control with the American colonies. The steady rise in Royal taxation and duties on British imports following the Treaty of Paris (1763), was reflected in the expansion of the Molasses Act (1733) as the Sugar Act of 1764,[iv] which included restrictions on shipping in an effort to limit smuggling.[v] The unpopular Stamp Act and Quartering Act of 1765 followed shortly. The Stamp Act, expected to generate £100,000 towards offsetting defence costs, was passed in addition to a battery of subsidies and other reforms aimed at stimulating trade between Britain and the colonies.[vi] Defence spending was cut, starting with the naval estimate, which declined from £2.8 million in 1766 to £1.5 million in 1768.[vii]

American boycotts on imports, as a result of the Stamp Act, led to the ascension of the Rockingham government. The Stamp Act was repealed, and replaced, by the Declaratory Act in March 1766.[viii] Next, Chancellor of the Exchequer Charles Townshend’s Acts of 1768 made modifications to the duties on paper, glass and tea, and was expected to generate £40,000 a year.[ix] Captured smugglers were made liable for seizure of property, including their ships. This situation was not acceptable to the wealthy Bostonian merchant class, amongst their supporters men such as John Hancock (whale oil, tea, Madeira) and Samuel Adams (heir to a brewing establishment).[x] Adams and James Otis circulated a letter in opposition to parliamentary taxation early in 1768.[xi] In the summer of 1768, General Thomas Gage was forced to dispatch troops to Boston from Halifax to maintain order.[xii]

Boston, population 16,000 in 1775, was the significant port in Massachusetts, the third largest port on the North Atlantic seaboard after New York and Philadelphia.[xiii] Boston was a center for opposition to the British colonial government. By 1775 there appeared a significant group of urban poor: Boston’s poor relief costs had quadrupled since 1740 and its population was no longer growing.[xiv] In 1771 the top 10% of Bostonians in the merchant and professional classes owned 60% of the city’s wealth.[xv]

The Sons of Liberty society, formed in Boston and New York, was opposed to the expansion of British economic and naval intervention in American trade.[xvi] There was a vested interest in maintaining New England’s laissez-faire status: while in 1763 “the average Briton paid 26 shillings” per annum in taxes, the equivalent for Massachusetts taxpayers was only one shilling.[xvii] Indeed, the New Englanders represented one of the wealthiest societies in the world at the time. Bootleggers out of Boston, Newport and New York continued to make a killing trading corn, cattle, lumber and codfish for sugar, rum and molasses, in the French West Indies.[xviii]


Paul Revere’s engraving of two regiments of British troops unloading at Boston in 1768.[xix]

Bostonians continued to protest the expansion of British tariffs and trade restrictions, despite Lord North’s January 1770 reduction on duties for commodities other than tea.[xx] When harassed British soldiers opened fire on a crowd and were generally acquitted in the following inquiry- what became known as the Boston Massacre of March 1770- tensions ran high between the Boston garrison and the colonials.[xxi] Shortly thereafter, Benjamin Franklin wrote for the London Chronicle, in November 1770, stating, “the Parliament of Britain hath no right to raise revenue from them [the Colonies] without their consent”.[xxii] In 1772 the sloop Gaspee was burned by John Brown and followers, after the sloop ran aground while chasing merchant shipping near Providence, Rhode Island.[xxiii]

The Tea Act of 1773 attempted to foist surplus British East India Company tea off on the Atlantic colonies (ironically tea prices were deflated in part by an American boycott of the Townshend Acts), thus keeping prices low and diminishing smuggling revenue.[xxiv] In response, the Sons of Liberty, including John Hancock and Samuel Adams, organized the Boston Tea Party of 16 December 1773. 342 boxes of BEIC tea, valued at £15,000 were destroyed.[xxv] The resulting Port Act of March 1774, and second Quartering Act in June, essentially established military control over the port and the naval blockade of Boston, to remain in force until an indemnity was paid for the tea.[xxvi] General Thomas Gage was made emergency governor.[xxvii] While the British maintained control over Boston, the surrounding countryside was of questionable loyalty. On July 1st, in Boston, Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves arrived as C-in-C North American Squadron aboard HMS Preston, and accompanied by the 5th and 35th regiments.[xxviii]

 NPG 4070; Thomas Gage by Jeremiah Meyer

General Thomas Gage by Jeremiah Meyer, circa 1770s.[xxix]

