McMullen Naval History Symposium 2019

This was an impressive international conference, held once again at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. The flagship US Navy (USN) history symposium, held every two years, this year brought together a record number of scholars and participants, 400 in total, to present and learn from panels of world-class researchers and naval thinkers.

Dawn’s early light over an F/A-18 display.

The weather on September 19 and 20 was beautiful, the sky was summer blue and warm, as the scholars awoke with the dawn to bus over to the US Naval Academy (USNA) from their hotels. Future USN lieutenants were starting classes on Thursday morning. The fall term had began on 19 August, with the conclusion of Plebe Summer for the new class of 2023 freshmen.

Your intrepid narrator arrives & registers for the conference.

After registering and picking up the conference booklet (which very helpfully included a small notebook, to be completely filled over the course of the following 48 hours), I headed down from the Hart Room reception and publishing exhibit at Sampson Hall (ie, the book store), making my way to the Mahan Hall Auditorium, to hear the symposium introductory remarks.

Mahan Hall & the Auditorium

After a quick appraisal of the conference administrative details, we were on our way to the first panels. As usual with a conference of this size, one must selectively decide which panels to attend, and although it is certainly tempting to skitter in and out of rooms (as the midshipmen tend to do throughout the conference – preparing notes for assigned reports before heading to scheduled classes), I prefer to stick through with each panel and get a feel for the full discussion.

Commander Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong covering conference administration and introductions

Although I was tempted to attend the session on the legacy of Jutland for the first panel, I decided instead to attend the panel on naval aviation and air power history, which I figured would complement my own research, to be presented in the afternoon on day two. As such, I was soon listening to Commander Andrew Moulis introduce the naval aviation panelists.

Panel One: Session A6, Commander Stan Fisher (commentator), John Orr, Jonathan Chavanne and Bruce Perry

Bruce presented first, summarizing the history of pre-1941 Anglo-Japanese naval cooperation, notably the 1921 mission of the proto-fascist Lord Sempill, who was focused on advancing Japanese naval aviation. Bruce highlighted the infamous Frederick Rutland (“of Jutland”) controversy, in which the legendary naval aviator became a Japanese double agent, comparable to the Cambridge Five who later spied for the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Although much of this ground is covered by Arthur Marder’s now almost totally forgotten Old Friends, New Enemies, Bruce was able to take advantage of his impeccable pronunciation of Scottish names to enliven his paper, a strong opening to the conference proper.

Jonathan was up next, presenting on the interwar history of the USN’s rigid airship program. Although the surviving First World War Zeppelins were destroyed by their crews rather than face internment, vis-a-vis the High Sea Fleet at Scapa Flow, they had in fact been promised as war reparations to the Americans. Rear Admiral Moffett, in particular, was keen to acquire rigid airships for the USN to act as long-range fleet scouts in the Pacific, a theatre where a Zeppelin’s endurance and operational radius, prior to the invention of radar, could have been useful. Towards this end Moffett, together with Lt. Commander Charles Rosendahl, arranged for the purchase of rigid airships from the Zeppelin works in Germany, of which the first for American service, LZ126, was completed in 1924. This Zeppelin entered American service as USS Los Angeles. Although the debate about the ongoing utility of rigid airships continued into the 1930s, the death of Moffett in the USS Macon disaster of 5 February 1935, like the demise of Britain’s R101 on 5 October 1930, as with the death of Germany’s Peter Strasser in LZ112 in 1918, generally put an end to the rigid airship program.

Los Angeles (right) and Shenandoah in 1924

Third, John presented on the US naval air station (NAS) based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, for anti-submarine purposes during the First World War. Proposed with support from former Wing Commander J. T. Cull (RNAS and then RAF) in April 1918, the air station was activated in August 1918. Although not mentioned by John in his presentation, the USN had plenty of experience establishing stations in Ireland and at Dunkirk, the former in particular immensely important for Captain Hutch Cone (USN), who was leading the American naval aviation deployment to Europe for Admiral William Sims. By September 1918 Halifax was operating H12 flying boats, but this late in the submarine war, there was little activity in the area of operations

John’s presentation included splendid nautical art by Group of Seven painter Arthur Lismer.

Lunch at the Alumni Hall was next, and as I had not formerly registered for the conference until a few days prior, my chances of making it into the assigned seating dining hall were slim. However, as luck would have it, a number of guests did not take their seats and thus I was thankfully ushered inside.

Alumni Hall on the waterfront, in front of Mahan Hall, with the somewhat triumphalist display “Winning The Cold War”.

The enormous model of USS Forrestal (CV59) outside the dining hall.

Inside the dining hall I quickly made my way to an open table and sat down to devour my salad entree and creamed chicken, followed by a satisfying carrot cake dessert. The sparse table I was sitting at turned out to be occupied by some of the ancient warfare presenters. This was in fact a significant bit of luck, as I had earlier sworn to Jesus, on Twitter, that I would attend more pre-1700 naval history panels at this years’ McMullen.

I soon found myself conversing with a group including Jorit Wintjes, and John Hyland amongst others. Our discourse ranged from Greco-Roman amphibious operations to flagrant historical inaccuracies in Hollywood cinema and New York broadway, notably in Zack Snyder’s tortuous quasi-pornographic adaptation of Frank Miller’s 300, in the opening battle sequence of Ridley Scott’s Gladiator (artillery accurately represented; cavalry and shouting Zulu warriors less correct), and the portrayal of Lafayette alongside an apparently sympathetic Aaron Burr in the pop-cultural adaptation of Ron Chernow’s Hamilton.

Refreshed, it was time to attend the afternoon panels. Feeling an irrepressible desire to break-out from my specialization, and no doubt influenced by the classical conversation at lunch, I decided to attend what turned out to be a fascinating session chaired by Gene Smith on the War of 1812

Panel Two: Session B8, Samantha Cavell, Kevin McCranie and Kenneth “Kenny” Johnson.

Samantha presented on the distribution of Royal Navy forces during the 1812-13 phase of the American war, providing a useful update on Nicholas Rodger’s figures which unfortunately do not go beyond 1804 in The Command of the Ocean. Samantha demonstrated that Admiral Sir John Warren, C-in-C North American Station, based at Bermuda, was essentially conducting a holding operation: Warren’s tasks included carrying out a naval blockade, capturing American trade, and protecting the West Indies, while the war in Europe wound down. As soon as the threat from Napoleon was contained the British Admiralty shifted its focus from Europe to North America, and appointed the aggressive Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane in Warren’s place, resulting in the defeat of the United States through a lightning maritime campaign that included Rear Admiral George Cockburn’s burning of Washington DC in 1814.

Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren in 1799

Kevin followed up, employing the methodology of organizational and command analysis, eg, Roger Knight’s Britain Against Napoleon, to explore the administrative details at the Admiralty, where a minute staff of not much more than 30 individuals were running a global naval conflict. Kevin’s most interesting point was addressing the relative geospatial-time dynamic necessary when selecting commanders and drafting orders: the farther a naval station was from Whitehall, the more abstract the Admiralty orders by necessity had to be, and thus, the more discretion given to the local commander.

While I was listening to the panel I was struck by the similarity of Britain’s 1812 strategy with that of the William Pitt – George Anson theatre strategy of 1756-63: concentrate in the decisive theatre while securing command of the sea, fight containment actions elsewhere, before shifting focus and eliminating the enemy’s overseas bases.

Kenny concluded the panel with a brilliant narration of Napoleon’s post-Trafalgar naval strategy, really a kind of “anti-strategy” as I saw it, in which the central objective was to confuse the British as much as possible regarding the Emperor’s objectives. This included fantasy operations to capture the Channel Islands with 10,000 men, another non-campaign in Egypt with 30,000, combined with a violent but generally ephemeral guerre de course intent on burning British merchants supplying Wellington’s Peninsular army. The extent of Napoleon’s effort to tie down British warships with deception included the comical case of blank orders and a brief effort during the American war to pay the United States to fight the privateering campaign on Bonaparte’s behalf.

Sir Charles Oman’s multi-volume history of Wellington’s Peninsula campaign.

It was time to make my way to the next session, for which I knew I was going to have to make some tough choices. I was drawn to the Cold War Naval Strategy panel chaired by Nicholas Prime, but also to the US Naval Aviation during the Pacific War panel chaired by Randy Papadopoulous. Tempting as these sessions were, I ultimately decided I just could not miss the all-star panel on Leyte Gulf that was being chaired by Thomas Cutler.

Panel Three: Session C7, Thomas Cutler introduces Trent Hone, Paul Stillwell, and K. J. Delamer, with comments by Craig Symonds.

Trent Hone, Guadalcanal and USN doctrine specialist, presented first, establishing the narrative basis for the Philippines’ campaign, known as Campaign Plan Granite. Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura’s South Force was pulverized as it attempted to run the gauntlet at Surigao Strait, leaving only Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s Central Force to operate against the American invasion force. A group of Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) carriers (without planes) are moving as a distraction north of USN Third Fleet, and although Task Force 38 under Admiral Mark Mitscher and his Chief of Staff Captain Arleigh Burke want to convince Admiral Halsey to concentrate against Kurita, Mitscher ultimately defers to Halsey and the entire force goes north after the Japanese decoy force. Trent argued that Halsey’s command process had become complacent, and when combined with fatigue and inexperience operating as a fleet commander, meant that Halsey’s subordinates did not feel confident to correct what they could see was clearly a mistake.

Trent Hone presenting on Admiral William “Bull” Halsey’s (in)famous command decisions at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

“Halsey acted stupidly” – Tom Clancy’s Marko Ramius played by Sean Connery in John McTiernan’s Hunt For Red October.

Paul presented next, examining the question of Task Force 34 under Admiral Lee, who by all expectations should have fought a decisive action against Kurita at the San Bernadino Strait, but was instead committed north in the goose chase against the IJN decoy force. At this point in the panel the thought foremost in my mind was that this entire situation sounded so very similar to the Battle of Jutland and the confusion and command indecision that surrounded that battle, perhaps best described by Andrew Gordon in The Rules of the Game.

Iconic photograph of USS Iowa, as featured on the cover of Life magazine, 30 October 1944

K. J., at this point, did everyone a service by deconstructing an obscure statement from Samuel Eliot Morison, the legendary American naval historian appointed by Franklin Roosevelt to write a “fighting” history of the war. S. E. Morison’s otherwise brilliant front-line quasi-official history is certainly an easy target for revision, but K. J. raised an interesting case by examining Morison’s seemingly bizarre comparison of Leyte Gulf to the Athenian Syracuse expedition. The thrust of K. J.’s counter argument was that American victory in the Pacific was clearly guaranteed by the geostrategic situation in 1944, and thus the tactical and operational details of Leyte, while interesting, were unlikely to produce a strategically significant result regardless of the what-if variables. Craig Symonds’ comments built off this analysis, flipping the Morison analogy on its head, and detailing the core controversies in the Leyte Gulf scenario that to my way of thinking clearly make this the American Jutland.

S. E. Morison’s renowned multi-volume history of the US Navy in the Second World War, and Thomas Cutler’s introduction to Volume 12 of Morison’s history.

So ended the panels for day one, September 19, and the scholars retired to the US Naval Museum at Preble Hall for cocktails and decompression. After a few drinks and hors d’oeuvre we returned to Mahan Hall for the Symposium keynote. This year, unlike 2017’s conference, a roundtable event was arranged, the idea being to hear comparisons of King, Burke and Zumwalt, generally geared towards the freshmen plebes, some evidently more interested than others.

Vice Admiral (retired) Frank Pandolfe chaired the panel that included scholars David Kohnen, David Rosenberg and Edward Marolda, with comment provided by Admiral (retired) Jonathan Greenert, former Chief of Naval Operations (2011-15).

David Kohnen highlighted Admiral King’s comprehensive service experience and technological mastery, while emphasizing King’s role as a naval educator, having co-authored the famous Knox-King-Pye report and later in his career established the Naval War College Command Course. David Rosenberg emphasized Captain Arleigh Burke’s role as Mitscher’s Chief of Staff during the war, a foundation that served Burke throughout his career, including planning the Inchon landings during the Korean War, aiding in the negotiation of the eventual ceasefire, and advancing to CNO under the Eisenhower administration where he helped develop high-frontier concepts such as NASA and ARPA. Edward brought the narrative into the post-Vietnam era with his discussion of Elmo Zumwalt, whose Project 60 concept led to the development of Harpoon missiles, the Sea Control Ship and other technologies that collectively created the foundation for the US Navy as it exists today.

This was an interesting overview of three very different, but immensely influential, American naval leaders, that unfortunately had to be wrapped up during the Q&A as it had run overtime – clearly the discussion between these scholars could have continued indefinitely, but 8:30 pm on Thursday evening was late, and only a few lieutenants and fewer midshipmen remained. With that, I returned to the conference hotel to catch dinner and get some sleep in preparation for an event filled second day.

The conference restarted at 8 am sharp on Friday, 20 September (an hour earlier than on Thursday!) and, blurry eyed, I decided to attend the session that seemed to me to be thematically structured around the vastly important concept of maritime blockade. Little did I realize that, from my perspective, this would actually turn out to be the most interesting panel of the conference.

Panel Four: Session D4, Cori Convertito, Hans Christian Bjerg, Nicholas Prime, with comment by Sharika Crawford.

Cori introduced the history of Key West in the context of the American Civil War. Key West was a hugely important fortified naval base and federal district court that became a decisive base of operations for both executing the blockade against the Confederate States of America (CSA), and in 1862 under Admiral David Farragut, the staging ground for the capture of New Orleans. Heavily fortified beginning in 1845, Key West became known as the American Gibraltar, the controlling point for access to the greater Florida southern United States. General Winfield Scott’s Anaconda Plan for strangling the CSA with riverine and coastal blockade relied on USN bases, including Boston and New York, with Key West playing a comparable role, the blockade forces there in fact responsible for capturing more Confederate blockade runners and merchants than either of the larger continental ports (although with cargos of less total value). Crucially, as the blockade forces seized Confederate supplies and ships, the Union’s merchants grew stronger – captured supplies could be put back into use during amphibious operations against the CSA.

Farragut’s flagship USS Hartford forcing Fort Jackson during the New Orleans operation, April – May 1862

Hans presented next, likewise examining the role of a small Caribbean island that loomed large in the history of the Monroe doctrine. The Danish Virgin Island of St. Thomas was of great interest to the reconstruction era United States as a possible naval base, and following the Alaska purchase of 1867, had been considered for purchase at the cost of $3 million in 1868, although not followed through. Renewed interest by the United States following consideration by the unified German Empire to purchase the island once again brought St. Thomas into American consideration, in particular after the Spanish-American War and then the decision to construct the Panama Canal in 1904. St. Thomas was finally purchased, at cost of $25 million in March 1917 – just prior to the US entry into the First World War – over concern that Germany might have acquired the island had Denmark been occupied during the war. This case study, like Cori’s presentation on Key West, highlighted the outsize significance of small but strategically located island bases which had the potential to provide sea-lane control, amidst frequent clashes between perceived strategic imperatives and political decision-making.

Needless to say, St. Thomas is no longer the contested strategic location it was during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Nicholas brought the conversation into the nuclear era, presenting the findings from his research into Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, later well known as a military strategist, who in fact played an important and indeed astonishing role in the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Wylie was the naval planner who, as early as mid-September 1962, had first proposed the plan to blockade Cuba. Wylie’s intention was to prepare a means of pressuring Castro, but his plan was however coopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and Robert Kennedy’s Mongoose planning group, into an off the shelf invasion plan aimed at removing Castro from power altogether. Utilizing Freedom Of Information (FOI) requests, Nicholas gained access to the Wylie plan, and dissected the document to demonstrate that the Pentagon had certainly been aware of the blockade strategy well before it was proposed during the Excomm meetings in October 1962. Furthermore, like the previous papers, Nicholas encountered the interplay between strategic planners and the political and service priorities that actually shaped policy.

New York Times front page for 23 October 1962, recording JFK’s announcement of the Cuban quarantine, a watershed moment in the history of the Cuban Revolution and the first phase of the Cold War.

As the panel wrapped up I headed back upstairs to scour the publishing stalls for fresh material. Amongst the cornucopia of free coffee, pop, danish and fruit platters, I discovered that the proceedings for the 2013 conference had at last (!) been published and were now available, free of charge. I chatted with the people manning the booths, but I was beginning to realize that I was confronted with a dilemma: on the one hand I was having fun with these panels, and no historian can resist collecting free books, but on the other hand I was rapidly exhausting any plausible storage space for the flight home. Furthermore there were only two panels remaining that I would have a chance to attend, considering that my own presentation was scheduled to follow in a few hours.

They will be mine, oh yes, they will be mine

With these deep thoughts on my mind, and my arms straining under the burden of dense volumes, I paced the halls of the history department, chugging coffee as my Oxfords clicked across the floor. The time between sessions was counting down, and I had to make a decision. Presentations were starting as I ducked into the session chaired by Mark Folse.

Panel Five: Session E2, Kelsey Power, Joy Carter, and Heather Haley, with comment by Lori Bogle.

Kelsey was presenting on the subject of how class shaped identity amongst POWs during the Napoleonic War. Officers captured during the war were sent to the Verdun Citadelle where they were treated relatively well, their class consciousness as gentlemen being generally respected. The overthrow of traditional 18th century European class norms during the French Revolution made Royal Navy officer POWs more liable for exploitation, and they were thereafter routinely subjected to search and seizure, including confiscation of their personal goods (and money). The prisoners in response utilized creative methods to hide their valuables, and were not unknown to have employed cross-dressing to orchestrate escape attempts.

The Verdun Citadelle today

Heather’s presentation focused on the case of Ensign Vernon Berg, who was discharged from the Navy over a homosexual scandal aboard USS Little Rock. Berg later successfully sued the Navy for unfair dismissal in a landmark legal case. Heather’s presentation focused on the Cold War cultural mentality in the navy during and after the Eisenhower era, when a particular version of masculinity was codified in which homosexuality was perceived as deviant and threatening. Perceptions of homosexuality changed over time, being perceived during the 1970s primarily as a psychiatric issue effecting the “character” of the naval officer in question. Modernization, manpower retention policies, and legal challenges such as those pursued by Ensign Berg eventually mandated greater tolerance for homosexuality towards the end of the Cold War.