The Quebec Act of 1774 closed the Canadian frontier to the American settlers, and recognized the right to Catholic practice by the French-Canadians, upsetting the anti-papist colonialists in New England.[xxx] The Massachusetts Government Act came into effect in August 1774 and provided George III with the authority to appoint the members of the formerly elected Massachusetts Governor’s Council. Pursuant to this act, Governor Thomas Gage dissolved the Provincial Assembly then meeting in Salem in October 1774.[xxxi] That same month he fortified his position in Boston.[xxxii] The concern was to secure Boston as a port of entry for the Army’s supplies.[xxxiii] Meanwhile, on 5 September 1774 the First Continental Congress was convened at Philadelphia, and in December of that year a group of Sons of Liberty supporters raided Forts William and Mary at Portsmouth, stealing cannon, muskets and powder.[xxxiv]

The former Provincial Assembly, now the Concord based Massachusetts Provincial Government, raised its own militia and was preparing to resist the British.[xxxv] The result was that in February 1775 Massachusetts was declared to be in a state of rebellion. Lord North issued the Conciliatory Resolution on 27 February 1775, granting duties payable directly to the colonies and parliamentary regulation on trade only, so long as the colonies agreed to pay something for defence.[xxxvi]

It was too little too late for the Americans. Local governments now began to supersede their imperial governors, starting with New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina.[xxxvii] Gage, in Boston, received secret orders around the middle of April 1775 to the effect that he was to “arrest and imprison the principal actors & abbettors” meaning the Provincial Congress then at Concord, and probably including Sam Adams and John Hancock then hiding in Lexintgon.[xxxviii] Gage was opposed to antagonizing the continentals, however, he suffered a disconnect with the government in London, which believed that a show of force would reduce the rebellion.[xxxix]


Map of Boston and countryside, showing route of British forces and Patriot messengers to Concord.[xl]

The operation meant to carry out these orders resulted in the first conflict between British forces and the colonial militia, on 19 April 1775: the battles of Concord and Lexington.[xli] British forces deployed from Boston with the objective of capturing suspected militia arms caches at Concord. Colonial messengers, including Paul Revere, were able to tip-off the militia, as well as Adams and Hancock, before the British arrived. Outnumbered, the colonial militia retreated from Lexington to Concord and then to the countryside. The regulars entered Concord shortly afterward and rounded up, and captured or destroyed, several hidden cannon, victuals, and supplies of powder and musket ball.[xlii]


British column enters Concord, 19 April 1775.[xliii]

            The militia reformed outside Concord, and backed by companies of Minutemen, were able to confront portions of the British force, inflicting casualties. Realizing that opposition was stiffening, and with the mission to search Concord complete, the British withdrew to Boston. Harassed and ambushed along the way by an increasing numbers of colonials, the British were given an unmistakable message: the continentals were prepared to resist. 259 soldiers had been killed or wounded in the retreat from Concord.[xliv] The militia, now numbering over 10,000 men, moved to invest the British base at Boston, thus initiating the 11 month long Siege of Boston.[xlv]


Views of entrance to Boston Harbour. Boston, seen between Castle Williams and Governors Island, distant 4 miles. 1777 by J. F. W. Des Barres.[xlvi]


Charlestown in 1743.[xlvii]

The Siege

            With Boston under siege there was no going back. On 22 April, the Massachusetts shadow government called up 30,000 men.[xlviii] The Second Continental Congress convened on 10 May 1775, and the colonies continued to assemble their contingents through the summer. The British could draw only limited forces from their small standing army of 38,000.[xlix] Nevertheless, reinforcements arrived from Britain to supplement Gage’s small force of 3,000, including Generals Sir William Howe, John Burgoyne, and Henry Clinton; bringing the total force up to 8,000 regulars.[l]

 NPG D19390; William Howe, 5th Viscount Howe by Richard Purcell (Charles or Philip Corbutt), published by  John Morris

General William Howe, 5th Viscount Howe, by Richard Purcell, 10 May 1778.[li]

The American force, now numbering 20,000 men, had largely assembled around Boston, under the overall command of General Ward. A prisoner exchange took place on 6 June, and on the 12th Gage declared martial law, simultaneously offering a general pardon; Samuel Adams and John Hancock excepted.[lii]


View of Charlestown and the Charlestown Peninsula, 1775, showing the isthmus, Bunker Hill, Breed’s Hill and Moulton’s Point.[liii] Moulton’s Point rose only 35 feet above sea level, Breed’s hill was 75 feet in elevation, and Bunker Hill 110 feet, providing an unobstructed view of Boston.[liv]