E. Lawrence Gibson’s book about Berg’s legal suit.

Joy’s presentation surveyed her career as a civilian hydrographer, contracted by the navy to conduct spot hydrographic surveys in what were invariably future combat zones, including Somalia and Kuwait during the 1990s. This was a very revealing presentation that apparently did not involve the CIA, although it certainly could have, and demonstrated an immense blindspot in the land power approach to naval operations that often seems to dominate US Navy doctrine. The United States Hydrographic Office, originally a part of the Navy, was transferred to the Department of Defense in 1949, and then abolished and replaced by the Naval Oceanographic Office in July 1962. I was not entirely surprised that the USN had been terribly short-changed by these events, leaving Defence Department civilians to manage the essential hydrographic mapping functions, alongside competitor mapping agencies such as the National Geospatial Agency, formed out of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in November 2003. The result of this bureaucratic centralization was that the USN routinely encountered scenarios for which it was woefully unprepared, notably for example during the rushed planning of the 1983 Grenada operation (Urgent Fury), during which nobody knew how dangerous the condition of the shoals were around Grenada. The resulting “just in time” reliance on civilians proved inadequate during the numerous littoral and special operations forces missions that followed 2001 as part of the War on Terror. The lesson that Joy’s experience emphasized is that the unglamorous and often dangerous work of hydrographic study is critical to naval operations and good order at sea, and is ignored at the peril of land powers with significant navies.

It was time for lunch, and I had to check in with my panel prior to our session.

The weather was gorgeous and hot as we marched down to Dahlgren Hall, where a free pizza lunch was being provided in part by the International Maritime History Association. Comically, we started off eating the wrong free pizzas (which had been provided to a different group), an error we only discovered after having munched our way through at least several pizzas. After resolution of this SNAFU, I spent most of lunch discussing Admiral Jellicoe’s empire mission of 1919-21 with Tim Moots, the two American Barbary conflicts, 1802-05 and 1815 with Abby Mullen, and amphibious capabilities within the Royal Marines with John Bolt. I encouraged a USNA midshipman, and history major, to utilize his written work on social media, say, in a blog format similar to this one, so as to establish a good foundation with the historical research he was doing – being very interested, as he explained, in comparative combat cultures in the ancient world.

At last it was time for my panel, so I hurried back to Mahan Hall.

Panel Six, Session F7, Chaired by Tim Benbow, presenters Alex Howlett, David McMeekin and Nicolas Blackman.

I recorded my presentation on naval aviation development with the Grand Fleet, visible here, also available in long form. I was impressed to see the room packed with midshipmen, giving me the impression someone had instructed them to write a report on my presentation – a belief that was reinforced as most of the cadets excused themselves from the room immediately after I finished presenting. Unfortunately for them, this meant that they missed the excellent work of my colleagues.

Converted escort carrier HMS Audacity

David discussed the introduction of the escort carrier as a trade defense measure in Britain and the US, ultimately a wildly successful measure for convoy protection and anti-submarine warfare that is not as well recognized today as it really should be. David related the Royal Navy’s ongoing interest in naval aviation for a number of roles, citing the significant Holland report of September 1938. Ultimately, no surprise from my perspective, the Royal Navy fully endorsed naval aviation for trade protection, despite ministerial opposition criticizing the conversion of merchant ships to escort carriers – fallacies that had in fact been employed before, during the First World War.

Cierva C30 autogyro

Nick described the development of the helicopter, a slow evolution of the non-rigid airship and catapult amphibian aircraft utilized by the Navy from 1915 to the 1920s, and beyond. Surprisingly, the Spanish were ahead of the technological curve in terms of helicopter development, the Cierva C30 autogyro being licence built by a number of countries during the 1930s, including the Cierva Autogiro Company established by the British. Weir and Hafner models followed, eventually succeeded during the Second World War by the very successful American firm of Sikorsky.

There was only time for one more panel, and I knew I wanted to catch the powerhouse session on British naval technology, covering the hundred years between 1860 and 1960.

Panel Seven: Session G5, chaired by Jesse Tumblin, featuring John Beeler, Duncan Redford and Tim Benbow, with comment by Matthew Seligmann.

John’s paper focused on late 19th century Royal Navy strategy and the network interplay between senior Admiralty personnel, notably Sir John Fisher, and newspaper and literary critics including W. T. Stead and Spencer Wilkinson, who were collectively responsible for shaping public opinion and swaying Admiralty decision making. The Clausewitzian tripod was in full display, actually a recurring theme throughout the conference, I began to notice: strategic principles, once articulated, could be forgotten, obscured, or indeed reinforced in the minds of the public, by skillful use of media to create false realities, invasion scares, or jingoism.

Duncan’s presentation precisely addressed these themes, examining the air power mania that swept Britain after the creation of the Air Ministry in January 1918. Invasion rhetoric drummed up by the Daily Mail, combined with total war predictions about the utility of bombing within the Royal Air Force, stressed the future of the Empire as an aerial entity, with imperial defence increasingly the responsibility of a vast air establishment, sidelining the Royal Navy. After the Washington Treaty of 1923 the future of the Empire as a seapower was in question, with the RAF’s own bombing rhetoric – magnified by the Northcliffe and Beaverbrook press – coming to dominate predictions about the future war.

Press baron Alfred Harmsworth, Lord Northcliffe, perhaps the greatest exponent of air power in Britain until his death in 1922.

Tim Benbow had the honor of closing out the panel, tackling in his presentation the thorny question of the role of the battleship after the Second World War. Beyond simply weapons systems, battleships were forms of naval diplomacy, and also aspects of national prestige, important cultural aspects of naval power that were often overlooked in the functionalist nuclear age. Increasing skepticism about nuclear warfare after 1945 began to emphasize the need to fight “broken backed” warfare – that is, in the post-attack environment – wherein survivability would be the preeminent currency, something the battleship retained well into the second half of the 20th century. The belief that the Air Ministry had become the final imperial institution was challenged, if the Cold War remained cold, and in fact the limited war concept offered by the Royal Navy became more important during the nuclear stalemate, not less.

HMS Vanguard, the Royal Navy’s last battleship

Matthew Seligmann’s comments extrapolated the central questions of the panel and indeed the entire conference to a certain extent: what will the future of naval war be like? Can deterrence continue to function amidst increasing uncertainty? What will the technology of the future mean for naval strategy? Political and fiscal reality had to be matched with the proper technological timing, otherwise organizations trying to introduce revolutionary technology could very well end up fighting themselves, sister services, or their own governments (and treasuries), more than any foreign enemy. The only protection against misguided strategic theorization is careful study of the fundamentals, coupled with a resourceful but historically grounded imagination.

The conference wraps up, two years of hard work and preparation producing a compelling two days of insight.

Operation Urgent Fury, Cold War Crisis in Grenada, October – November 1983

Operation Urgent Fury: Cold War Crisis in Grenada

Prelude 

US President Ronald Reagan and First Lady Nancy at Andrew Air Force Base, 23 April 1983, honouring victims of the 18 April Beirut US embassy bombing.

On Friday, 21 October 1983, President Ronald Reagan was in a budget overview meeting. Afterwards, the President met with Henry Kissinger and the Commission on Central America. Communist infiltration into Nicaragua was discussed. Finishing up the week, the President departed the White House for the Eisenhower cottage at the Augusta Country Club in Atlanta. With Reagan went Secretary of State George Shultz and his wife, along with the newly appointed National Security Advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane.[i] The President was expecting developments in the Lebanese crisis, bright on the National Security Council’s (NSC) radar after the US embassy bombing in Beirut that April

The President turned in for bed after dinner, but was awoken hastily at four in the morning. It was Bud McFarlane and George Shultz. The President had been requested to authorize the invasion of Grenada, led by the United States, and supported by the Dominican headed Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), formed in 1981 and composed of St. Lucia, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis, Antigua, Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Grenada.

Secretary of State George Shultz being updated by satellite phone while staying at the Augusta Country Club, Atlanta Georgia, 21 October. From Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

The US President spoke to Margaret Thatcher by phone on the 22nd and the British Prime Minister requested calm, emphasizing that no immediate military action should take place. For the British government, the twin crisis in Grenada and Lebanon came too soon on the heels of the 1982 Falkland’s war, itself involving a major amphibious operation requiring carriers and assault ships acting against an island base.

President Reagan at the Eisenhower cabin in Atlanta, Georgia, consulting with Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane early on the morning of 22 October. & Teleconferencing with NSC staff, 22 October.

Discussion and a 9 am teleconference followed, after which the President approved Operation Urgent Fury – the invasion of Grenada – and then went back to sleep.Since the end of American military involvement in the Vietnam war in 1973 and the subsequent over-running of Saigon in 1975, there was a perception that the United States was reticent to utilize military action in a potential conflict. Jimmy Carter had put his presidency on the line over Operation Eagle Claw – the effort to rescue American Iranian embassy hostages in 1980 – and so the decision to intervene weighed heavily on the mind of his successor.

Reagan spent the rest of Saturday, October 22^nd playing golf, a normally mundane event punctuated by the incident at the 16^th hole: A gunman held up the golf shop, taking hostages and demanding to speak to the President. While he was being escorted away from the country club, Reagan called the gunman as requested, but the man on the phone hung up every time the President got through.[ii] The man was duly apprehended after his hostages escaped.[iii]

At 2 am the following morning, Sunday 23 October, Reagan was awoken again and informed about the Beirut barracks bombing and the enormous death toll, later reports finalizing at 242 Americans and 58 French dead.[iv] The suspects included the Iranians, Syrians, or the organization that eventually became Hezbollah.[v] The killing of so many American marines and French peacekeepers – one-fourth of the US component of the four nation peacekeeping force – came as a shock. This second major attack followed closely on the heels of other United States Marine Corps (USMC) casualties, resulting from sniper-fire and a car-bombing incident against a convoy on 19 October.[vi]

The morning of Sunday, 23 October President Reagan, Shultz and MacFarlane returned to Washington D.C. Hurried meetings with the National Security Council followed, and it was decided to continue with the invasion of Grenada. Special Operations Forces (SOF) were going in immediately, flown 1,500 miles by C-130s to investigate landing beaches for the Tuesday morning attack.

Before finishing for the evening, the President briefed congressional leaders Tip O’Neill, Jim Wright, Bob Byrd, Howard Baker, and Bob Michel about the invasion, and then took a phone call from Margaret Thatcher, who, again, warned of the potentially negative international reaction to American military action and advised against rushing the operation.[vii]

In the Caribbean waters around the small Windward Island nation of Grenada, nevertheless, an amphibious assault ship and an aircraft carrier battle group – hundreds of thousands of tons of warships – laden with United States Marines, aircraft, helicopters, artillery and commandos, was assembling under the command of Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf,[viii] and Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf,[ix] to overwhelm Grenada’s small People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA), and its Cuban and Soviet bloc fighters. Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 120 was steaming steadily towards Grenada. Operation Urgent Fury was about to begin.

 

SR-71 Blackbird and TR-1 (U-2), high altitude reconnaissance aircraft of the type used by the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to photograph Grenada between 20 – 24 October 1983

CJTF 120, responsible for carrying out Operation Urgent Fury, led by Vice Admiral Metcalf, has itself become a model for joint operations. Meltcalf’s career and resolute decision-making during the thirty-nine hour planning phase prior to Operation Urgent Fury’s execution are now considered a military case-study in leadership during an international crisis.[xiii] Furthermore, the future commander of Central Command, Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, had been significantly influenced by his role as Metcalf’s deputy during Urgent Fury, and thus the otherwise brief campaign in Grenada is of interest to those studying the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War.

This post examines Urgent Fury and its planning, providing the reader with the essential battle-narrative and conclusions required to understand the nature of the conflict and judge why, in a House Appropriations Committee meeting on 26 February 1986, Secretary of the Army John Marsh and Chief of Staff of the Army General John Wickham testified that Urgent Fury had been a great success and, as General Wickham put it, “…a whale of a good job”.[xiv] Likewise, the seventh edition of the Marine Officer’s Guide describes Urgent Fury as a, “coup de main”. On the other hand, Norman Schwarzkopf would later write that, “the coup de main had failed utterly” and Sean Naylor, in his history of JSOC, described Urgent Fury as, “a fiasco”.[xv]

Maurice Bishop, Revolutionary Prime Minister of Grenada (1979 – 1983)

Ultimately a successful joint campaign, the brief struggle over the future of Grenada is a watershed moment in the history of the Caribbean during the Cold War.[x] The United States was set to reassert itself through a massive conventional arms buildup and a more aggressive foreign policy.[xi] Utilizing a combined force architecture that included Navy, Marines, Army Rangers, Airborne, and JSOC Special Operations Forces (SOF), components, the planning and execution of Operation Urgent Fury should not lightly be dismissed as a brief example of US imperialism or a distraction in some calculated Machiavellian dry-run for a futuristic cold-war doctrine.[xii]

Far from it, the Caribbean leaders outside of Cuba could see where the political situation in Grenada was heading. The US, with historical interest in the integrity of the Caribbean states, especially those members of the British Commonwealth, including Grenada, had a responsibility to protect the islands from internal conflict and their exploitation by the Soviet Union. The United States was requested to enable what the local Caribbean forces did not have the capacity to implement: the capture of the traitorous members of Bishop’s cabinet, and the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) junta who had overthrown the island’s government and murdered Maurice Bishop.

PART ONE

 A Revolutionary Spark

Grenada in 1983 was a favourite tourist destination, only 133 square miles in size, with a population of 110,000. Grenada’s significant domestic product was nutmeg, of which the island produced a third of the world’s supply. Grenada had been a French colony until captured by Admiral Rodney’s forces in February 1762 and then ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Paris at the end of the Seven Years War.[xvi] Although briefly captured by France during the American Revolutionary War, the island remained a member of the British Commonwealth into the 20^th century. In 1983 Grenada was home to more than 600 medical students at the island’s St. George’s University, comprising the majority of the 800 Americans and 120 other foreign nationals then visiting Grenada.

Daniel Ortega, Maurice Bishop and Fidel Castro.

In March 1979 Maurice Bishop’s New JEWEL (Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education, and Liberation) movement, including Colonel Hudson Austin (chief of the Grenadian armed forces), seized power in a bloodless coup, overthrowing the corrupt Sir Eric Gairy. 1979 was a critical year in the Cold War. That year the Somoza family, led by Anastasio Somiza, was overthrown in Nicaragua, General Romero was ousted by a coup In El Salvador,[xvii] and Ayatollah Khomeini returned to head the revolutionary government in Iran.

Fidel Castro greeting Maurice Bishop; The Grenada Papers by Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall (1984).

In Havana, Castro’s Cuba quickly aligned with Bishop’s Marxist government, agreeing to finance the construction of a modern airport at Point Salines on the southern-most tip Grenada.[xviii] US analysts believed this airfield, scheduled for completed in January 1984,[xix] would enable the operation of MiG-23s from Grenada, while also acting as a staging ground for guerrilla deployments to Central America and West Africa.[xx]

Letters from the New JEWEL government to Yuri Andropov, then the Chairman of the State Security Committee of the Politburo, and the future General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, requesting counter-intelligence training. Also a letter to the Ministry of Defence of the USSR requesting military training. From The Grenada Papers by Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall (1984).

Bishop, despite his revolutionary Marxism, had recently shown signs of gravitating towards the United States, and had met with US officials in Washington in June 1983. Although Bishop then met with Castro early in October, hardliners in Bishop’s cabinet now decided to remove him from power. Cuban and Soviet backed Marxist revolutionaries, led by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and the Leninist General Hudson Austin, placed Bishop under house arrest during the night of 13 October.[xxi]

Spurred by counter-revolutionary broadcasts supporting Bishop from Radio Free Grenada, a mob began to form outside the government run newspaper office. By 18 October General Hudson’s government was in crisis, with five cabinet members, including foreign minister Unison Whiteman having resigned to join the pro-Bishop mob, now more than 1,000 protester strong.

On Wednesday, 19 October 1983, the mob, led by Whiteman, freed Bishop from his house arrest and proceeded to march towards Fort Rupert, the police headquarters, and the entry point to St. George’s harbor. At this point troops loyal to Bernard Coard and General Austin, including armoured personal carriers (APCs), surrounded the mob and opened fire. Bishop and his cabinet were arrested and marched to Fort Rupert where they were executed. 18 people altogether, including education minister Jacqueline Creft and others, were killed.[xxii] General Austin declared himself head of the new Revolutionary Military Council and imposed a 24-hour curfew, in addition to closing the island’s commercial airport at Pearl, Grenville, on the island’s east coast.[xxiii]

Bernard Coard, Deputy Prime Minister & General Hudson Austin, Chief of the People’s Revolutionary Army, from the Associated Press newsreel archive.

Fort Rupert being stormed by the coup forces. Soviet BMP armoured vehicles lead the charge to capture Maurice Bishop, who was shortly thereafter executed by the junta. From The Grenada Papers by Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall (1984).

On 20 October Tom Adams, the Prime Minister of Barbados, denounced the violence on Grenada, followed shortly by Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica.[xxiv] On 21 October it became known, at an OECS meeting held on Barbados, that the US was looking for a reason to intervene in Grenada, and would be willing to do so at the OECS’s behest. A written request for intervention was thus drawn up,[xxv] and on 21 October, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, supported by Jamaica and Barbados, agreed to respond militarily to the overthrow of Bishop.[xxvi]

Prime Minister Adams of Barbados formally appealed to President Reagan for US military intervention in Grenada on 23 October.[xxvii] The OECS’s eight point request for information was also sent to the US State Department.[xxviii]

Geographical map of Grenada and the Grenadines from 1990

Grenada’s Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, had long before requested American assistance towards countering the rise of Cuban guerrillas on the island. Indeed, fighters from all over the Eastern bloc had been arriving in Grenada, including operatives and technical personal from Cuba, Russia, North Korea, Libya, East Germany and Bulgaria.[xxix] Castro, himself a promoter of Bishop’s government, however, refused to further support Austin,[xxx] no doubt concerned about directly confronting the United States over the crisis.

The Cuban dictator did, however, despatch Colonel Tortolo Comas to organize defensive measures on the island. Colonel Comas’ force included 43 Cuban soldiers and 741 Cuban construction workers, many of whom were also army reservists.[xxxi] Comas organized the Cuban fighters into companies to resist American intervention and deployed Soviet quad 12.7 mm Anti-Aircraft guns around the island, also authorizing the blocking of the runway at Point Salines with heavy equipment.

The People’s Revolutionary Army

From Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010). There were about 40 Cuban guerrillas fighters on Grenada, plus handfuls of fighters from the Soviet Union, North Korea, Syria and other Soviet bloc countries. There were 650 Cuban construction workers on the island, many of whom had military reservist training. The PRA was composed of a large battalion of soldiers, more than 450, supported by a small company sized militia.

19 October – 24 October: The Crisis & Planning

The Americans had become aware of the imminent possibility of action on 12 October. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Langhorne A. “Tony” Motley, convened the Regional Interagency Group of the National Security Council (NSC),[xxxii] and Motley informed the representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Colonel James. W. Connally (USAF) – the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the Plans and Policy Directorate – that the Pentagon should begin a planning process in the event a US evacuation were ordered and military support required.[xxxiii]

The rungs of “Traditional Crises” in Herman Kahn’s On Escalation (1965)

This started the ball rolling, and on 14 October the Latin American desk officer for the NSC, Alphonso Sapia-Bosch, got in touch with Commander Michael K. McQuiston, USN, at the Joint Operations Division (JOD), Operations Directorate (J3), who informed Lieutenant General Richard L. Prillaman, US Army, the Director of Operations, who in turn raised the problem of military intervention with the National Military Command Center. A crisis unit composed of officers from the Western Hemisphere Branch of the JOD, an officer J5, and a member of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were assembled to consider the possible program of operations.[xxxiv]

Meanwhile, on Barbados, the US Ambassador (also responsible for Grenada) began to receive reports of threats to the US medical students on Grenada. The NSC’s Regional Interagency Group met on 17 October to consider the ambassador’s reports, and, during this meeting, Assistant Secretary of State Motley asked Lt. General Jack N. Merritt (US Army), the Director of the Joint Staff, to prepare plans for a military rescue of the students. On 18 October Lt. General Merritt asked Lt. General Prillaman to contact Admiral Wesley L. McDonald (CINCLANT) to consider options.[xxxv] The group met again on 19 October, with Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Jr., Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in attendance.

The Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Caribbean Affairs, Richard Brown, briefed the group, specifically mentioning that at least 600 Cubans, mainly workers for the Point Salines airfield construction, were on the island, and two Cuban vessels were currently moored in St. George’s Harbor. At this point Vice Admiral Moreau pointed out that the JCS crisis unit was working on the problem, and that Lt. General Prillaman was monitoring the situation and in touch with USCINCLANT. It was decided to brief the Vice President (Special Situation Group) and the President (National Security Planning Group) to get authorization for military action.[xxxvi]

General John W. Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, 1982 – 1986

That evening Lt. General Prillaman sent Admiral McDonald the JSC Chairman’s warning order, requiring Admiral McDonald to submit plans covering various evacuation contingencies by the morning of the 20^th. Readiness Command (USCINCRED) and Military Airlift Command (USCINCMAC) were to be in close touch with USCINCLANT. This planning group now requested DIA photoreconnaissance coverage of Grenada.[xxxvii]

As it happened, USLANTCOM had carried out rescue operation exercises involving Ranger and Marine landings in the Caribbean back in August 1981, and thus Admiral McDonald was able to reply speedily to the JCS, providing a full briefing to the Chairman later on the 20^th. The need for higher resolution photography of Grenada, combined with better information on Grenadian forces (believed to number 1,200 regulars from the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA), 2,500 – 5,000 militia, and four torpedo boats) was paramount.[xxxviii] It was known from DIA sources that a Cuban vessel (Vietnam Heroica) had delivered Cuban workers to the Point Salines airfield site, and that on 13 October more Cuban ships had delivered arms caches to the island.

Given the unknown nature of possible resistance on Grenada, the Atlantic Command staff recommended two general positions: first, diplomatic negotiations followed by civilian airlift of the hostages, if possible, or, in the event of opposition, the deployment of Marine Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) 1-84 and the USS Independence battle group, both in the process of transiting from the continental United States to Lebanon, with the possibility of a follow-on attack by multiple airborne forces from USREDCOM.[xxxix]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Vessey, now briefed the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) of the National Security Council, in a meeting chaired by Rear Admiral John M. Poindexter (USN), the Military Assistant to the NSC (and Bud McFarlane’s deputy). Also present were John McMahan, the Deputy Director of the CIA, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne A. Motley, the CIA’s Latin American specialist, Constantine Menges, and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North.[xl] This meeting essentially passed the buck up to the Special Situation Group (SSG),[xli] although the lack of intelligence on Grenadian defences was discussed, with the CIA being requested to provide additional information. The CIA, however, had no agents actually in Grenada. Eventually the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was contacted to provide immediate intelligence and, under this authorization, TR-1 and SR-71 overflights took place.[xlii] Although the results of these high-altitude reconnaissance missions were passed on to JSOC, they did not reach the assault force in time for the invasion.

At 6 pm on the 20^th the Special Situation Group of the National Security Council was convened by the Vice President. Present at that meeting were Secretary of State George P. Shultz and General Vessey, who briefed Vice President Bush, the Secretary of Defense (Caspar Weinberger), the Director Central Intelligence (William Joseph Casey), the Counselor to the President (Edwin Meese), the President’s Chief of Staff (James Baker), the Deputy Chief of Staff (Michael Deaver), and the National Security Advisor (Robert McFarlane) on the Grenada situation. The Vice President approved an expanded mission including “neutralization” of the Grenadian forces, although both “forceful extraction” and “surgical strike” plans were also considered.[xliii] Both Casey and Shultz favoured an invasion followed by the restoration of democracy, a plan supported by the CIA’s Menges.[xliv]

The timeframe was an issue, as the forces diverted to Grenada were needed to relieve MARG 2-83 in Lebanon, while the naval forces were required for the CRISEX ’83 exercise to be held with Spain. Nevertheless, as evening fell on 20 October, orders were issued to divert the task force.

Combined Joint Task Force 120

At 3 am on October 21^st MARG 1-84 started heading in the direction of Puerto Rico, while the CV-62 (USS Independence) group made for Dominica.[xlv] At 10 pm on 22 October orders were received for the entire force to combine near Grenada.[xlvi]

Organization Chart for Operation Urgent Fury, reproduced from Edgar Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

General Vessey was in contact with Admiral McDonald the morning of the 21^st by which time it had been decided to add the two battalions of US Army Rangers and components of the 82^nd Airborne Division to the invasion force. Vessey, due to attend a speaking engagement that evening, was briefly replaced by Admiral James D. Watkins the Chief of Naval Operations, to continue the planning processes. By now it was suspected that as many as 240 Cuban soldiers were on Grenada, plus as many as 50 Soviet citizens.[xlvii]

Vessey, about to depart for Chicago, contacted Atlantic Command, Military Airlift Command, Readiness Command and JSOC, instructing them to manage the deployment of Rangers, airborne and special operations forces to Grenada, in conjunction with the CINCLANT naval force deployments, all while maintaining operational secrecy and security. Grenada’s message traffic, being intercepted at the Pentagon, was, at Lt. General Prillaman’s behest, transferred to SPECAT (Special Category restrictions) channels. This was prudent, and helped to reduce later leaks, however, the story was nevertheless about to break: CBS had gotten wind of the Task Force diversion and ran the story on the 21 October evening news.[xlviii] Staff planners from the Rangers, JSOC, and 82^nd Airborne were already aboard flights to Norfolk to meet with planners from the USMC, MAC and Atlantic Command headquarters.

Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia. From Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010). & Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, CINCLANT, October 1983

Meanwhile, Donald Cruz, the consular officer in Barbados, traveled to Grenada to meet with Major Leon Cornwall, a senior figure in the Revolutionary Military Council. Cruz met with the students at St. George’s university, who expressed concern about their situation. Cruz then departed by plane after it was cleared for Grenadian airspace.[xlix] At Bridgetown, Barbados, the OECS convened, and invoked Article 8 of the 1981 treaty, requesting the intervention of Barbados, Jamaica and the US in a multinational peacekeeping effort aimed at Grenada. Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon requested OECS support to liberate the island. These requests were relayed to the US State Department from Barbados between 21 and 22 October.

On the evening of the 21^st Constantine Menges and Lt. Colonel Oliver North drafted an invasion order under the authority of a National Security Decision Directive for Reagan to sign. The order was sent to the President in Augusta, Georgia, but Reagan delayed.[l]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010). Vessey seated.

At 1:30 in the morning of 22 October, General Vessey returned to Washington, and the SSG was convened. At 4:30 am, as we have seen, the SSG phoned President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz and National Security Advisor McFarlane, who were staying at the Eisenhower cottage at the Augusta Country Club in Atlanta. A teleconference was arranged for the complete National Security Planning Group at 9 am.[li] In that conference, Bush, Poindexter, McMahon, Motely, Menges and North consulted with Reagan, Shultz and McFarlane. By 11:30 am the NSC had reached a consensus decision on intervention.[lii]

The Joint Chiefs had prepared two force packages, utilizing combinations of Army Rangers and other JSOC elements (Team Delta and Navy SEALs), supported by a Marine Corps landing and 82^nd Airborne assault. The primary objectives involved capturing the Port Salines and Pearls airfields, followed by capture of the Grenadian capital at St. George’s (including radio station, government buildings and police HQ), the St. George’s medical school, the Grand Anse beach, and then the Grenadian army barracks at Calivigny. All objectives would be secured within the first four hours. The airborne force would then deploy to consolidate and reinforce. D-Day would be Tuesday, 25 October, requiring an action decision no later than 8pm, 22 October.[liii] In fact, the decision for action and the order to carry out Urgent Fury had been issued at 4:45 pm.[liv]

President Reagan’s evening meeting with the National Security Council in the White House Situation Room, 23 October. George Shultz to Reagan’s left, Vice President Bush to his right.

When Reagan, Shultz and McFarlane arrived back in Washington on the 23^rd, they discussed the Lebanon crisis and the Grenada operation. After discussing Lebanon, Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger briefed Reagan on the Grenada plan. Reagan was wary of the risks, both to the medical students, and to the American forces. The Joint Chiefs assured the President that the the risks were marginal.[lv] Reagan signed the formal invasion order.[lvi] With the President’s approval, operation planning kicked into high gear. Secretary Weinberger authorized General Vessey to take control over of the operation, with the objective of speeding the decision cycle now that the political choice for action had been made.[lvii]

As with any action in the Cold War dynamic, American intervention in one hemisphere could prompt a Soviet response elsewhere. Reagan would brief Congress (under Section 3, War Powers Resolution) or inform Congress within 48 hours of the legality of the mission. The State Department would inform the United Nations Security Council and the Organization of American States regarding the justification for the invasion under UN Charter Article 51 and Rio Treaty Article 5. The United Kingdom would also be informed, considering Grenada’s status as a member of the Commonwealth. Shultz argued that Article 22 of the OAS and Article 52 of the UN charter, in addition to Prime Minister Eugenia Charles’ request for American assistance, provided the legal background for the intervention in Grenada.[lviii] With these issues outlined, new intelligence from the DIA (high-altitude reconnaissance) placed Grenadian and Cuban forces at as many as five thousand with eight Soviet made BTR-60 APCs and 18 ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns, in addition to 81-mm mortars and several 75-mm recoilless rifles located around the island.[lix] Grenada had no radar, ships or air units. The National Security Planning Group decided upon a maximum effort utilizing all available assets, and thus issued the Go order to Admiral McDonald.

After concluding his secure telephone call to Admiral McDonald, General Vessey contacted Strategic Air Command (SAC) and informed them of the operation. SAC immediately prepared KC-135 and KC-10 tanker aircraft to support the operation from Robbins Air Force Base, Georgia and Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station, Puerto Rico. SAC also approved reconnaissance missions over the Eastern Caribbean.[lx]

Grenada and Carriacou.

On 23 October Secretary Shultz despatched Ambassador Francis J. McNeill, supported by Major General George B. Crist, USMC (future CENTCOM commander), the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, to meet the OECS representatives and determine their willingness to join in a peacekeeping force, coordinated by the State Department, the Joint Chiefs and the CIA.[lxi]

Meanwhile, Admiral McDonald’s staff revised the operational plan, now composed of four phases: Transit, Insertion, Stabilization/Evacuation, and finally, Peacekeeping. The US assault force would manage the first three phases, which essentially amounted to maneuver, special operations forces landing, full invasion, including US Marines, and pacification followed lastly by the OECS force being assembled to act in the constabulary role in the fourth phase during which an interim government would be created.[lxii]

Admiral McDonald flew to Washington to brief the JCS on the evening of the 23^rd. He proposed placing Vice Admiral Metcalf (CINC Second Fleet) in command of the Combined Joint Task Force 120.

Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, Second Fleet, Atlantic Command, selected to command Combined Joint Task Force 120, photographed here in October 1986. & Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf  (centre, as Lt. General I Corps in 1987) was assigned as the Army – Navy liaison for Atlantic command, and then appointed by Metcalf as the operation Deputy Commander.

The Joint Chiefs were aware that the Navy needed access to consultation from someone with experience commanding combined operations, including Rangers, Airborne and Marines, and decided to appoint an Army-Navy liaison to Metcalf’s staff. On the afternoon of Sunday, 23 October, Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, then the divisional commander of the 24^th Mechanized Division, received a phone call from Major General Dick Graves, informing him that he was being considered for the position of Army – Navy liaison. Schwarzkopf soon discovered that this operation was the full-scale plan for the Grenada invasion.[lxxx]

List of USN warships involved in Operation Urgent Fury

The core of the CJTF was Task Group 20.5: the reinforced USS Independence (CV-62) battle group, commanded by Rear Admiral Richard C. Berry. Captain John Maye Quarterman Jr. in USS Guam (LPH-19) provided the base for amphibious operations and the flagship for Vice Admiral Metcalf. Amphibious Squadron Four itself was commanded by Captain Carl R. Erie (Task Force 124), with Commander Richard A. Butler as his chief of staff (Butler would later prove invaluable as one of the few naval officer in the squadron with knowledge of Grenadian waters).[lxvi] Captain David Bennett was also on hand in USS Saipan (LHA-2), part of Destroyer Squadron 24, in addition to two modern nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) amidst a host of destroyers, frigates and landing craft.

USS Independence, Air Wing CVW-6 and a Wichita-class refueler operating off Lebanon in December 1983.

The JSOC force element, including Rangers, SEALs, Delta, and 160^th Aviation Battalion pilots, was designated Task Force 123. JSOC had received the notice to prepare on 21 October.[lxvii] The MH-60A Black Hawk Helicopters from the newly formed 160^th Aviation Battalion,[lxviii] composed of pilots selected from brigades of the 101^st Airborne division, would lead the way in their battlefield debut. Delta Force and US Army Rangers, received orders to surge on 23 October, deploying to Barbados in C-5A aircraft before assembling their seven UH-60 helicopters.[lxix]

USS Independence (CV-62), Task Group 20.5, Carrier Group Four

Task Group 20.5 CO, Rear Admiral Richard C. Berry, photographed in 1983, to the left of Vice Admiral Edward Briggs (center), Commander US Surface Forces, Atlantic Fleet)

The centrepiece of the USN task force was Carrier Group Four’s fleet carrier, USS Independence (CV-62), a 60,000 – 79,000 ton Forrestel class aircraft carrier.

CV-62 photographed alongside USS Savannah, (AOR-4), in the early 1980s. CV-62 CO, Captain William Adam Dougherty Jr. (seen here as Rear Admiral)

CJTF 120 was created on 23 October with Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, Second Fleet, appointed as Operation Urgent Fury’s commander. Metcalf’s amphibious force was designated Task Force 124, placed under the command of Captain Carl R. Erie, with attached 22^nd Marine Amphibious Unit under Colonel James P. Faulkner.[lxiii] Additional elements included Task Force 121, which was comprised of components of the 82^nd Airborne. Major General Edward Trobaugh, commander 82^nd Airborne Division, had received the warning order on 22 October. The Division Ready Brigade at the time was 2^nd Brigade’s three battalions, 2/325^th, 3/325^th, 2/508^th, plus fire-support from B & C batteries 1/320^th AFAB.[lxiv]

82nd Airborne Division, US Army

82nd Airborne troopers waiting to deploy for Operation Urgent Fury air assault, MSG Dave Goldie colleciton. & Major General Edward Trobaugh, CO 82nd Airborne Division.

B Company, 2nd Battalion, 505th, December 1983 in Grenada, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017). Major Edward Trobaugh’s 82nd Airborne Division’s Ready Brigade, three battalions of the 2nd Brigade, 2/325th, 3/325th, 2/508th and B & C batteries 1/320th AFAB.

Organization of the 82nd Airborne Division, with units then on readiness selected for Urgent Fury. From Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

In addition to SAC and MAC air support, the USAF would provided Task Force 126: eight F-15s from the 33^rd Tactical Fighter Wing and four E-3As from the 552^nd Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) detachment, with the explicit objective of preventing Cuban interference around Grenada’s airspace.[lxv] General Vessey roughly determined that Grenada would be split into two areas of operation, with the north designated for the US Marines, and the south for all Army operation

Task Force 123

Joint Special Operations Command, 75th Infantry Regiment (Rangers), Team Delta, US Navy SEALs, 160th Aviation Battalion, 1st Special Operations Wing (USAF)

Major General Richard Scholtz, CO of JTF 123 and the first commander of JSOC. & Organization of Task Force 123, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010). This was the first battlefield test of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), created by Charlie Beckwith following the debacle during Operation Eagle Claw in 1979. The idea was to combine the US military’s elite special operations forces under a single tactical command, supported by specially trained helicopter pilots, enabling rapid insertion and exfiltration during hostage rescue and counter-terrorism missions.

The JSOC Ranger assault (1^st Battalion, Lt. Col. Wesley Taylor) would drop or land in five C-130 aircraft, escorted by four helicopter gunships, and secure the airfield at Salines. The Rangers would then secure medical students at the True Blue campus, afterwards moving to support the capture of St. George’s. 2^nd Battalion’s Lt. Col. Ralph Hagler would then deploy and lead an attack on the PRA barracks at Calivngy.[lxx] JSOC commander Scholtes notified the Rangers on 22 October, and informed them that due to the limitation in available night-trained C-130 pilots, the Rangers would have to manage the initial deployment with only 50% of their total force.[lxxi]

The Point Salines objectives were given to the Rangers’ 1^st Battalion’s A Company, Captain John Abizaid – later CENTCOM commander – and B Company, Captain Clyde Newman. Total strength was 300, plus two 25-man HQ elements. The Calivigny assault, scheduled for dawn on D+1, was given to 2^nd Battalion’s A Company, Captain Francis Kearney, B Company, Captain Thomas Sittnik, and C Company, Captain Mark Hanna. Each company captain was to select 50 or 80 Rangers for their portion of the mission.[lxxiii] Once the 1^st Ranger Battalion had cleared the Point Salines runway, C-141 Starlifters would arrive with Team Delta’s Little Bird helicopters, deploy them, and then carry out an assault on Fort Rupert.[lxxiv]

Under the guise of a training exercise, the two battalions now mobilized at Hunter Army Air Field, Georgia, at 2 pm, 23 October.[lxxii]

1st SFOD-Delta, A & B Squadrons

B Squadron. Eric Haney in back with sunglasses, Grenada, October 1983; Eric L. Haney, author of the memoir Inside Delta Force (2002).