The Second Continental Congress now authorized the American Continental Army and appointed George Washington as General and Commander-in-Chief on 15 June, his commission going through on the 17th.[lv] On 13 June at Ward’s HQ, Cambridge, information was received indicating that General Gage intended to take control of the Charlestown peninsula.[lvi] By June 15th it was known that Gage, at a council of war, had picked 18 June for the start of the Charlestown operation; and the Massachusetts authorities therefore deployed the Continental Army in preparation for a showdown.[lvii] The roster for the Continental detachment at Bunker Hill is here.[lviii]


Plan of Action for the Bunker Hill operation, by Lieut. Page of the Engineers, Major-General Howe’s Aide de Camp.[lix] Note location of “Bunker’s Hill” relative to Breed’s: reversed by Page.[lx]


The spoiling plan called for the occupation of Bunker Hill and the heights overlooking Charlestown, although, in the event, the central Breed’s Hill was selected. General Ward and General Warren, at Army HQ, were opposed to a heavy engagement. They knew the Continental Army was short on powder: the Army’s entire supply of powder amounted to 27 half barrels with another 36, “a present from Connecticut”.[lxi]


Regiments accounted at Cambridge HQ.[lxii]

General Israel Putnam commanded the division from which the American contingent that was to occupy the peninsula was drawn. Detachments from Massachusetts and Connecticut were selected, led by Colonel William Prescott and supported by Colonels Frye and Bridge.[lxiii] Captain Thomas Knowlton was attached with 200 Connecticut rangers. Support was provided by Colonel Richard Gridley, chief engineer, “with a company of artillery”- 49 men.[lxiv] The total force was at least 1,200 strong, carrying 24 hours of rations, and accompanied by all the entrenching tools in Cambridge.[lxv] Prescott’s orders were to fortify the Charleston peninsula, starting at Bunker Hill. He could expect support and fresh rations the following morning.[lxvi] As this contingent deployed it was joined by Major Brooks with more infantry and another company of artillery. Captain Nutting was dispatched with a small detachment of Connecticut men to investigate Charlestown, and Captain Maxwell of Prescott’s regiment was sent to patrol the shore and observe the Royal Navy warships in the Harbour.


Plan of Battle for Bunker Hill, Library of Congress[lxvii]

These ships were under the command of Vice-Admiral Samuel Graves:[lxviii] HMS Somerset, 68, (3rd rate, crew 520, built 1748) Captain Edward Le Cras; Cerberus, 36, (built 1770) Captain Chads; Glasgow, 24, (6th rate, 130 men, built 1757) Captain William Maltby; sloop Lively, 20 guns, 130 men, Captain Thomas Bishop; sloop Falcon, Captain Linzee; and the transport Symmetry with 18 or 20 nine-pounder guns, plus lesser gunboats and floating batteries.[lxix]

All afternoon on the 16th and morning on the 17th the Americans developed their entrenchments. By the morning of the 17th a small redoubt had been established on Breed’s Hill.[lxx]

The Battle

It was a hot day, with a light breeze blowing. The Continentals lacked water and were low on rations. At 9 am, HMS Lively, accompanied by Glasgow, as well as cannon from the shore batteries and howitzers from Copp’s hill, opened fire on the Continental positions.[lxxi] The Americans arranged a council of war: no reinforcements had arrived, and the British were evidently preparing to confront them.[lxxii] With rations running out, Major John Brooks was dispatched to HQ to report on the situation, where he arrived at 10 am. Along the way, Brooks passed General Putnam who was racing towards the Charlestown Heights to support Prescott with a detachment of one third of Colonel Stark’s regiment. Putnam arrived at the redoubt on horseback not long afterwards. Putnam’s orders were for the entrenching tools to be sent to the rear, with the exception for a group to start fortifying Bunker Hill, which had hitherto been ignored.[lxxiii]

At 11 am the rest of Stark’s regiment went in, along with Colonel Read’s fellow New Hampshire regiment.[lxxiv] Detachments from Colonels Brewer, Nixon, Woodbridge, and Major Moore followed. Little, Whitcomb, and Lt. Col. Buckminster made appearances with more handfuls of men. [lxxv] Joseph Warren now arrived, serving under Prescott, and encouraging the defenders of the redoubt. Ward continued to feed reinforcements to the heights throughout the day, however, for the duration of the battle there were no more than 1,400 Americans and their 6 guns on the field. In addition to the shortages of powder, the urgency of the situation revealed weaknesses at Army HQ: critical was a shortage of adequate horses for the purpose of message dispatch.[lxxvi]


Plan of Charlestown peninsula, showing Battle of Bunker Hill, produced in 1775.[lxxvii]


            Meanwhile, Gage called a council of war and the plan of operations was rushed to decision. Clinton and the majority of the council favoured a deployment at the isthmus. Gage opposed this on the concern that it would place the British detachment between two armies; Prescott’s detachment and Ward. Gage favoured a frontal attack, and issued orders to that effect at 10 am.[lxxviii] This deployment has generally been regarded as a mistake: not only did it force a frontal assault of the Continental positions, but to compound errors, it left the Continentals free to reinforce, or withdraw, through the isthmus. Furthermore, General Putnam, in overall command of the division to which Prescott was attached, had failed to fortify Prospect Hill north of the isthmus, and did not do so until 18 June. Thus, had the British deployed to the neck of the peninsula, Prescott would have found his detachment cut off from Ward, running low on rations, and dangerously exposed to the guns of the Royal Navy.[lxxix]


Amphibious movements

The British intended to warp HMS Somerset closer to the shore to better place the ship for fire support, but, due to the shallow waters, only the frigates, sloops and gunboats could close to provide direct support. HMS Glasgow and the transport schooner Symmetry directed fire against the Charlestown isthmus. Colonel James, Royal Artillery, with two boats equipped with 12 pounder cannon, supported the warships.[lxxx] Meanwhile, HMS Lively, Falcon, and the gunboat, Spitfire, “anchored abreast of… Charlestown, covered the landing of troops, and kept up a well-directed fire”.[lxxxi]

The base of Breed’s Hill was swept with naval fire as the regulars embarked. Gage dispatched ten companies of Grenadiers, ten companies of light-infantry, along with the 5th, 38th, 43rd, and 52nd regiments.[lxxxii] The British disembarked their force of 2,200 men at Charlestown point and took up position on Moulton’s Hill.


Array of American forces for the Battle of Bunker Hill.[lxxxiii]

By about 1 pm, Colonel Prescott could see that the British were deploying towards Mystic River and Charlestown with the intention of flanking the Continental positions by going around the redoubt. He thus dispatched Captain Knowlton with 400 men and two cannon to form works nearer the base of the Bunker Hill, thus cutting off the flanking efforts.[lxxxiv] Knowlton was soon supported by the New Hampshire detachments of Colonels Stark and Reed, together forming a line 900 feet long. Likewise, Captain Nutting was recalled from Charlestown to cover the redoubt’s south flank.

Between 1 and 2pm, General Clinton received orders to deploy from Boston with his detachment from the 47th regiment, plus 400 marines from the first battalion, and additional companies of Light Infantry and Grenadiers.[lxxxv]



Battle of Bunker Hill by E. Percy Moran, 1909.[lxxxvi]

            At 3 pm the British forces began their attack with a cannonade from their positions on Moulton’s, followed by an advance by the first two lines.[lxxxvii] General Pigot, with the 28th, 43rd, 47th, 52nd Regiments and Major Pitcairn’s marines, was ordered to take the redoubt on the left while Howe would take the main emplacements on the right. The light-infantry were dispatched to flank along the Mystic.[lxxxviii] The frontal attack was made by the Grenadiers and the 5th and 52nd regiments.[lxxxix] The British reached the Continental lines at about 3:30.

            The Americans held fire until the regulars closed to within musket shot, and then unleashed a withering fire that broke the advance of the British. A brief fire-fight ensued, and the British retreated back to their positions at the base of the hill.[xc]

Admiral Graves, alleged to have gone ashore with Howe, at this point inquired if the destruction of Charlestown would be useful in reducing the harassing fire on the left wing.[xci] Howe agreed, and the order was given to fire red-hot shot into the town, while a group of marines from HMS Somerset landed with torches.[xcii] The destruction of Charlestown produced a prodigious quantity of smoke, however, prevailing winds carried the smoke away from the battlefield.