JSOC had a number of targets to hit: while the Rangers were capturing Point Salines, Team Delta’s B Squadron, flown in by Major Larry Sloan’s Black Hawk, would secure the Richmond Hill Prison,[xcii] and SEALs from Team 6 would land from Major Bob Johnson’s Black Hawks in St. George’s to capture the Governor’s residence (behind Fort Rupert at the harbour entrance) as well as the Beausejour radio station. Nearby, Fort Frederick would be plastered by USAF aircraft to prevent the PRA from intervening in the Richmond Hill attack.[xciii]

A Squadron operators on 25 October. Emerson “Mac” Bolen, Tommy Carter, John Turner, unknown, and Danny Pugh. Reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

After the Rangers had taken Point Salines, Delta’s A Squadron would land its Little Bird helicopters via C-141s and make an airborne assault against Fort Rupert. Although JSOC possessed plenty of detailed maps, most were left behind in the scramble to mobilize: USS Guam had only a 1936 copy of an 1895 British nautical chart of the Island, and Guam’s only Xerox machine printed copies too small to be useful.[xciv] The Delta operators bought Michelin guide maps of the Windward Islands to make do.[xcv]

SEAL Teams 4 & 6

SEAL Team 4 operators in January 1990 during Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama. During Urgent Fury, Team 4 would carry out UDT reconnaissance of the Grenville – Pearls area.

US Navy SEALs from Team 6 were scheduled to insert on the morning of the 23rd to provide beach reconnaissance for the planned Marine Corps and Ranger landing sites. Once cleared to land, the Marines would secure the medical school campus at the Grand Anse beach, while simultaneously securing the nearby town of Grenville and the Pearls Airfield – the island’s commercial airfield – [lxxv] SEALs from Team 6 would work with the Delta and Ranger assault force to secure inland objectives, beginning with Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General, held captive in his residence at For Rupert. Team 6 was also tasked with capturing Grenada’s radio station, and several other key targets including Fort Frederick, the Richmond Hill Prison, and the PRA training camp at Calivigny.[lxxvi]

1st Special Operations Wing (USAF)

Five AC-130 gunships (16th Special Operations Squadron) provided close air support for the landings at Salines as well as during the SEAL insertion at St. George’s. The Ranger elements were deployed from 10 C-130s and two MC-130Es flown by this wing. The USAF Combat Control Teams used as pathfinders for the Rangers were also attached.

22nd Marine Amphibious Unit, USMC

On 22 October the Marine officers in MAU-22 – Colonel Faulkner, Lt. Colonel Smith and Lt. Colonel Amos – met aboard Guam to discuss the expected Grenada operation, which they believed at this time would be essentially an evacuation mission, assuming of course that the mission was going to go ahead.[lxxvii] It was decided that Company D would be used for amphibious assault, Company E for air assault, with Company F in reserve, or for a landing at the Pearls airfield.[lxxviii] Intelligence also arrived detailing what information was known about the PRA and its Cuban and Soviet bloc advisers. Liaison officers from CINCLANT, flown out from Antigua in a CH-53s, arrived the following evening, carrying information concerning the mission planning and Vice Admiral Metcalf’s objectives.[lxxix]

Ray Smith (USMC), the regimental Lt. Colonel who was commander of the 2/8th Battalion Landing Landing team. Smith’s Marine Corps career spanned Vietnam and the Cold War. Lt. Col. Ralph Hagler (left), CO 2nd Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment, Rangers, US Army, photographed on 3 November, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

Amphibious Squadron Four, the MAU’s parent naval component, had sailed from the continental US for the Mediterranean on 18 October, with orders to relieve the Marine battalions stationed in Lebanon. Amphibious Squadron Four included the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked under the command of Colonel James P. Faulkner (USMC). The entire force consisted of 43 officers and 779 men. Lt. Colonel Ray L. Smith’s men composed the core Battalion Landing Team 2/8. Lt. Colonel Granville R. Amos commanded the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 (HMM-261) and the Service Support Group 22 was commanded by Major Albert E. Shively. The Marine companies were commanded by Captains Henry Donigan (E), Michael Dick (F), Robert Dobson (G).

Early on 24 October Major General Crist was meeting with the chiefs of staff of the defense forces of Jamaica and Barbados, as well as the OECS Regional Security commander, to iron out the contribution of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF). It was determined that the CPF would deploy on the 25^th, following the American assault, and would relieve US forces from holding key targets such as the Richmond Hill Prison, government buildings and the radio station in St. George’s. Jamaica was sending 150 troops, including a rifle company, an 81-mm mortar section and a medical team. Barbados contributed a rifle platoon of 50 soldiers, with the OECS unit comprising 100 constabulary personnel.[lxxxi]

Admiral McDonald called a meeting early in the morning on 24 October at Norfolk. In attendance were Vice Admiral Metcalf (CJTF 120), Major General Ed Trobaugh (82^nd Airborne – TF 121), Major General Richard Scholtes (JSOC – TF 123) and Major General Schwarzkopf, in addition to representatives from the CIA and State Department. The atmosphere, following the loss of the Navy SEAL team at Salines (see below) was tense.[lxxxii] With less than 24 hours to go before the invasion was to commence, Major General Scholtes recommended a 24 hour delay so further reconnaissance could be carried out. This was denied, and a compromise was agreed instead, with Admiral McDonald pushing back H-hour from 2 to 5 am on the 25^th, so that the Navy SEALs could take one more shot at Salines early on the 25^th.[lxxxiii]

The attack plan as represented by Wikipedia, showing Ranger and 82nd Airborne Division drops, JSOC insertion, and USMC assaults; & Detail of the same, showing allocation of US forces and targets. The initial landings were centred around securing three primary objectives: the Point Salines airstrip, the Pearls airport at Greville, and the capital buildings at Saint George’s. There were a series of secondary targets, including colonial fortifications, the university campuses, army barracks, and the surrounding hillside.

Metcalf suggested placing Schwarzkopf in the position of ground commander once the amphibious landings had taken place, but he was overruled by McDonald who pointed out that Major General Trobaugh outranked Schwarzkopf.[lxxxiv] Schwarzkopf, for his part, wasn’t certain how much use his input would be on such short notice. Metcalf made another important decision at this point, designating four members of his staff to send half-hourly status reports back to CINCLANT- the idea being to outflank any media reports while also providing a concise narrative of event for the political and military leadership to follow as the invasion unfolded.[lxxxv]

At 11 am, after concluding this meeting, Vice Admiral Metcalf and Major General Schwarzkopf boarded an aircraft for the flight to Bridgetown, Barbados, to meet Major General Crist and Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis, the commander of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. Arriving at the Bridgetown airport amidst a flurry of journalists – expectations of imminent American military action having leaked out – and with Brigadier General Lewis not immediately available, Metcalf met briefly with Major General Crist instead, ordering him to organize the CPF for airlift to Pearls or Salines.[lxxxvi] Next, Metcalf, Schwarzkopf and their staffs transferred to Navy helicopters for the flight out to USS Guam, arriving between 5:30 and 5:45 pm while the Task Force was still several hundred miles from Grenada.[lxxxvii] The last of the task force arrived in Grenadian waters at 2 am on 25 October.[lxxxviii]

In Tampa, Florida, General Wallace Nutting, C-in-C Readiness Command (REDCOM) ordered the XVIII Airborne Corps to prepare the 82^nd Airborne for deployment to Grenada, placing the deployed battalions under the command of Admiral McDonald.[lxxxix]

Black Hawk UH-60 helicopters, 160th Aviation Battalion photographed near Point Salines airfield, where 1st and 2nd battalions, 75th Ranger regiment, deployed on 25 October. SPC Douglas Ide collection.

The Black Hawk helicopters of Colonel Terrence “Terry” M. Henry’s 160^th Aviation Battalion, five from Charlie 101 and four from Charlie 158 – both technically 101^st Airborne Division components, were being loaded aboard C-5A aircraft on the evening of 23 October. The battalion’s helicopters were being flown to Barbados, along with more than 100 SEALs and Delta operators, 45 pilots and crews for the helicopters, and a handful of CIA and State Department officers.[xc] The Black Hawks would be led by pilots Major Robert Lee Johnson and Major Larry Sloan.[xci] The fully loaded C-5As took off from Pope Air Force Base on the evening of the 24^th, and after landing in Barbados early on the 25^th were ready to launch an hour before the sun was due to rise.

Detailed western targets, ie, not including Grenville and the Pearls Airport. During Operation Urgent Fury maps of Grenada were scarce. This was the result of short-timing and lack of local sources in the CIA and State Department. Estimates about force locations were often wrong and enemy skill with machine guns and anti-aircraft guns was underestimated, proving a real threat to Special Operations Forces helicopters and light infantry.

Forts overlooking St. George. Fort Rupert/Fort George at harbour entrance in green, Fort Frederick & Fort Mathew in red and the ruins of Forts Lucas and Adolphus in blue. Richmond Hill Prison in purple.

24 October, President Reagan holds a briefing with the National Security Council to discuss Lebanon. Present are: National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter, James Baker, Ed Meese, Michael Deaver, David Gergen, Larry Speakes, Richard Darman, Ken Duberstein, Craig Fuller, and George H. W. Bush.

At noon on 24 October President Reagan met individually with the Joint Chiefs at the White House, who again expressed their belief in the success of the operation. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, General Vessey and the other Joint Chiefs met with Secretary of State Shultz and the President to brief Congressional leaders. After the meeting the President and the rest of the National Security Council met with National Security Advisor McFarlane who had converted the Situation Room into a War Room to receive Metcalf’s staff reports from Grenada. Reagan asked Vessey what he intended to do. General Vessey said he planned to telephone the Pentagon with the final authorization and then go home and go to sleep.[xcvi]

PART TWO

Reconnaissance, 23 – 24 October

View of St. George’s harbour with Fort Frederick complex overlooking the Richmond Hill Prison, and Fort Rupert at right.

The Navy SEALs of Team 6 carried out the first JSOC mission. 12 SEALs and four members of an Air Force Combat Control Team (CCT) were sent in to reconnoiter the proposed beach landing site at Salines early on the morning of the 24^th. The crews and their Boston whaler boats were parachuted into the water south of Grenada, near where USS Clifton Sprague was operating. The mission called for the crews to go ashore at Point Salines and carry out beach reconnaissance while the CCT operators planted radio beacons at the airfield for the C-130s to hone in on during the Ranger drop.[xcvii] This was a dangerous, complex, and untested mission and the results were poor.

The weather and sea conditions were not favourable, with the result that four of the SEALs drowned – either when their boat overturned or as a result of the drop. When the remaining SEALs and CCT men headed towards the shore in their only boat, the boat was swamped by waves and the engine flooded. Dawn was breaking by the time the SEALs were nearing the shore, and, for fear of revealing themselves and thus compromising the mission, the SEALs headed back out to sea, meeting up with Clifton Sprague.[xcviii]

Cuban construction workers on the Point Salines airfield, from the Grenada Papers (1984). & View of the unfinished terminal buildings at the Salines airport

Various SOF missions during the Grenada campaign. The failed Team 6 mission for 24 October was the Salines beach reconnaissance. The Paul Scoon rescue mission occurred on 25 October, as did the Beausejour radio tower mission. The first SEAL Team 6 mission to Salines (failed) is not listed. The 1st SOW mission for 25 October was the USAF Combat Control Team pathfinder jump.

Patrol Boat Light (PBL)-type Boston whaler, improved variant of the single-engine type airdropped with Team 6 crew for the Salines mission.

Second, after meeting with Metcalf aboard USS Guam, a SEAL Team 4 crew attached to Amphibious Squadron Four and commanded by “Wild” Bill Taylor and Lieutenant Michael Walsh, departed USS Fort Snelling at 10 pm on 24 October in the SeaFox patrol-boat. Once near Pearls the SEAL crew took to their Zodiac boats and carried out a traditional frogman UDT mission at the Pearls airport landing site,[xcix] successfully examining Grenville’s beaches. Considering the unfavourable nature of the terrain, the SEALs recommended a helicopter assault rather than a shore landing, and this change in plans was approved by Captain Erie and Vice Admiral Metcalf, only a few hours before the beginning of the invasion.[c] Afterwards, with the invasion underway, the Team 4 crew exfiltrated, eventually making their way to Guam to brief Schwarzkopf on the mission outcome.[ci]

SeaFox patrol boat used by the SEAL Team 4 crew as part of the Pearls airfield reconnaissance mission. Note Zodiac inflatable boat.

While SEAL Team 4 was beginning their mission, around midnight on the 24^th, a second SEAL Team 6/CCT insertion was attempted at Salines, but again the whaler boats were swamped and the engines flooded. The operators, no doubt exhausted, were unable to reconnoitre the Salines beachhead before sunrise.[cii] The failure of the Team 6 insertion, and the loss of four SEALs during the unit’s first wartime operation since its inception, has generated considerable controversy, especially considering the relative success of the more traditional Team 4 mission at Grenville.

Although there was another Team 4 crew available at Puerto Rico, who theoretically could have been inserted by one of the Task Force’s two nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), hindsight is 20/20 and there almost certainly would not have been time for such a diversion.[ciii] Regardless of the exact details, the failure at Point Salines impacted not only mission planning – with Salines being deemed too dangerous for an amphibious landing – but also delayed the entire operation, with the Ranger’s C-130 drop pushed back twice from the planned 3 am launch to 5 am, only a dozen minutes before the sun began rising.[civ]

Helicopter Assault, 25 October

Guam in October 1983 off Grenada & Dr. Robert Jordan’s photograph of Guam seen from Grenada on 25 October, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

The Marines destined for Grenville were awaken at 1 am.[cv] The first 21 helicopters from Lt. Col. Amos’ HMM-261 element left USS Guam at 3:15 am.[cvi] Rain caused some delays, and thus the first components of Company E, carried in CH-46s with AH-1 Cobra escort, arrived at LZ Buzzard – south of Pearls – 30 minutes behind schedule.[cvii] A TOW equipped jeep was damaged during its deployment from a CH-53, and two marines broke arms or legs while unloading, but otherwise the deployment went off successfully.[cviii] 12.7-mm AA cannons fired on the incoming helicopters waves, but these guns were knocked out by Cobra gunships.[cix]

Sikorsky R(C)H-53 Sea Stallions, a Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight and Bell UH-1N Iroquois on Guam‘s flight deck during Operation Urgent Fury. & CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters deploying, SGT M. J. Creen’s collection

CH-46 Sea Knights on 25 October 1983. UH-60 landings at Salines during Operation Urgent Fury. 

The helicopters delivered their Marines ashore at the Pearls airport at 5 am. Captain Henry Donigan, CO of Company E, deployed one platoon to secure the landing zone perimeter while the other two platoons attacked the airfield itself.[cx] Within two hours both the airfield and the Grenville objectives had been secured; the Marines captured two Cuban airplanes and their crews in the process.[cxi]

Lt. Colonel Smith was soon ashore with his HQ group, and he ordered the capture of Hill 275 that overlooked the airfield. The Grenadians had emplaced two 12.7-mm guns on the hill, but the crews fled as the Marines approached.[cxii] Company E now began moving west, encountering scattered 81-mm mortar fire in the process.

Marines landing at the Pearls airport, Grenville, 25 October, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

At 6.30 am the assault on Grenville began, with helicopters landing Company F at a soccer field, identified at LZ Oriole.[cxiii] In the case of both landings the initial landing zones had been less suitable than hoped, requiring quick adaptation by the helicopter pilots. Grenville and the port area were quickly secured without opposition, the population both friendly and excited to see the arriving Marines.

Black Hawks touching down on 25 October, SGT Michael Bogdanowicz.  & UH-1N hovering 25 October, SPC Gregory Tully collection

On the west coast the Navy SEALs and Team Delta were about to hit their targets. Most of Team 6 was landed outside St. George’s to secure Sir Paul Scoon at the Governor’s residence, while one squad hit Grenada’s public radio station north of the capital. Fifteen SEALs, including Lieutenant Wellington “Duke” Leonard, Lt. Bill Davis, and Lt. Johnny Koenig, fast-roped successfully down to the residence. After deploying its SEALs, the command Black Hawk piloted by Major Robert Johnson and carrying Team 6 CO Captain Robert Gormly as well as the satellite radios, was hit by anti-aircraft fire. The helicopter’s instrument panel was blown to pieces and Johnson was badly wounded, forcing the co-pilot, Chief Warrant Officer David “Rosey” Rosengrant to fly back to Guam.[cxiv] Indeed, the Grenadians and Cuban gunners manning the anti-aircraft and machine guns covering the St. George’s approach were putting up a tremendous fire at the approaching helicopters.[cxv]

The Governor-General’s residence behind Fort Rupert, in St. George’s, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

The SEALs persevered and successfully entered the Governor-General’s residence, locating Sir Paul with his family hiding in the building’s basement.[cxvi] The SEALs were shortly surrounded by Grenadian forces, including three BTR-60 APCs.[cxvii] The besieged SEALs were able to communicate to the fleet using their short-range radios, and, through Guam, SEAL Team 6 commander Gormly, who was about to head for Point Salines, was able to call for AC-130 gunship support. Metcalf despatched four Cobra gunships,[cxviii] and the Grenadian APCs were shortly out of commission.[cxix] The other telling is that Lt. Bill Davis used a phone in the Governor’s residence to call, “the airfield where American forces were already in control [Salines], and asked for gunship protection…”.[cxx] At any rate, with gunship and Cobra support, the SEALs held off the Grenadian infantry until the following morning when the Marines reached the Governor-General’s residence (see below).