The Battle at Bunker’s Hill by Henry A. Thomas, Circa 1875. Showing the British landings and positions, Charlestown in flames, and HMS Somerset at left.[xciii]

Howe rallied his force and led another assault, the British firing as they went in.[xciv] The line was again held, the Regulars mowed down by the accurate fire of the Americans, although not without loss: “Colonels Brewer, Nixon, and Buckminster were wounded, and Major Moore was mortally wounded.”[xcv] British casualties at this point were over 500 in number.[xcvi] Two of Howe’s aides had been shot.


View of the Attack on Bunker’s Hill, with the Burning of Charles Town. June 17th 1775. Circa 1783, Engraved for Barnard’s New Complete & Authentic History of England.[xcvii]

The supporting naval vessels intensified their fire, torching Charlestown. The fleet developed an intense cannonade of “bombs, chain-shot, ring-shot, and double-headed shot” and was able to clear some of Continental forces from the Breed’s Hill redoubt, likewise destroying some of the Continental positions along the fence-line.[xcviii] In preparation for a third charge, Pigot marshaled elements of the 5th, 38th, 43rd, and 52nd Regiments and returned to attack the redoubt. Clinton was by now in position to reinforce, and Howe ordered a general bayonet charge, this time concentrated against the redoubt.


            The Battle of Bunker Hill, by Howard Pyle. 1897. Published by Scribner’s Magazine in February 1898.[xcix]


General Gardner presently arrived at the American lines with 300 men, and was put to task under General Putnam until Gardner was badly wounded. The Continentals were now desperately short on ammunition and lacked bayonets.[c]

The British final effort began between 4 and 5 pm. The regulars advanced under the cover of naval fire and field guns, then received musket fire at close range until the Continentals exhausted their ammunition and began to throw rocks.[ci] The regulars then stormed the American positions with the bayonet, starting with the redoubt, where Major Pitcairn of the marines was killed. Inside the redoubt, Colonel Prescott drew his sword and engaged in hand-to-hand combat, before escaping- but Joseph Warren was killed.[cii] All along the line the Continentals retreated with munitions exhausted. HMS Glasgow, along with the floating batteries stationed in Charles River, swept the retreating Continentals with cannon and grape shot.[ciii] By 5pm the peninsula was under Howe’s control. General Putnam tried to rally the Continentals as they fell back across the isthmus- they were too disorganized and depleted to continue- and thus they regrouped at Prospect Hill.[civ]


John Trumbull’s iconic Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker’s Hill; painted in 1786.[cv]



Table showing American casualties.[cvi]


            441 continental soldiers had been killed, wounded or captured. 5 artillery pieces were lost.[cvii] Doctor Joseph Warren, General, Son of Liberty, Mason, had been killed.

           1,054 British soldiers and officers had been killed or wounded: 19 officers killed, 70 wounded, 207 soldiers killed, 304 wounded. [cviii] Gage gave these figures: “1 lieutenant colonel, 2 majors, 7 captains, 9 lieutenants, 15 sergeants, 1 drummer, 191 rank and file killed – 3 majors, 27 captains, 32 lieutenants, 8 ensigns, 40 sergeants, 12 drummers, 706 rank and file wounded.”[cix] Heavily outnumbered by the Continental Army, these were losses the British could ill afford. It was the beginning of the end for Gage’s command; Howe replaced him in October.[cx]



Washington takes command of the American Army at Cambridge, 1775.[cxi]

On 21 June, Washington left Philadelphia and headed for Boston where he assumed command on 3 July 1775.[cxii] In July 1775 the Continental Congress issued John Dickinson’s Olive Branch Petition, and Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms circular, aimed at a reconciliation settlement. The King did not seriously consider the offer.[cxiii] That August in London, George Germain replaced Dartmouth as colonial secretary.[cxiv] In February 1776, in Philadelphia, Thomas Paine anonymously published his Common Sense pamphlet.[cxv] H. H. Brackenridge’s heroic dramatization of the Battle of Bunker Hill appeared the same year.[cxvi]


Boston and the surrounding countryside, showing remains of Charlestown, and the location of the American and British commands after June 1775.[cxvii]

Charlestown was reduced to ruin. The heights had been secured, but it was a temporary solution. The battle did not break the siege of the Boston peninsula, nor did it completely secure the heights from Continental attack. Although the British held the captured redoubt atop Breed’s Hill with a small garrison, eventually the Continental Army moved in enough artillery to generate a crisis. On 17 March 1776, Howe was forced to abandon Boston, and he withdrew his army of 9,000 by sea to Halifax.[cxviii]

            In May 1776 British intelligence became aware that France planned to support the American revolutionaries with military aid.[cxix]


The Continental Congress votes Independence, July 2, 1776.[cxx]

In the autumn of 1776, General Howe deployed from Halifax with 23,000 men and bested Washington at New York, forcing the latter to withdraw to avoid encirclement.[cxxi] Washington won minor victories and Trenton and Princeton at the end of 1776. By July 1777, Howe confided in General Henry Clinton that he expected the war to last for another year, at least.[cxxii] The Royal Navy was to commence full mobilization in August 1777. In November, General Howe issued a general pardon to all rebels who “surrendered and reaffirmed their allegiance to George III.”[cxxiii] The month before, however, the 1777 campaign came to its distressing close with Burgoyne’s surrender of over 5,000 regulars at Saratoga to General Horatio Gates.[cxxiv] In February 1778, Louis XVI entered alliance with the Colonies, followed by Spain in 1779.

The Naval situation for Britain now became critical. In 1778 the Royal Navy possessed 117 ships of the line to France’s 59 and Spain’s 64. By 1779 France could marshal about 80 of the line.[cxxv] With 63 of the line massed in the channel, against only 57 for the Royal Navy, the combined Continental force blockaded Plymouth and threatened England with invasion.[cxxvi]


Battle of Bunker Hill and Subsequent Campaigns.[cxxvii]

Clinton, who had replaced Howe as C-in-C, now deployed to Savannah as part of Germain’s southern strategy, capturing it in December 1778. Charleston fell in May 1780.[cxxviii] By 1780 the cost of supplying the war in America was consuming £12 million a year (12.5% of the national income).[cxxix]


A Tuscan pillar was placed atop Breed’s Hill, to commemorate the spot where Joseph Warren was killed. Seen here in 1818.[cxxx]


Boston bird’s-eye view from the north. J. Bachman, 1877.[cxxxi]

Enlarged Joseph Warren monument of 1842 visible.


Today: the monument on Breed’s hill, with USS Constitution, 44 (1794).[cxxxii]



[i] Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2004)., p. 71 note

[ii] J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo, vol. 2, 3 vols. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1955)., p. 272


[iv] Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2004)., p. 306-7

[v]; George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, American: A Narrative History, 6th ed., vol. 1 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004). p. 193; Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power., p. 72; Herman, To Rule the Waves., p. 307

[vi] Ramsay Muir, A Shorty History of the British Commonwealth, 3rd ed., vol. 2, 2 vols. (London: George Philip & Son, Ltd., 1924)., p. 43

[vii] Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946)., p. 141; Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Humanity Books, 1976)., p. 109

[viii] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 272

[ix] Ibid., p. 272

[x] Herman, To Rule the Waves., p. 309

[xi] Tindall and Shi, American: A Narrative History., p. 198

[xii] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 273

[xiii] Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America (New York: Penguin Books, 2001)., p. 306

[xiv] Ibid., p. 308

[xv] Ibid., p. 308

[xvi] Tindall and Shi, American: A Narrative History., p. 193

[xvii] Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power., p. 70

[xviii] Herman, To Rule the Waves., p. 306; Muir, A Shorty History of the British Commonwealth., p. 40


[xx] Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power., p. 72

[xxi] Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Folio Society, 2004)., p. 107

[xxii] Ibid., p. 105

[xxiii] Herman, To Rule the Waves.,, p. 310; Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 273

[xxiv] Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power., p. 72 note; Herman, To Rule the Waves.,, p. 311; Muir, A Shorty History of the British Commonwealth., p. 47

[xxv] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 274; Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power., p. 72, says £10,000


[xxvii] Herman, To Rule the Waves.,, p. 310

[xxviii] Nathaniel Philbrick, Bunker Hill: A City, a Siege, a Revolution (New York: Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2013)., ebook


[xxx] James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire., p. 109


[xxxii] Henry Beebee Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, 1876)., p. 92

[xxxiii] Herman, To Rule the Waves.,, p. 310-11

[xxxiv] James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire., p. 110; Tindall and Shi, American: A Narrative History., p. 206


[xxxvi] Tindall and Shi, American: A Narrative History., p. 208

[xxxvii] James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire., p. 111

[xxxviii] John Shy, “Gage, Thomas (1719/20-1787),” The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).; Tindall and Shi, American: A Narrative History., p. 209

[xxxix] James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire., p. 113





[xliv] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 275



[xlvii] Richard Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents” (Massachusetts Historical Society, 1876),