Two teams of SEALs – 12 operators total – commanded by Lt. Donald K. “Kim” Erskine had also landed by MH-60 Pavehawks in a field next to the radio transmitter at Cape St. George Beausejour.[cxxi] Although the SEALs quickly overwhelmed the local guards at the Soviet built radio transmitter, PRA reinforcements, including a BTR-60, arrived and a firefight commenced.[cxxii] The SEALs lacked communication with the fleet (their cryptographic satellite radios did not work as planned, and their short range sets were too short range), and, worse, did not possess any anti-tank weapons.[cxxiii]

Radio Free Grenada, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

At about 2:30 pm, with ammunition nearly exhausted, Lieutenant Erskine retreated under fire. Although many of his SEALs were wounded, they managed to make it to the waterfront.[cxxiv] As the Navy called in airstrikes and naval gunfire on the transmitter,[cxxv] Erskine’s teams swam along the shoreline until they reached a rocky cliff-face and hid there. Two pairs of swimmers were despatched to commandeer local fishing boats, but the SEALs were unable to free the boats from their fishing lines. Eventually the SEALs all made for the open ocean, where they were luckily spotted by a C-130 aircraft early on the 26^th, and thence retrieved by USS Caron.[cxxvi] Lt. Erskine received the Silver Star.

USS Caron firing on the Beausejour radio station after exfiltration by SEAL Team 6

While the SEALs were carrying out these operations, Delta’s B Squadron and components of Ranger C Company (1^st Battalion) and their five Black Hawk helicopters were moving to their target. As the Black Hawks neared their objective at Richmond Hill they encountered heavy anti-aircraft and machinegun fire from Fort Frederick. Delta operator Eric Haney recalled his Black Hawk being hit by 23-mm rounds, wounding many of the occupants, including Major Larry Sloan, the commander of this Black Hawk section, who was hit in the shoulder and neck by 23-mm fire.[cxxvii]

Richmond Hill Prison, atop Mount Cardigan, west of Fort Frederick & Mathew. The tip of Point Salines (end of the airstrip) is visible at the extreme left.

When they reached the Richmond Hill prison the Rangers and Delta operators were stunned to find the target deserted. The helicopters thus broke off the attack, heading back out to the fleet to repair, refuel, and drop off wounded. As they were departing, one of the Black Hawks (#5), was hit by 23-mm rounds, the shells exploding through the cockpit windshield and killing the pilot, Captain Keith Lucas.[cxxviii] The Black Hawk went down inshore at 6:45 am near Amber Belair Hill. Although the crew, Rangers, and Delta operators aboard were badly injured, they were able to hold off a Cuban patrol until a rescue team led by Steve Ansley arrived.[cxxix] The UH-60 that Delta team member Eric Haney was in made an emergency landing on USS Moosbrugger.[cxxx]

While attempting to repair aboard the Navy’s warships the 160^th Aviation Battalion was encountering the sharp end of inter-service bureaucracy: the Navy comptroller in Washington cabled Guam instructing Metcalf not to refuel the Army’s helicopters due to budgeting issues between Army and Navy logistics.[cxxxi] “This is bullshit,” Schwarzkopf recalled Metcalf saying, “give them fuel.”[cxxxii]

Those uninjured in Delta’s B Squadron flew back to Grenada to support the Rangers, and the Delta operators landed at Point Salines, moving into the hills around the airstrip to try to disrupt the 23-mm AA cannons before the Rangers began their C-130 airdrop.[cxxxiii]

SEAL Team 6 CO Captain Bob Gormly and Delta Deputy Commander Lt. Commander “Bucky” Burruss at Point Salines, during Urgent Fury & LTC Burruss with LTC John “Coach” Carney, USAF Combat Controller.

The Airdrop

A Company’s Rangers departed the airfield in Georgia at 11:30 pm on 24 October.[cxxxiv] The Pathfinders were over the target at 3:30 am and jumped from a reconnaissance C-130 at 2,000 feet. On the ground, they confirmed that the Salines’ runway was blocked.[cxxxv] As the Rangers were preparing for the airdrop, Lt. Col. Taylor was unable to communicate with all of the aircraft in the formation, the lead aircraft’s navigation instruments were malfunctioning, and there were no radio beacons to hone in on. Taylor’s executive officer, Major Jack Nix, in transport #5, anticipated the jump order.[cxxxvi] Due to conflicting orders, some of the Rangers were stowing their chutes when they received a twenty minute warning that they were in fact jumping.

Major General Scholtes, who was airborne in a command EC-130, delayed the drop by thirty minutes to 5:30 am.[cxxxvii] Although a specialist team of heavy machinery operators from the 82^nd Airborne Division’s 618^th Engineering Company were supposed to drop first and clear the runway, the C-130 they were in was forced to fall back, putting Lt. Col. Taylor’s aircraft in the lead.[cxxxviii]

Photograph taken by Ranger during airdrop at Point Salines

Photograph by Tom Tassakis of Rangers dropping on Point Salines, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

With dawn breaking and sky conditions partly cloudy, the 1st Battalion Rangers began their drop at Salines at 5:34 am. Immediately the aircraft were lit by PRA searchlights and then fired upon by quad 12.7-mm fire.[cxxxix] Once on the ground Lt. Col. Taylor and nearby B Company Rangers watched two of the C-130s curve away, having aborted their drop due to intense AA fire. With only 40 men on the ground, Taylor called in AC-130 support, with two gunships responding. The Rangers hurried to clear the airfield of debris and vehicles. At 5:52 A Company’s Rangers started their drop, and were assembled on the ground by 6:34 am.[cxl] The Rangers, leading an infantry charge, quickly cleared the enemy guns from the airfield and then commandeered a local bulldozer to clear the runway. Colonel Taylor’s force was fully deployed within the hour.

Airdrop, 25 October, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

At 7:07 am 2^nd Battalion began its drop, and sustained several casualties in the process: Sergeant Kevin Joseph Lannon and Sergeant Phillip Sebastian Grenier were dead when they hit the ground.[cxli] Specialist Harold Hagen broke his leg, and Specialist William Fedak was tangled exiting the C-130, but was recovered aboard the plane.[cxlii]

Private Mark Yamane, M60 machine-gunner in A Company, was killed by a shot through the neck while providing fire behind a truck on the tarmac. 1^st Battalion was in an extended gunfight with the Cuban defenders, more than 75 of whom eventually surrendered.[cxliii] The Rangers moved out to secure the village of Calliste.[cxliv]

Salines, showing the approach and runway, from the air. Department of Defense photograph of objectives at the incomplete Salines airfield

The Rangers reached the medical school’s True Blue Campus at 7:30 am, and the building was secured after a firefight lasting 15 minutes. The PRA guards fled to the north. While conducting a jeep reconnaissance around True Blue, Sergeant Randy Cline of A Company (1^st Battalion) drove into a PRA Ambush, and Cline, Privates Marlin Maynard, Mark Rademarcher and Russell Robinson were all killed.[cxlv]

By 9 am the Rangers had rescued 138 of the American medical students who were being held at the True Blue Campus, and learned that there were another 200 students being held at the Grand Anse beach campus. In total 250 Cubans had by now been captured, however the assault force lacked translators to interrogate the prisoners.[cxlvi]

2nd Ranger Battalion soldiers cover captured Cuban prisoners at the Salines airfield, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

Delta operator overlooking Task Force 160s UH-60s and OH-6s, which had been flown in aboard MAC transports to the cleared Salines airfield during Urgent Fury

While B Company’s Rangers were securing the airport, Team Delta’s A Squadron was deploying at Salines by C-141s. A Squadron set off in their Little Bird helicopters to attack Fort Rupert, but was forced to abandon the assault due to heavy AA fire.[cxlvii] 2^nd Battalion (Rangers) were meanwhile preparing for the Calivigny operation, consolidating their hold on the Salines airfield, while C-130s landed equipment and Major General Scholtes established his HQ.

Prepared 82nd Airborne trooper, photograph by JOC Gary Miller collection, 28 October, & 82nd Airborne deploying for Grenada operation, SPC James Hefner

At 10 am the 2^nd Battalion of the 2^nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne, began their C-141 airlift from Fort Bragg to Point Salines. The Airborne troopers, beginning with A Company, 2^nd Battalion, landed at 2:05 pm.[cxlviii]

Advance from Salines, 25 October, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

Vice Admiral Metcalf meanwhile was deploying the CPF to Point Salines to help reinforce the assault forces, and, along with General Crist, the CPF began landing at 10:45 am.[cxlix] CPF commander Brigadier General Lewis met with Major General Scholtes and Major General Trobaugh and agreed to use the CPF units to guard the Cuban prisoners.

Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis of Barbados, commander Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF), 25 October 1983 by JO1 Sundber

Eastern Caribbean Defence force soldiers board a Black Hawk helicopter on 25 October, Creen collection. Eastern Caribbean Defence (ECD) force soldiers, by PH2 D. Wujcik.

The Ranger’s final action at the Salines runway occurred at 3:30 pm when three BTR-60s attempted to break through a section of the line held by 2^nd Platoon, A Company. Two of these APCs were quickly knocked out by LAW and 90-mm recoilless fire; Sergeant Jimmy Pickering is credited with the 90-mm hits.[cl] The third BTR, which had attempted to flee, was destroyed by AC-130 gunship fire.[cli]

Knocked out Grenadian BTR-6. & C company, 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment (Rangers) on 25 October, at Point Salines

Cobras Down

As we have seen, earlier in the day SEALs from Team 6 attempted to rescue Governor-General Paul Scoon. The SEALs had quickly secured Scoon but where then pinned down by APCs.[clii] The Rangers who were supposed to support the SEALs were busy fighting what they thought was a Cuban battalion north of Salines. Metcalf ordered airstrikes around the Governor-General’s residence to hold off the Grenadian forces.

Four Cobra gunships – in addition to a 1^st SOW USAF AC-130 gunship – were tasked to provide this support, but the Cobras were low on fuel and unable to communicate with the Army or Air Force ground coordinators outside St. George’s. While Captains John P. “Pat” Giguere and Timothy B. Howard were heading to Guam for refueling, Captains Douglas J. “Darth Flight” Diehl and Gary W. Watson were just about finished their own refuelling and ready to depart. As the Cobras were heading back to Grenada, Captain Watson managed to establish radio contact with a forward air controller from the 1^st Ranger Battalion, who wanted the Cobras to attack a 75-mm recoilless gun positioned inside a house near St. George’s. Watson destroyed the target and a nearby truck with two TOW missiles.[cliii]

AH-1 Sea Cobra in flight, 25 October, PH2 D. Wujcik collection, & HMM-261 AH-1S Cobra firing its 20mm cannon, 25 October, MSGT David Goldie

Watson and Diehl headed back for Guam, to re-arm and re-fuel, as Giguere and Howard had finished fueling and were again flying out to replace them on station. Now in touch with the ground air controllers, Giguere and Howard received a request to attack Fort Frederick, overlooking St. George’s. While the two Cobras were carrying out this strike, Captain Howard’s Cobra was hit by anti-aircraft fire, shells blowing out his engines and wounding both Howard and his co-pilot, Captain Jeb F. Seagle, who was knocked unconscious. With leg broken and arm injured, Howard brought the Cobra down on a soccer field.[cliv]

LTC Marshall Applegate photograph of SeaCobra supporting 1st Rangers at Salines, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

Seagle, who had regained consciousness, pulled Howard from the crash only moments before the Cobra exploded, setting off the gunship’s 2.75-inch rockets. Howard gave Seagle his pistol and the co-pilot set off to find help while Howard tried to radio for rescue, sporadic fire from Fort Frederick landing around him. Unbeknownst to Howard, Captain Seagle was killed by enemy fire not long after departing the crash site.

Captain Jeb Seagle drags Captain Timothy Howard from their downed Cobra gunship, although Howard was rescued, Seagle was killed. Art by Lt. Colonel A. M. Leahy.

Burning wreck of Captain Howard’s Cobra at Tanteen field, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

Howard’s wingman, Captain Giguere, was able to hold off Grenadian reinforcements moving to the crash site with rocket fire, while he radioed for a CH-46 to come pick up the survivors. CH-46 pilots Major DeMars and First Lieutenant Lawrence M. King Jr. made the approach, landing under fire near Howard. Gunnery Sergeant Kelly M. Neidigh jumped from the helicopter and with the aid of Corporal Simon D. Gore, Jr., rescued Howard. The CH-46 took off and headed for Guam.[clv] Tragically, Captain Giguere’s Cobra, which had been flying protection for the CH-46 during this time, was now hit by AA fire coming from the forts, and crashed into the harbor of St. George’s, killing Giguere and his co-pilot, First Lieutenant Jeffrey R. Scharver.[clvi]

Dr. Robert Jordan’s photograph of Captain Giguere’s Cobra crashing, taken from the Medical School. Major Melvin DeMar’s CH-46 is evacuating Captain Howard at the left. Major DeMar & Gunnery Sergeant Kelly Neidigh received Silver Stars for this action, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

Vice Admiral Metcalf now authorized the destruction of Fort Frederick. “Bomb it” agreed Schwarzkopf.[clvii] A-7 Corsairs from Independence were ordered to strike the forts. When Fort Frederick was bombed at 3:25 they inadvertently also destroyed what was in fact a mental hospital that had been fortified by the Grenadians, killing 18 of the patients who were locked in one of the hospital rooms when the airstrike occurred.[clviii]

A-7 Corsair overflying the Salines airstrip. Photograph by Gunnery Sergeant Joe Muccia. reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

Amphibious Landing

The assault forces would now direct their efforts towards securing St. George’s. At 12 pm, Vice Admiral Metcalf met with Major General Schwarzkopf to discuss the situation. Schwarzkopf recommended a landing north of St. George’s at Grand Mal Bay by the Marine forces that were currently loaded in their amphibious transports but not yet deployed (Company G).[clix] This would create a flank to draw away PRA forces from the Grenadian capital.[clx]

Marines disembarking from landing craft, 25 October.

Lieutenant Colonel Smith, who was ashore at Grenville, was having difficulty communicating with Guam. At 3 pm he received word from the Fort Snelling that an amphibious landing was being planned for the Grand Mal Bay. Smith departed for Guam in a helicopter, where he was briefed by Major Van Huss.

UH-1 Iroquois landing amongst Marines, JOC Gary Miller collection & Marines with M16A1 rifles secure a housing complex on 25 October, photograph by PH2 D. Wujcik

The plan so far called for Captain Robert K. Dobson’s Company G to make the amphibious landing, while Company F would redeploy by helicopter from Grenville.[clxi] Smith convinced Metcalf and Schwarzkopf to delay the landing from 4:30 to 6:30, which meant recalling Company G – in the process of deploying to their landing craft from Manitowoc.[clxii] Navy SEALs hit the beaches and carried out a rapid beach reconnaissance.[clxiii] Dobson’s company had been sitting in its amphibious tractors since 3:45 am, their landing having been delayed four times until scrubbed at 7:30 am.

Still expecting to land at Pearls, Dobson was notified of the change in plans at 1:30 pm. USS Guam and the other amphibious ships were moving from the Pearls area to the west coast of the island for staging against Grand Mal Bay. Dobson, assuming the mission would be delayed until the following morning, at 5:50 pm had his marines prepare to stow their weapons and get some rest. Immediately after issuing this order the Go order was received for the Grand Mal Bay landing – designated LZ Fuel – at 6:30 pm.[clxiv] The first AAVs (amtracs) were ashore at 7:10 pm.

Marine drinking from a coconut, photograph by PH2 D. Wujcik, 25 October & US Army Rangers at Point Salines airfield on 26 October

Captain Dobson had his platoons establish a perimeter while conducting reconnaissance of the road south towards St. George’s. At 11 pm the Marines established a helicopter LZ, enabling the MAU air liaison Major William J. Sublette to land in a UH-1. Sublette briefed Dobson on the situation, informing the Company G commander that it was believed there were significant enemy forces between their location and the capital. Company F was scheduled to arrive within the hour by helicopter. Sublette headed back to Guam to pick up Lt. Colonel Smith, who had been trying to coordinate the situation between Pearls and the fleet for several hours, and now came ashore by CH-46.[clxv] Smith ordered Sublette to return to Pearls and contact Lt. Colonel Amos, who would organize Company F for immediate deployment to LZ Fuel.[clxvi]

Smith now briefed Company G on the situation, utilizing a detailed map of Grenada that had been captured at Pearls.[clxvii] Tanks, jeeps with TOW missiles, and Dragon anti-tank missiles were arriving aboard utility landing craft. At 4 am on the 26^th Company F began to arrive by helicopter. Company G was making its way south towards St. George’s, encountering only sporadic RPG fire as the PRA soldiers, hearing the approach of Marine armor, fled their positions.[clxviii]

US serviceman shaving, 25 October, by SGT Michael Bogdanowicz

CV-62 under combat conditions during Operation Urgent Fury. Hundreds of sorties were flown, missions including strike, medievac, reconnaissance, anti-submarine and close air patrol.

D-Day + 1, 26 October

With the Marines ashore and morning breaking on the 26^th, Lieutenant Colonel Smith ordered Captain Dobson to storm the Governor-General’s residence. Marines fought their way south into the capital, reaching the residence at 7:15 am.[clxix] Three hours later the Marines had relieved not only Scoon, his wife, and nine other civilians, but also the 22 SOF forces that had been pinned down at the residence (all but one of the SEALs involved had been wounded) for more than 24-hours.[clxx]

This entire group exfiltrated by helicopter to USS Guam,[clxxi] and by 10 am they were having tea in Metcalf’s messroom.[clxxii] Governor-General Scoon, however, requested that he be landed at Point Salines until St. George’s had been cleared by the Marines, who were at that time in a protracted battle against Fort Frederick. Once St. George’s had been fully liberated, Major General Crist and Governor-General Scoon moved into a private residence at the capital and established an interim government through a JCS and CIA connection to London.