[xlviii] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 84

[xlix] Muir, A Shorty History of the British Commonwealth. p. 53

[l] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 275; Muir, A Shorty History of the British Commonwealth., p. 54


[lii] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 37; Robert Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783, vol. 4, 6 vols. (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees and Orme, 1804)., p. 75

[liii] Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents.”, between p. 4-5

[liv] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., Ibid., p. 92

[lv] Tindall and Shi, American: A Narrative History., p. 210

[lvi] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 93

[lvii] Ibid., p. 93



[lx] Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents.”, p. 7

[lxi] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 99, 94-5

[lxii] Richard Frothingham, Battle of Bunker Hill (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company., 1890)., p. 13

[lxiii] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 95

[lxiv] Ibid., p. 95

[lxv] Frothingham, Battle of Bunker Hill., p. 16

[lxvi] Ibid., p. 17


[lxviii] A. W. H. Pearsall, “Graves, Samuel (1713-1787),” The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[lxix] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 96; see also, Frothingham, Battle of Bunker Hill., p. 23

[lxx] Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents.”, p. 8-9

[lxxi] Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783., p. 76, Ibid., p. 75

[lxxii] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 98

[lxxiii] Frothingham, Battle of Bunker Hill., p. 27

[lxxiv] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 100

[lxxv] Ibid., p. 100

[lxxvi] Frothingham, Battle of Bunker Hill., p. 26


[lxxviii] Frothingham, Battle of Bunker Hill., p. 29

[lxxix] Charles Francis Adams, “The Battle of Bunker Hill,” The American Historical Review 1, no. 3 (April 1896): 401–13., p. 404, 407

[lxxx] Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783., p. 75

[lxxxi] Ibid., p. 76; on the Spitfire see, T. D. Manning and C. F. Walker, British Warship Names (London: Putnam, 1959). p. 415

[lxxxii] Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783., p. 76


[lxxxiv] Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents.”, p. 9-10

[lxxxv] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism. , p. 108


[lxxxvii] Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783., p. 77

[lxxxviii] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 106

[lxxxix] Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783., p. 77

[xc] Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents.”, p. 20

[xci] Philbrick, Bunker Hill: A City, a Siege, a Revolution., Kindle, ebook

[xcii] Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783., p. 77; Frothingham, Battle of Bunker Hill., p. 50-1


[xciv] Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents.”, p. 49

[xcv] Frothingham, Battle of Bunker Hill., p. 53

[xcvi] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism. , p. 107


[xcviii] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism. , p. 107; Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents.”, p. 12


[c] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 109

[ci] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 275; Tindall and Shi, American: A Narrative History., p. 211-2; Frothingham, Battle of Bunker Hill., p. 61

[cii] Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents.”, p. 22

[ciii] Ibid., p. 22

[civ] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 110


[cvi] Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism.

[cvii] Ibid., p. 103

[cviii] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 275;; p. 111

[cix] Battle of Bunker Hill, The Boston Patriot, June 17, 1818.

[cx] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 276


[cxii] Philbrick, Bunker Hill: A City, a Siege, a Revolution., Google ebook.; Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution: 1775-1781, Historical and Military Criticism., p. 90

[cxiii] Tindall and Shi, American: A Narrative History., p. 212

[cxiv] James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire., p. 113


[cxvi] H. H. Brackenridge, The Battle of Bunkers-Hill. A Dramatic Piece, of Five Acts, in Heroic Measure (Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1776).


[cxviii] Fuller, A Military History of the Western World. Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo., p. 276

[cxix] N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006)., p. 334

[cxx] Tindall and Shi, American: A Narrative History., p. 215

[cxxi] Muir, A Shorty History of the British Commonwealth., p. 56; James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire., p. 118-9

[cxxii] James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire.,, p. 120

[cxxiii] Ibid., p. 118

[cxxiv] Muir, A Shorty History of the British Commonwealth., p. 58; p. James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire., p. 121

[cxxv] Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery., p. 110

[cxxvi] Herman, To Rule the Waves., 313

[cxxvii] James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire., p. 117

[cxxviii] Ibid., p. 121

[cxxix] Herman, To Rule the Waves.,, p. 311;

[cxxx] Frothingham, “The Battle-Field of Bunker Hill: With A Relation of the Action by William Prescott, and Illustrative Documents.”, p. 15


[cxxxii] ;