CH-53 Sea Stallion, photograph by JOC Gary Miller, dated October 1983

After the Marines had secured the residence, Lt. Col. Smith arrived. He issued orders for Company G to capture the remains of Fort Frederick itself.[clxxiii] As Captain Dobson deployed his platoons for this assault he observed PRA soldiers abandoning the fort, throwing their uniforms to the ground. The PRA was beginning to crumble.[clxxiv]

Advance to Grand Anse, 26 October, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

Back at the Salines airfield, 82^nd Airborne troopers were planning to deploy to capture the Grand Anse beach, where it was believed more medical students were being held. Facing significant defense preparations, Major General Trobaugh requested support from Vice Admiral Metcalf. Schwarzkopf, who was now formally designated the deputy commander CJTF by Metcalf,[clxxv] recommended a Ranger helicopter assault – flown in by USMC helicopters due to the Rangers’ helicopters being damaged or unavailable. “Make it happen,” replied Metcalf.[clxxvi]

Marines boarding a Sea Knight, Creen collection, and Black Hawk UH-60 aboard USS Guam, 3 November, Creen collection

The fragmentary plan required CH-46s to land elements from three of the Ranger companies, followed by four CH-53s arriving to extract the rescued medical students. The CH-46s would then return and pick up the Rangers.[clxxvii] Lt. Colonel Amos would control the now extensive fire-support available (ranging from AC-130s gunships to A-7 Corsairs, and including naval gunfire and Army mortar and artillery), while aboard a UH-1.[clxxviii]

The Grand Anse campus

At 4 pm 19 Marine Sea Knight helicopters departed from Salines to land the Rangers at the beach. The Task Force pummelled suspected Cuban and PRA positions with support fire from A-7 Corsairs, an AC-130 gunship, and Cobra helicopters up until the moment the CH-46s touched down at 4:15. One of the Sea Knights clipped a palm tree and, with a damaged rotor, had to be temporarily abandoned, although this helicopter was recovered later.[clxxix]

CH-53s arrived next to extract the medical students. Despite ongoing small arms fire, casualties amongst the Rangers were minimal; no Marines or Rangers were lost. After rescuing the students at Grand Anse, the Rangers learned of a third group being held at Lance aux Epines, east of Point Salines. As the CH-46s returned to pick up the Rangers, another Sea Knight clipped a palm tree, completely destroying the rotor. The crew abandoned their helicopter, utilizing a life raft to escape to sea where they were recovered by USS Caron.[clxxx] The entire operation was completed in 26 minutes with only one Ranger injured from flying shrapnel.[clxxxi]

Sea Knight abandoned on 26 October at Grand Anse, photographed on 29 October.  .

The Airborne battalions, meanwhile, were clearing southern Grenada. The 82^nd’s 2^nd Battalion, A and B Companies, had been tasked to secure the Cuban positions around Salines known as “Little Havana”. Prior to launching the attack at 4:30 am, B Company’s commander Captain Michael Ritz carried out a reconnaissance of the Cuban positions. Ritz was in fact walking into an ambush, and he was killed in a burst of gunfire that also wounded Sergeant Terry Guinn.[clxxxii]

A-7 Corsairs bombed the Cuban building complex and the Airborne troopers stormed the position. 16 Cubans were killed and another 86 captured. While collecting the large Cuban arms cache at the site, Staff Sergeant Gary Epps was killed when the recoilless rifle he was trying to disarm exploded.[clxxxiii]

Consolidation, 27 October

Marine Company E had meanwhile spent 25 October at Grenville awaiting a non-existent mechanized attack, and then spent the 26^th covering the Pearls airfield. On the 27^th Company E received orders to conduct reconnaissance around Mount Horne, three kilometers from Grenville, where a PRA battalion headquarters was expected to be located.[clxxxiv] Company E encountered no resistance as they secured the Mount Horne Agricultural Center, where maps, documents, and arms caches were discovered.

82nd Airborne enroute (photograph by Larry Hennebery) & being ferried to a landing zone, 25 October by Specialist Douglas Ide

At the urging of local residents, the Marines moved to seize the nearby Mount St. Catherine television and microwave relay station, where they located an 81-mm position the PRA was in the process of abandoning.[clxxxv] Shortly afterwards Company commander Captain Donigan received orders to secure an arms cache at the nearby Mirabeau hospital. While the Company was moving by vehicle convoy towards the objective they encountered fire from several isolated groups of PRA, including a team that was captured and later identified as Cuban.[clxxxvi] During the return drive to the Pearls airfield another small squad of PRA fighters engage the Marines from a ridgeline, but again were driven off.

JOC Gary Miller collection, UH-60 air ambulance. Wounded serviceman removed from OH-6A aboard USS Guam, 26 October

The Marine’s F and G Companies, on the west coast, spent 27 October consolidating St. George’s and the surrounding area. On the night of the 26^th a jeep team with Company G encountered a BTR-60 and knocked it out with a LAW infantry anti-tank weapon. The following morning Lt. Col. Smith received orders to capture the Richmond Hill Prison – the abandoned complex west of Fort Frederick that JSOC had misidentified as occupied – as well as secure the ruins of Forts Lucas and Adolphus, slightly south of Fort Frederick.[clxxxvii] Captain Dobson’s G Company presently secured the abandoned Richmond Hill Prison, as well as the Fort Lucas ruins, and while the Marines were preparing to take-over the Fort Adolphus buildings they discovered that it was in fact the Venezuelan embassy.[clxxxviii] Company F now entered St. George’s to search for weapons caches.

US Marines patrol St. Georges on 28 October, filmed by JO1 Peter D. Sundberg

With St. George’s thoroughly secured, the Marines prepared to attack the Ross Point Hotel, where it was believed a further 400 Canadian, British and Americans were held. Company F secured the hotel in the evening, but found only a few Canadians.[clxxxix] On the morning of the 28^th the Marines were relieved by the 82^nd Airborne, 2^nd Battalion. Not long afterwards, Lieutenant Michael Flynn, 1^st Platoon, Alpha Company, 313^th Military Intelligence Battalion, 82^nd Airborne Division moved into the phone company building in St. Georges to tap into the Grenadian telecommunications, hoping to locate fleeing Cubans.[cxc]

The Canadian citizens were evacuated by Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft. 379 American medical students had by now been evacuated to Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina. Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne Motley, in addition to a dozen reporters, had arrived on Grenada on the 27^th as part of the post-invasion consolidation aspect of the operation. Major General Crist flew back to the Pentagon on 28 October.

Marine radio operator receives a call while shaving, photography by JO1 Peter D. Sundberg, 28 October. & Airborne troopers using binoculars in early November, Sergeant M. J. Creen’s collection

US Airborne trooper with M203 grenade launcher covering a building corner during Operation Urgent Fury & 82nd patrol, 25 October, SGT Michael Bogdanowicz

To reinforce the exhausted Rangers and Marines, two additional battalions of 82^nd Airborne were landed at Point Salines at 9:17 pm. The JSOC commander, Major General Scholtes, departed Grenada in the afternoon on the 26^th, and so at 7 pm Metcalf placed the Ranger battalions under Major General Trobaugh’s command.[cxci]

Advance on Calivigny, 27 October, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

The final Ranger operation on the island was the capture of the Calivigny barracks on 27 October. This was expected to be a major operation, involving large numbers of PRA fighters and Soviet bloc advisors.[cxcii] The attack was to begin at 4:30 pm, leaving only one hour for planning and briefing. After a preparatory attack carried out by the 82^nd Airborne’s 105-mm howitzers, the Rangers would fly in aboard Black Hawks and secure the site. 2^nd Battalion was to carry out the attack with A, B, and C companies, along with the attached 1^st Battalion’s Charlie Company.[cxciii] Each company would arrive aboard four Black Hawks resulting in four waves of landings.[cxciv]

82nd Airborne firing M102 (155 mm) howitzers during the 27 October Calivigny barracks attack. SGT M. J. Creen

USS Caron firing on Calivigny, 27 October, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

Explosion of 500-lb bombs on 27 October Sequence, during the Calivigny attack

Although the 82^nd’s artillery fell short, Spectre gunship and naval gunfire from Moosbrugger destroyed a fuel and ammunition dump. A-7s then flew eight sorties, further destroying the camp. Unbeknownst to the Rangers, the barracks garrison had abandoned the camp, but were preparing an ambush for the approaching Black Hawks.

Black Hawks at Point Salines, 4 November 1983, Staff Sergeant Haggerty collection

B Company Rangers from 2nd Battalion launching on the Calivigny raid, 27 October, reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

A fusillade of fire hit the Black Hawks as the first chalks landed at 5:50 pm. The target was obscured by smoke and fire from the airstrikes and it was now that a major incident occurred: As the second Black Hawk was unloading troops, the third Black Hawk, taking enemy fire, lost control and crashed into the second. The incoming fourth UH-60 attempted to steer clear of the disaster area, but in the process clipped its tail rotor and lost control, also crashing.[cxcv]

Although three Black Hawks had been destroyed, none of the pilots or crew were killed, although one disembarking Ranger (Sergeant Stephen Eric Slater) was killed,[cxcvi] and many others badly wounded. Medical Sergeant Stephen Trujillo received the Silver Star for his life-saving work on the wounded.[cxcvii]

Time Life photograph from Jay Harrison collection showing burning Black Hawk helicopters & USAF Major Marshall Applegate photography of wrecked Black Hawk, 28 October, both reproduced in Stephen Trujilo, Grenada Raiders (2017)

The barracks, which turned out to be empty, was searched and secured by 9 pm.[cxcviii] The Rangers loaded onto C-141s and flew home the next day, arriving at Hunter Army Airfied on 29 October.[cxcix]

There was a major friendly fire incident caused by communications problems on the 27^th. Snipers attacking Airborne positions nearby Frequente prompted an Air Naval Gunfire Liaison team to order a Corsair strike against what turned out to be a 2^nd Brigade, 82^nd Airborne command post, resulting in 17 injuries.[cc] Badly wounded soldiers were evacuated to USS Guam and then Puerto Rico.

C-130 Hercules on approach to Pearls airport, 28 October, Creen collection & UH-60 helicopters flying over Point Salines airfield, 28 October 1983

By the evening of the 28^th the primary objective had transitioned from high-intensity fighting to mopping up, while continuing to attempt to locate the Grenadian coup leaders. A team of post-invasion specialists, ranging from medics to military police were deployed to the island to assist with the return to normalcy.[cci] On the 29^th Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and his wife Phyllis, the Minister of National Mobilization Selwyn Strachan, and Lt. Colonel Liam Jones, were rounded up in St. Georges.[ccii] The final 202 medical students were located at Lance aux Epines near St. George’s by the 82^nd Airborne troopers.

Salines under US control, 28 October 1983. 82nd Airborne Division soldiers resting at Port Salines airfield, 28 October, Mike Creen

US Marine guards captured PRA fighter in plain clothes, 28 October, JO1 Peter D. Sundberg collection

Operation Duke, 1 November

The interior of Grenada and the island of Carriacou to the north were believed to be the location of the final Cuban holdouts, and focus now shifted to locating and eliminating those last opposition forces.

The Grenada coup conspirators were shortly located, captured, and interned aboard USS Guam. The Cuban embassy was surrounded on 29 October and the ambassador, Jullian Torrez Riso, verified that he had been ordered to leave Grenada immediately. By the end of the day 599 US citizens and 121 foreign nationals had been rescued and evacuated. Admiral McDonald and General Vessey landed at Point Salines on 29 October to inspect the prisoners and captured arms caches.

A/V crew with Betacam filming Urgent Fury, 3 November, SGT M. J. Creen collection.

The Marines learned through a local informant that a PRA battalion commander was hiding in Grenville and captured him. With fresh information on the PRA formation in Sauteurs, Company E prepared to move out from Pearls, readying at 3:30 am on the 30^th.[cciii] By 5:15 that morning the Marine column had entered Sauteurs and secured it, the local PRA commander surrendering without a fight.

Meanwhile, on the west coast, Company G received orders to mount its amtracs and secure Gouyave and Victoria. The Marines moved out at 3:30 pm on the 30^th, supported by two tanks carried by utility landing craft and Cobra gunships overhead.[cciv] Both towns were secured that evening without opposition.

On 31 October Metcalf approved Operation Duke, the capture of Carriacou island to the North of Grenada. Over the course of the day all of the Marine forces on Grenada re-embarked with the fleet, their positions being taken over by the 82^nd Airborne. The Marines returned to their landing ships for a final amphibious operation against Carriacou, scheduled for 1 November.

Top: Details of Operation Duke. Navy SEAL insertion at Lauriston Point (green), Company F’s helicopter landing at the airstrip and march on Hillsborough (blue). Company G’s amphibious assault at Tyrrel Bay (red). Bottom: Captain Robert Dobson, G Company, speaks with locals from his amtrac after coming ashore at Tyrrel Bay, photograph by SGT Christopher Grey, USMC.

The Carriacou operation was to be carried out by USS Saipan, the Marines going ashore at 5:30 am on 1 November. One company would be air inserted at the Lauriston Point Airstrip, secure it, and then advance on Hillsborough. Simultaneously, another company would land at Tyrrel Bay and attack what was believed to be a PRA training base.[ccv]

SEALs went in first to reconnoiter Lauriston Point, and then, covered by eight USAF A-10 jets, Company F made the helicopter landing, while Company G performed the amphibious assault. The Marines secured all of their objectives without opposition in three hours.[ccvi] 17 or 19 Grenadian soldiers were captured, in addition to more equipment and ammunition, however, the expected Cuban guerrillas were not located and Lt. Col. Smith, sensing the situation was well in hand, paroled the PRA soldiers on good behavior.[ccvii] The 82^nd Airborne relieved the Marines at 7 am the next morning. Within an hour the paroled PRA platoon reported to the 82^nd Airborne and formally surrendered. By the afternoon of the 2^nd all the Marines had departed for the fleet.

The Liberated medical students with 82nd Airborne trooper, note bayonet . & US Airborne troopers watch a C-141 Starlifter arriving to evacuate rescued hostages on 3 November

C-141 Starlifter at Point Salines airfield, Marines in foreground, photograph by GOC Gary Miller & 82nd Airborne trooper board C-141 Starlifter on 4 November 1983, the end of Operation Urgent Fury

Combat operations officially ceased on 2 November and the entire task force was redirected towards its original objectives in Spain and in the Middle East.

Ronald Reagan sent this message to the 22^nd MAU:[ccviii]

Although you have scarcely cleaned off the sand of Grenada where you were magnificent, you will now shortly relieve 24^th MAU in Beirut. Once there you will assume the key role in our efforts to bring peace to Lebanon. You have proven without a doubt that you are up to the task as our very best. Godspeed and a happy 208^th [USMC birthday – 10 November 1983]. Semper Fidelis.

Back at Grenada, Admiral McDonald designated Major General Trobaugh the senior commander. The task was now to prepare for the return to normalized governance. The 82^nd Airborne was completely redeployed on 12 December.

Students board a Starlifter during evacuation.

Major General Edward L. Trobaugh, CO 82nd Airborne Division, greeting Command Sergeant Major Tommie McKoy after returning to the United States on 4 November 1983

Resolution and Aftermath

President Reagan and George Shultz meeting with Dominican Prime Minister Eugenia Charles on 25 October.

President Reagan and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles announcing the joint military action at a White House press conference, 25 October.

Following the success of the initial operation, on 25 October, President Reagan and Prime Minister Charles of Dominica gave a press conference at the White House. When confronted with probing questions by the White House press pool Eugenia Charles defended the legitimacy of the mission. Charles argued that the United States had been requested to leverage its unique military capabilities within the Organization of American States treaty framework, due to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States members lacking the military capacity to carry out the liberation mission. A visibly shaky President Reagan echoed these sentiments, stating that the legitimacy of the “invasion” was to be found in the OECS treaty structure, in combination with Grenada’s status as a member of the British Commonwealth.

US Ambassador to the UN Jeane J. Kirkpatrick presented the US case for intervention to the Security Council on 27 October. President Reagan spoke to the nation that evening, addressing both the Grenadian coup and intervention, and comparing the relative cost of action: A single suicide truck-bombing attack against the US Marine Corps and French peacekeepers in Lebanon, an act of multinational terrorism, with hundreds killed, and the success of an amphibious intervention that removed a murderous tyranny and restored democratic governance at similar cost of life.

President Ronald Reagan drafts the 27 October speech, and then delivers it in a televised national address on the events in Grenada and Lebanon, 27 October 1983.

On 2 November Major General Crist and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam briefed the House Foreign Affairs Committee, while the Senate Armed Services Committee was briefed by Admiral McDonald and General Paul Gorman (CINC Southern Command).[ccix] On 6 November General Vessey appeared on NBC’s Meet the Press to answer questions about the operation.[ccx] Vessey maintained that, given the planning constraints and despite the errors made, the operation was a great success.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Commandant of the Marine Corps General Paul Kelley testified before the House Appropriations Committee on 8 November. Both Admiral McDonald and the Joint Staff carried out investigations into the planning process, the latter’s report being released in January 1984 and the former’s in February.[ccxi]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John Vessey briefs congressional leaders on the Grenada operation, 25 October 1983. Cheney on the left.

A smiling Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf takes questions from reporters on Grenada shortly after the invasion.

Vice President Bush with USMC Commandant General Paul Kelley (left) and Col. Geraghty (right) tour the Beirut USMC barracks rubble on 26 October.

In a May 1984 article of the US Naval Institute Proceedings, Lt. Colonel Michael J Byron, USMC, argued that the major lesson of Grenada was that it would no doubt become a model for the future of combined and joint operations.[ccxii] After Vice President Bush was elected President, the Grenada operation and the Lebanon crisis became a haunting reminder of the lure of military action, influencing decision making during Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama, and the conflicts of the 21^st century.[ccxiii]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John W. Vessey arrives aboard USS Guam, 28 October.

The conflict demonstrated several things about the nature of post-Vietnam 20^th century conventional warfare and the American way of war. As was traditional, speed of planning could generate operational advantages in terms of surprise, however, the associated risks and unknowns were increased proportionately. Although the media quickly got word of the major naval maneuvers, the plans themselves were kept on a need-to-know basis amongst the decision-makers.

Major General Edward Trobaugh, CO 82nd Airborne Division (left), alongside General Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (center), touring Grenada on 3 November.  Note USMC M60 tank in background

Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, CINCLANT, General John Vessey, Chairman JCS, unidentified soldier 82nd Airborne, and Major General Edward Trobaugh, CO 82nd Airborne Division, pose with captured M-52 Czechoslovakian quad 12.7 mm AA gun

A major sticking point for the public was the press embargo that had barred reporters from Grenada until 28 October, with the exception of several reporters who had managed to slip in. This lack of independent journalistic coverage contributed to the generally negative international reaction to the US intervention.[ccxiv] General Vessey’s quest for operational security  was responsible, a decision that also impacted the ability of the services to cooperate with one-another.[ccxv]

Interservice cooperation was also hampered by the rapid planning process, that did not allow the services time to coordinate their communications, with the result that friendly fire incidents took place on some occasions. At other crucial moments the soldiers in contact were unable to radio for the necessary supporting fire or contact outside help.

Press cartoon denouncing the JCS media policy, representative of the negative reaction to Operation Urgent Fury, both in America and internationally. From Operation Urgent Memory: The Grenada Revolution in the Caribbean Present by Shalini Puri (2014).

As with the Falkland Islands conflict in 1982, special operations forces and naval aviation proved their worth. SOF forces captured critical objectives with the lowest possible loss of life, utilizing their advanced tradecraft to overcome not only the enemy, but also critical equipment failures and untested tactics.

Naval fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft had unlimited freedom to operate once the enemy’s anti-aircraft guns had been suppressed. USS Independence generated hundreds of sorties. VA-15 flew 143 combat sorties, VA-176 flew 350 sorties, HS-15 flew 97 Search and Rescue (SAR) sorties, VF-32 flew 256 sorties in Grenada and Lebanon during its 1983 tour, VF-14 flew 82 sorties, VAQ-131 flew electronic surveillance, and VA-87, VS-28, and VAW-122 flew an unknown numbers of sorties. No naval aircraft were lost.[ccxvi]

Marine helicopters provided rapid on-site transport, fire-support and medical extraction, often in the face of significant enemy fire and with despites losses in equipment and crews. Military Airlift Command delivered the rapid deployment of 82^nd Airborne forces, military supplies, medical evacuation, and the extraction of captured Cuban prisoners and the liberation of the thrilled medical students.

Captured communist literature, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

Captured munitions, shells, autocannon, rifle ammunition, rifles, BREN guns, explosives, mortars

Captured Czech made M-53 12.7 mm quad cannon

Captured Soviet ZU-23 (mm) AA guns, (Note LSTs and support ship in background) 2nd by 28 October, PH2 D. Wujcik

CH-53 picks up ZU-23, 3 November, Creen collection

Soviet BRDM-2 amphibious vehicle captured during the assault, filmed 28 October by Sergeant Mike Creen & Soviet BTR-60PB captured, 28 October

The PRA achieved a number of tactical surprises, taking advantage of knowledge of the local terrain and the probable American plan of action to block key service routes and airports, defend positions with ambushes, RPGs, mortars and heavy machineguns. Positions were held furiously for a few minutes and then abandoned in anticipation of heavier attacks, the local force maneuvering around to establish roadblocks and ambushes. This combination of defensive elements by experienced Caribbean soldiers easily inflicted significant damage on the helicopter assault forces and denied them landing zones.

CIA report for September 1984, based on seized Grenadian documents, highlighting Soviet bloc armament shipments to Grenada, which would have continued until 1986

The enemy’s resistance was often determined and unexpected, depending on the fighting capacity of the Grenadian, Cuban and Soviet professionals defending their objectives. The CJTF was able to take advantage of the fact that Grenada possessed no radar installations or Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites – allowing the USAF and Navy’s airpower to provide close air support and reconnaissance. That said, the PRA was well supplied with small arms, anti-aircraft equipment, mortars, rifles, machine-guns and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), modern, Soviet and Eastern Bloc mad, and sold in large quantities with the intention of eventually being exported to South America.

Although the enemy’s capacity to sustain resistance was rapidly destroyed and, more importantly, a legitimate and popular democratic interim government re-established, at the tactical level individual actions could still frustrate the American effort. The PRA and its allies fought successfully against elite JSOC elements until being overwhelmed by conventional reinforcements and air strikes. Four Black Hawks, two Cobra gunships, and one Marine Sea Knight helicopter were destroyed or shot-down during the operation, with many more badly damaged.

Clockwise: Machinist’s Mate 1st Class Kenneth J. Butcher, (1)  Senior Chief Engineman Robert R. Schamberger, (2), Hull Maintenance Technician 1st Class, Stephen L. Morris, (3) Quartermaster First Class, Kevin E. Lundberg, (4), SEAL Team 6 crew killed 24 October 1983.

The loss of the Navy’s SEAL Team 6 operators and the 160^th SOAR pilots was another blow to JSOC and its mission, but also a transformative event for the incipient special operations force, similar in magnitude to the aftermath of Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989), Operation Gothic Serpent in Somalia (1993), Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan (2002), or the set-piece Operation Vigilant Resolve, in Fallujah, Iraq (2004).

The success of the Rangers resulted in the creation of an additional Ranger battalion, with the three battalions of the 75^th Infantry Regiment (Ranger) regrouped together as the 75^th Ranger Regiment on 17 April 1986.[ccxvii] The Goldwater-Nichols act followed, reorganizing the Defense Department and creating the new Special Operations Command (SOCOM), stemming from lessons learned regarding inter-service cooperation and communication during Urgent Fury.

Task Force 120 casualties, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

4 November 1983, Nancy and Ronald Reagan greet wounded veterans at the Grenada and Lebanon campaign memorial service.

US losses amounted to 19 killed and 116 wounded. The 160^th Aviation Battalion’s 45-man crew had 11 wounded with one pilot killed in the first twenty minutes during the initial helicopter insertion.[ccxviii] At least 13 JSOC personnel had died in combat.[ccxix] Ten Rangers had been killed or died of their wounds, with another 10 seriously wounded.[ccxx] Two members of the 82^nd Airborne had been killed.

Memorial service for the two 82nd Airborne soldiers killed on Grenada, 2nd Battalion B Company CO, Captain Michael Ritz and Staff Sergeant Gary Epps.

Marine Corps Commandant General Paul Kelley and his wife at the Bethesda Naval Hospital, visiting Captain Timothy Howard, the survivor of the Cobra shot-down on 25 October. & Captain Keith Lucas, helicopter pilot killed during Richmond Hill assault, the morning of 25 October 1983

1st Battalion Rangers with captured Cuban flag from Operation Urgent Fury. & A Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Rangers, KIA during Urgent Fury October 1983

Rangers Tony Nunley, Ramon Bual, and Manous Boles and others carry the coffin of Mark Yamane, the M60 gunner killed taking Salines on 25 October. & Silver Star recipient Ranger Medical Sergeant Stephen Trujillo beside Nancy Reagan at the State of the Union address on 25 January 1984. Stephen Trujillo’s story is told in his book, A Tale of the Grenada Raiders.

Cuban losses were 25 killed in action, 59 wounded and 638 prisoners, primarily the construction crew and Point Salines airport garrison. Grenadian forces casualties amounted to 45 killed and 358 wounded. 24 citizens of Grenada, primarily the 18 at the mental hospital near Fort Frederick, were killed during the operation.[ccxxi]

Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon gives a press conference on 9 November after being appointed head of the interim government of Grenada.

 US forces left Grenada by mid-December, and the government was intrusted to Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon and a nine-member council, tasked with managing the return to parliamentary democracy.[ccxxii] In 1984 Grenada elected Herbert Blaize as Prime Minister.

November 14, 1983, Castro condemned the US action in Grenada in his Nineteen Lies Speech, denying that the Salines airfield was a military base, and holding a memorial for Cubans killed during the operation.

For Castro, the Grenada operation was confirmation that President Reagan would intervene in Latin America if American interests were threatened.[ccxxiii]

Metcalf & Schwarzkopf on Grenada, from Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War (2010).

Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, despite receiving a warning for attempting to return trophy rifles to the US, became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, retiring in 1987.[ccxxiv]. In 1988 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf became the Commander in Chief of Central Command, succeeding General George B. Crist, thus becoming the architect of Operation Desert Storm.[ccxxv]

In December 1986, 14 of leaders of the anti-Bishop coup (the so-called Grenada 17) were convicted of murder by a 12-member jury. The various sentences, ranging from death by hanging to life in prison, were announced by Acting Chief Justice Denis Byron. The prosecution argued that the defendants, who pleaded not-guilty and in protest of the trial’s legitimacy had dismissed their attorneys, were members of the Central Committee that issued the orders to a four-man death squad, led by Lt. Callistus Bernard, to execute Bishop and his cabinet.

Propaganda poster denouncing the murderers of Bishop (the Grenada 17), produced by the intervention forces, from the Grenada Papers (1984).

The guilty parties appealed their sentences on 8 March 1988. Although the sentences were upheld by the appeals court in 1991, they were commuted to life in prison by the Governor-General in August of that year. Further legal complications and protests from Amnesty International resulted in ongoing scrutiny of the Grenada 17 case, and in February 2007 the London Privy Council, the highest court of the former British colonies – still, pending a November 2018 referendum[ccxxvi]  – threw out the case, resulting in the release of former General Hudson Austin in December 2008 and on 5 September 2009 the final seven of the Grenada 17, including former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, were released.[ccxxvii]

Former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard (photographed here at St. George’s in July 2007), General Hudson Austin and others (the Grenada 17) were released from prison between 2007-09 as a result of appeals to the London Privy Council that found irregularities in their trials and appeals between 1986 and 1991.

Operation Urgent Fury memorial at St. George’s University, Grenada.

Operation Urgent Fury memorial at Point Salines, from Operation Urgent Memory: The Grenada Revolution in the Caribbean Present by Shalini Puri (2014).

Appendix, Components of CJTF 120

Carrier Group 20.5

CVW-6 embarked aboard CV-62 off Lebanon in 1983. Specifications of Forrestal-class from Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1981-2

CVW-6 in October 1983  CV-62’s Air Group was CVW-6, composed of VA-15, VA-176, VA-87, HS-15, VF-32, VF-14, VAQ-131, VS-28, and VAW-122.

VA-87 A-7E Corsair IIs, embarked on CV-62 in 1982. & VA-15 A-7E Corsair II, photograph from 1984

VF-32 F14-A Tomcat launching from CV-62 in 1983, off Lebanon  & VF-14 F-14A Tomcat landing on CV-62 off Lebanon in 1983

VA-176 A-6E in 1970, also flown were KA-6D tankers. & VAQ-131 EA-6B Prowler launching from CV-62 in 1983, off Lebanon

VAW-122 E-2C Hawkeye aboard CV-62 in 1979, and at Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia

VS-28 S-3A Viking in 1982. & HS-15 SH-3H Sea King, deploying A/S sonar

USS Independence (CV-62) Carrier Battle Group

USS Richmond K. Turner (CG-20), CO Captain David Brooks Robinson, photographed in September 1981

DD-970 Caron, Urgent Fury CO Commander James Stanley Polk, photographed in March 1985.  & DDG-40 Coontz, Commander Leon Preston Brooks Jr., with USS Independence in background, Naval Station Norfolk, August 1983.

FFG-16, Clifton Sprague, underway in September 1982. Clifton Sprague was used to retrieve the US Navy SEALs on the morning of 24 October. CO: Commander, later Admiral, James Beatty Ferguson III

DD-980 Moosbrugger, underway in July 1983. DD-980 CO, Commander Donald A. Dyer

Destroyer Squadron 24

Specifications for Tarawa-class LHA, including 27,000 – 39,300-ton USS Saipan. LHA-2 CO, Captain David Michael Bennett (photographed here as Rear Admiral) 

USS Saipan (LHA-2), September 1980, with CH-46 Sea Knight, AV-8A Harrier, and OV-10D Bronco on deck.

USS Sampson (DDG-10), photographed in 1988-9. Commander Jerrold J. Negin

USS Samuel Eliot Morison (FFG-13), photographed in 1988. FFG-13 commanded by CDR Laurence Joseph Gionet, Jr., during Urgent Fury.

USNS T-AO-143 Neosho, fleet oiler

Other components of Task Force 120

USS Silversides (SSN 679), Sturgeon-class nuclear attack submarine

USS Portsmouth (SSN 707), Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarine, commissioned on 1 October 1983.  Captain Donald D. M. Olson

USS Briscoe DD-977 at Antwerp, May 1986, CO, Commander Edward Brigham Hontz

USS Aubrey Fitch FFG-34 CO, Commander Floyston Allan Weeks

AE-21 Surabachi, ammunition ship., CO, Commander Stephen P. Duermeyer

USS Recovery ARS-43, Urgent Fury CO, Lt. Commander Robert Peter Brittingham

USS Taurus PHM-3  ,  Taurus CO, Commander Richard Stewart Moore, Jr. & USS Aquila PHM-4, Urgent Fury CO, Commander David Michael lee

Task Force 124

CO TSF 124 was Captain Carl R. Erie

Amphibious Group Ships

Naval warships in the squadron included USS Guam (LPH-9), – also the operation flagship – Trenton (LPD-14), Fort Snelling (LSD-30), Manitowoc (LST-1180) and Barnstable County (LST-1197)

USS Guam (LPH-9), an 11,755 (light) – 18,300 ton (full load), Iwo Jima-class amphibious assault ship, provided the staging point for the operation (seen here in November 1982 off Lebanon). Urgent Fury CO, Captain John Maye Quaterman Jr.

9,000 (light) – 17,000 ton (full load) Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD 14), USS Trenton seen here in 1974. Urgent Fury CO: Captain Ralph Earl Whitby & LSD 30, Landing Ship Dock USS Forst Snelling (Commander William Ivey Taylor III), 7,000 to 12,000 tons loaded.

USS Barnstable County, LST-1197, Landing Ship Tank, with Landing Craft Utility 1664 alongside, 1 October 1981  Tod W. Wagner, then the commander of LST-1197

8,450 ton LST-1180 USS Manitowoc underway off Virginia in October 1985. Urgent Fury CO: Commander John Dennis Kolata

Trenton and Guam near Barcelona on 16 January 1977

******

Mid-19th century (note steamship) watercolour of St. George’s with Forts George and Frederick visible. 

Notes

[i] Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley (HarperCollins e-books, 2007)., p. 188-9

[ii] Reagan., p. 189

[iii] https://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/23/us/reagan-unhurt-as-armed-man-takes-hostages.html

[iv] Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Press, 1993)., p. 328

[v] https://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/24/nyregion/monday-october-24-1983-bombings-in-beirut.html

[vi] Vice President George Bush personally visited Lebanon, attending at the site of the bombing on 26 October.

[vii] Reagan, The Reagan Diaries., p. 190; Thatcher, The Downing Street Years., p. 330-1

[viii] Dennis Hevesi, “Joseph Metcalf III Dies at 79; Led Invasion of Grenada – The New York Times,” New York Times, March 13, 2007, sec. Obituaries, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/obituaries/13metcalf.html.

[ix] https://cawarstudies.wordpress.com/2015/10/07/armour-tactics-at-the-battle-of-73-easting-26-february-1991/

[x] Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987, ebook (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1987)., p. 280-1

[xi]  Chris Cook and John Stevenson, World History since 1914 (New York: Longman, Inc., 1991)., p. 311. Ronald Reagan gave his “Star Wars” speech on 23 June 1983

[xii] Russell Crandall, Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006)., p. 108

[xiii] Samuel D. Ward, Urgent Fury: The Operational Leadership of Vice Admiral Joseph P. Metcalf, III, Kindle ebook (Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014).

[xiv] James Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of the SAS, Delta Force, and the Spetsnaz, Kindle ebook (Hutchinson & Co. Publishers Ltd, 1988)., p. 204

[xv] Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Estes, The Marine Officer’s Guide, 7th ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008)., p.132-3; H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992)., p. 250Schwarzkopf and Petre., p. 252; Sean Naylor, Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command, Kindle ebook (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015)., p. 24

[xvi] https://cawarstudies.wordpress.com/2018/06/22/master-of-the-seas-of-the-two-indies-the-naval-career-of-admiral-sir-george-pocock/ see also, https://cawarstudies.wordpress.com/2016/12/31/captain-charles-middleton-and-the-seven-years-war/

[xvii] Cook and Stevenson, World History since 1914., p. 154

[xviii] Robert R. Quirk, Fidel Castro (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995)., p. 820

[xix] Thatcher, The Downing Street Years., p. 329

[xx] Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, Kindle ebook (Joint History Office, 1997)., p. 10

[xxi] Steven J. Mrozek, 82nd Airborne Division: America’s Guard of Honor, ed. Greg Wurth, Kindle ed. (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 2004)., loc. 1101

[xxii] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 11

[xxiii] George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, Kindle ebook (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993)., loc. 6541 – 6578

[xxiv] Shultz., loc. 6578-90

[xxv] Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987., p. 283

[xxvi] Quirk, Fidel Castro., p. 821

[xxvii] Mrozek, 82nd Airborne Division: America’s Guard of Honor., Loc. 1113

[xxviii] Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987., p. 283

[xxix] George Childs Kohn, Dictionary of Wars, Revised ed. (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 1999)., p. 198

[xxx] Quirk, Fidel Castro., p. 821

[xxxi] Mrozek, 82nd Airborne Division: America’s Guard of Honor., Loc. 1126

[xxxii] Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State., loc. 6590

[xxxiii] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 12

[xxxiv] Cole., p. 13

[xxxv] Cole., p. 12

[xxxvi] Cole., p. 13

[xxxvii] Cole., p. 14

[xxxviii] Cole., p. 14

[xxxix] Cole., p. 14

[xl] Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987., p. 280

[xli] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 15

[xlii] Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of the SAS, Delta Force, and the Spetsnaz., p. 211-2

[xliii] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 6; Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987., p. 281

[xliv] Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987., p. 282

[xlv] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 16; Lt. Col. Michael J. Byron, “Fury From the Sea: Marines in Grenada,” in The U.S. Naval Institute on The Marine Corps at War, ed. Thomas J. Cutler (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 120–42., p. 129; Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of the SAS, Delta Force, and the Spetsnaz., p. 208

[xlvi] Ronald H. Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983, Kindle ebook (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, HQ, USMC, 1987)., loc. 168

[xlvii] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 17

[xlviii] Cole., p. 18; Dan Rather, “Grenada,” Vanderbilt Television News Archive, October 21, 1983, https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/broadcasts/287081.

[xlix] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 18

[l] Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987., p. 282-3

[li] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 19

[lii] Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987., p. 283

[liii] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 20

[liv] J. D. Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present, Kindle ebook, 2nd ed. (New York: Pocket Books, 1998)., loc. 6657

[lv] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 20

[lvi] Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987., p. 283

[lvii] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 26

[lviii] Cole., p. 21

[lix] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6668

[lx] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 22

[lxi] Cole., p. 23

[lxii] Cole., p. 23; Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6678

[lxiii] Byron, “Fury From the Sea: Marines in Grenada.”, p. 128

[lxiv] Mrozek, 82nd Airborne Division: America’s Guard of Honor., Loc. 1126

[lxv] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 24

[lxvi] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 123

[lxvii] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6657

[lxviii] Mark Markowitz, “Urgent Fury: U.S. Special Operations Forces in Grenada, 1983 | Defense Media Network,” Defense Media Network, June 3, 2013, https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/urgent-fury-u-s-special-operations-forces-in-grenada-1983/

[lxix] Eric L. Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit (New York: Bantam Dell, Random House, Inc., 2002)., p. 365

[lxx] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 20; Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6678

[lxxi] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6678

[lxxii] Lock., loc. 6688

[lxxiii] Lock., loc. 6688

[lxxiv] Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit., p. 367

[lxxv] Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 247

[lxxvi] Schwarzkopf and Petre., p. 247; Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (Lexington Books, 1989)., p. 137

[lxxvii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 143

[lxxviii] Spector., loc. 157

[lxxix] Spector., loc. 196

[lxxx] Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 245-6

[lxxxi] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 28

[lxxxii] Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 246

[lxxxiii] Schwarzkopf and Petre., p. 247; Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 27; Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6730

[lxxxiv] Ward, Urgent Fury: The Operational Leadership of Vice Admiral Joseph P. Metcalf, III., loc. 164

[lxxxv] Ward., loc. 176

[lxxxvi] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 29

[lxxxvii] Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 248; Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc 228

[lxxxviii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 236

[lxxxix] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 30

[xc] Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit., p. 366; Michael J. Durant, Stephen Hartov, and Robert L. Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Kindle ebook (New York: New American Library, 2008)., p. 11, 15

[xci] Durant, Hartov, and Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment., p. 2, 11-12

[xcii] Durant, Hartov, and Johnson., p. 14

[xciii] Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit., p. 368

[xciv] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 123; Joseph Metcalf, “Decision Making and the Grenada Rescue Operation,” in Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on MIlitary Decision Making, ed. James G. March and Roger Weissinger-Baylon (Marshfield: Pitman Publishing, 1986)., p. 291; Durant, Hartov, and Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment., p. 13; Adams, Secret Armies: The Full Story of the SAS, Delta Force, and the Spetsnaz., p. 211

[xcv] Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit., p. 368

[xcvi] Edgar F. Raines, The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military Histroy, United States Army, 2010)., p. 164-5

[xcvii] Orr Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters, Kindle ebook (New York: Open Road Integrated Media, Inc., 1992)., loc. 3926-37

[xcviii] Kelly., loc. 3949-61. The Boston whaler boats are sometimes described as Zodiacs. Sometimes the team composition is given as 11 SEALs and one CCT.

[xcix] Michael Walsh and Greg Walker, SEAL!: From Vietnam’s Phoenix Program to Central America’s Drug Wars (New York: Pocket Books, 1995)., p. 227-32

[c] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 27; Dick Couch and William Doyle, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story (HarperCollins e-books, 2014)., p.141; Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 236

[ci] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 27; Couch and Doyle, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story., p. 141; Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc 442; Walsh and Walker, SEAL!: From Vietnam’s Phoenix Program to Central America’s Drug Wars., p. 237

[cii] Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 3961

[ciii] Kelly., loc. 3973

[civ] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6730; Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 248-9; Raines, The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983., p. 242

[cv] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 247

[cvi] Edwin Howard Simmons, The United States Marines: A History, 4th ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003)., p. 273

[cvii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 257

[cviii] Spector., loc. 275

[cix] Spector., loc. 275

[cx] Spector., loc. 275

[cxi] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 32; Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 287

[cxii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 303

[cxiii] Spector., loc. 318

[cxiv] Couch and Doyle, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story., p. 142; Durant, Hartov, and Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment., p. 23-4

[cxv] Durant, Hartov, and Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment., p. 19-20

[cxvi] Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 3881

[cxvii] Couch and Doyle, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story., p. 142

[cxviii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 349

[cxix] Couch and Doyle, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story., p. 144

[cxx] Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 3881; Durant, Hartov, and Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment., p. 27

[cxxi] Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 3904; Couch and Doyle, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story., p. 125. In Couch and Doyle Lt. Erskine is referred to as Lt. Jason Kendall, although the text of the narration is identical to Couch’s telling of the event from The Warrior Elite where Erskine is referenced. Erskine did in fact receive the Silver Star, and there is no mention of Jason Kendall outside of this source.

[cxxii] Couch and Doyle, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story., p. 125-6

[cxxiii] Dick Couch, The Warrior Elite: The Forging of SEAL Class 228, Epub ebook (Three Rivers Press, 2009)., p. 16

[cxxiv] Couch and Doyle, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story., p. 131; Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 3915

[cxxv] Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 3926

[cxxvi] Couch and Doyle, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story., p. 135-8

[cxxvii] Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit., p. 370-1; Durant, Hartov, and Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment., p. 22

[cxxviii]  Durant, Hartov, and Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment., p. 22

[cxxix] Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit., p. 379-80

[cxxx] Haney., p. 374

[cxxxi] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6864

[cxxxii] Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 250

[cxxxiii] Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit., p. 377-8

[cxxxiv] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6719

[cxxxv] Lock., loc. 6730

[cxxxvi] Lock., loc. 6740

[cxxxvii] Lock., loc. 6751

[cxxxviii] Mrozek, 82nd Airborne Division: America’s Guard of Honor., loc. 1135; Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6719, 6751

[cxxxix] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6761

[cxl] Lock., loc. 6761-71

[cxli] Stephen Trujillo, A Tale of the Grenada Raiders, Kindle ebook, 2017., p. 364

[cxlii] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6781; Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 3961

[cxliii] Trujillo, A Tale of the Grenada Raiders., p. 131

[cxliv] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6781; Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 6781

[cxlv] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6781; Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 6822

[cxlvi] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 32

[cxlvii] Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit., p. 379

[cxlviii] Mrozek, 82nd Airborne Division: America’s Guard of Honor., loc. 1135

[cxlix] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6781; Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters., loc. 6802

[cl] Trujillo, A Tale of the Grenada Raiders., p. 173-7

[cli] Haney, Inside Delta Force, The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit., p. 378; Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6874

[clii] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 33

[cliii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 360

[cliv] Spector., loc. 376

[clv] Spector., loc. 411-22

[clvi] Spector., loc. 422

[clvii] Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 250

[clviii] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 34

[clix] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 349

[clx] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 34

[clxi] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 432

[clxii] Spector., loc. 442

[clxiii] Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 252

[clxiv] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 460

[clxv] Spector., loc. 480

[clxvi] Spector., loc. 493

[clxvii] Spector., loc. 509

[clxviii] Spector., loc. 515

[clxix] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 35

[clxx] Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform (Simon & Schuster, 1985)., p. 54

[clxxi] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 524

[clxxii] Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 253

[clxxiii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 524

[clxxiv] Spector., loc. 534

[clxxv] Schwarzkopf and Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero., p. 255

[clxxvi] Schwarzkopf and Petre., p. 254

[clxxvii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 568

[clxxviii] Spector., loc. 568

[clxxix] Spector., loc. 590

[clxxx] Spector., loc. 610

[clxxxi] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6905; Trujillo, A Tale of the Grenada Raiders., p. 210

[clxxxii] Mrozek, 82nd Airborne Division: America’s Guard of Honor., loc. 1154

[clxxxiii] Mrozek., loc. 1154

[clxxxiv] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 649

[clxxxv] Spector., loc. 649

[clxxxvi] Spector., loc. 681

[clxxxvii] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 38

[clxxxviii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 705

[clxxxix] Spector., loc. 726

[cxc] Michael T. Flynn and Michael Ledeen, The Field of Fight: How to Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies, ebook (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016)., p. 16-18

[cxci] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6874

[cxcii] Lock., loc. 6915

[cxciii] Trujillo, A Tale of the Grenada Raiders., p. 252-65

[cxciv] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6915

[cxcv] Lock., loc. 6936; Trujillo, A Tale of the Grenada Raiders., p. 271

[cxcvi]  Trujillo, A Tale of the Grenada Raiders., p. 271

[cxcvii] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6936; Trujillo, A Tale of the Grenada Raiders., p. 279-99

[cxcviii] Gordon Rottman, US Army Rangers & LRRP Units, 1942-86 (London: Reed International Books Ltd., 1997)., p. 46-8; Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6946

[cxcix] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6946

[cc] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 39-40

[cci] Cole., p. 42

[ccii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 741

[cciii] Spector., loc. 751

[cciv] Spector., loc. 786

[ccv] Spector., loc. 807

[ccvi] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 45

[ccvii] Spector, U. S. Marines in Grenada, 1983., loc. 819

[ccviii] Spector., loc. 830-2

[ccix] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 47

[ccx] John Vessey, Selected Works of General John Vessey, Kindle ebook (Progressive Management, 2013)., p. 85-90

[ccxi] Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, 1997., p. 47

[ccxii] Byron, “Fury From the Sea: Marines in Grenada.”, p. 137

[ccxiii] Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991)., p. 285

[ccxiv] Thatcher, The Downing Street Years., p. 332-3

[ccxv] Raines, The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983., p. 170

[ccxvi] Mark Evans and Roy Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation, 1910-2010, Statistics, Kindle ebook, vol. 2, 2 vols. (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016)., loc. 3417

[ccxvii] Rottman, US Army Rangers & LRRP Units, 1942-86., p. 48

[ccxviii]  Durant, Hartov, and Johnson, The Night Stalkers: Top Secret Missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment., p. 26

[ccxix] Naylor, Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command., p. 24

[ccxx] Lock, To Fight With Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present., loc. 6946

[ccxxi] Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 1983, Kindle ed. (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997)., p. 9

[ccxxii] Kohn, Dictionary of Wars., p. 198

[ccxxiii] Quirk, Fidel Castro., p. 819

[ccxxiv] Hevesi, “Joseph Metcalf III Dies at 79; Led Invasion of Grenada – The New York Times.”

[ccxxv] https://cawarstudies.wordpress.com/2015/10/07/armour-tactics-at-the-battle-of-73-easting-26-february-1991/

[ccxxvi] Dominica News Online, “Antigua and Grenada to Hold Referendum on CCJ on Nov 6,” Dominica News Online, accessed July 19, 2018, http://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/news/antigua-and-grenada-to-hold-referendum-on-ccj-on-nov-6/.

[ccxxvii] Times Wire Services, “14 Convicted of Murdering Grenada Leader, 10 Others,” Los Angeles Times, December 5, 1986, http://articles.latimes.com/1986-12-05/news/mn-790_1_grenada-leader. & “BBCCaribbean.Com | Last of ‘Grenada 17’ Released,” September 7, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/09/090907_grenada_release.shtml. & Linda Straker, “7 Convicted of Killing Grenada Leader Released,” sandiegouniontribune.com, September 5, 2009, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-cb-grenada-coup-prisoners-090509-2009sep05-story.html. & Peter Ischyrion, “Privy Council Throws out Death Sentence against Maurice Bishop’s Killers,” Caribbean360 (blog), February 9, 2007, http://www.caribbean360.com/news/privy-council-throws-out-death-sentence-against-maurice-bishops-killers.

Master of the Seas of the Two Indies: the Naval Career of Admiral Sir George Pocock

Early 19th Century oil painting of Sir George Pocock, based on a c. 1761 painting by Thomas Hudson.

The Career of Admiral Sir George Pocock

A distant figure in our time, Sir George Pocock was a consummate naval officer, with victories in both the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, responsible in the latter for securing command of the Indian Ocean during 1759, and for Britain’s greatest maritime operation of the 18^th century – the capture of Havana in 1762. Closely associated with controversial figures such as Lord Clive, John Byng and the Earl of Albemarle, Pocock was marginalized in the historiography during the 19^th century in comparison to the towering figures of Anson, Rodney, Hawke and Boscawen. Pocock nevertheless played an integral role in several of Britain’s most important maritime operations and his well deserved reputation for courage, steadfastness and imperturbability encourage modern reappraisal.

The Young Gentleman

George Pocock was born on 6 March 1706 at Thames Ditton, Surrey, the son of the Reverend Thomas Pocock and his wife Joyce Master. Thomas was a Royal Navy chaplain who ministered to the Royal Hospital at Greenwich.[i]

HMS Superb, captured French Superbe of 1710, flagship of Admiral George Byng, Pocock’s first posting in 1718

Pocock’s naval career began in 1718 at the age of twelve when he joined HMS Superb (64), the captured French warship then the flagship of Admiral George Byng (Viscount Torrington) – himself married to one Margaret, Joyce’s sister. Superb’s flag captain was Streynsham Master, Pocock’s uncle. Pocock was accompanied to sea by his cousin John Byng (of eventual Minorca infamy) who was also beginning his career aboard the flagship of the Admiral, his father.[ii] Pocock’s path was thus smoothed by his close association with senior officers and his extended network of relatives and relations.

Both Byng and Pocock were aboard Superb when it fought at the battle at Cape Passaro, Sicily, 11 August 1718.[iii] From here Pocock spent three years aboard the hospital ship Looe and a further four years aboard the warships Prince Frederick (70) and Argyle (50).

HMS Namur, 90 gun 2nd rate in which Pocock was made First Lieutenant in August 1732.

The Portrait of a Naval Officer, from Lieutenant to Post Captain

Pocock made Lieutenant on 19 April 1725 (other sources say December 1726), and was stationed aboard HMS Burford (70), followed by Romney (54), and then Canterbury (60).[iv] Pocock was next appointed to HMS Namur (90) the flagship of Admiral Sir Charles Wager, and in August 1732 he was promoted to First Lieutenant. Pocock’s first command was the fireship Bridgewater, to which he was appointed on 26 February 1733.

1719 establishment frigate similar to the 1727 rebuilt 20 gun 6th rate HMS Aldborough, Pocock’s first command in 1738.

Pocock made Commander in February 1734,[v] and after four years of service was promoted, on 1 August 1738 at the age of 32, to Post Captain with command of the frigate Aldborough (20), first built in Pocock’s birth-year of 1706, then rebuilt in 1727.[vi] Thus, Pocock was stationed in the Mediterranean under Rear Admiral Haddock. The squadron in which Pocock served secured several lucrative Spanish captures following the declaration of war in 1739.[vii] Pocock continued in the Mediterranean until 1741, and then he returned to England.

HMS Woolwich in 1677 as a 54 gun 4th rate, by Willem van de Velde, rebuilt in 1702 and again in 1736 as a 50 gun ship, to which Captain Pocock was appointed in 1742.

In August 1742, now 36, Pocock was appointed to the Woolwich (50), a heavily rebuilt 4^th rate originally completed in 1675.[viii] He was transferred briefly to the Shrewsbury and then in 1744 (or January 1743) he was appointed to the Sutherland (50) a new 4^th rate only three years out of the yards, in command of which he was despatched to the East Indies, convoying British East India Company (BEIC) ships. These 4^th rates of the 1733 and 1741 establishment were designed by Sir Jacob Acworth, the Surveyor of the Navy between 1715-1749. Although plentifully armed,[ix] they were nevertheless under-gunned due to a shortage in heavier ordnance that prevailed in Britain during the 1730s, and have further been criticized as cramped and overly expensive.[x]

Lines of the ‘Sutherland’-type 50 gun 4th rates built in 1741, Pocock’s command in 1744.

Block model of HMS Preston a 1733 establishment 50 gun cruiser built in 1742. The 853 ton 4th rate was crewed by 300 men and equipped with 22 18-pounders, 26 12-pounders, 14 6-pounders on the quarterdeck and four 6-pounders on the forecastle.

Model of 50-gun cruiser circa 1725, similar to the newer Sutherland commanded by Captain Pocock in 1744.

Pocock was ordered to the African coast in October 1744, but his sailing from Plymouth was delayed due to trouble fitting and manning the Sutherland and the operation was not carried out until April 1745 (Pocock arrived at Madeira on the 27^th of that month).[xi]

The eastern Caribbean during the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the principle convoy assembly points at Antigua (British – red), and Martinique (French – blue) circled.

Map of Antigua made in 1780 and drawn from late 1740s surveys, base of Britain’s Leeward Island Station during the 18th century

Pocock was eventually assigned to the Barbadoes and Leeward Islands station under Commodore Edward Legge, who had been appointed to the Leeward Island station command on 24 October 1746.[xii] The Sutherland, arrived at Antigua on 28 April 1747. Under Legge’s command, Pocock’s Sutherland was employed on trade defence, convoy protection and shipping interdiction missions, working with the other cruisers on station in pairs. Sutherland worked alongside HMS Captain (70), Suffolk (70), Dragon (60), Sunderland (60), Dreadnought (60), Gosport (44), and assorted frigates and sloops against the French convoys sailing from Martinique.[xiii]

Second Battle of Cape Finisterre, 14 (25) October 1747, Rear Admiral Hawke’s action scattered a large French convoy that proceeded to the West Indies where it was intercepted by Pocock’s Leeward Island’s squadron in November.

Pocock was thrust into command when Commodore Legge became seriously ill in August and then died on 18 or 19 September 1747 at the age of 37. Pocock, the senior captain, now succeeded Legge as C-in-C.[xiv] Pocock’s singular achievement came in November with the capture of a scattered French convoy, the result of Rear Admiral Hawke’s action off Cape Finisterre, 14 (Julian, 25, Gregorian) October 1747.[xv] Pocock’s small squadron of cruisers, frigates, sloops and privateers captured as many as 40 merchant ships – and 900 prisoners – although a further 66 merchant ships from the original convoy of 252 made it to Martinique.[xvi]

Pocock returned to England, having been relieved in the Caribbean in May 1748 by Rear Admiral Henry Osborne. Shortly afterwards, on 18 October 1748, the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ended the War of Austrian Succession.

Pocock, now a wealthy – although not yet rich – man as the result of his shipping captures, moved into an apartment on St. James Street, London. In 1749, at the age of 43, Pocock was painted by Thomas Hudson.

Commodore George Pocock, 43, painted by Thomas Hudson in 1749

Pocock had no command until 1754 when he was appointed to the Cumberland (66) for home duty, before being transferred to the Eagle (60) – although this ship was badly damaged in a storm, and Pocock returned to the Cumberland – to sail on 24 March with Rear Admiral Charles Watson and 400 troops, destined for the East Indies.[xvii]

Admiral in the Indian Ocean

The Seven Years War with France provided Pocock with the opportunity he needed to resume his naval career. Cumberland arrived in the Indian Ocean in September 1754 and Pocock’s role in the global conflict began at sea on 6 January (or 4 February) 1755 when he was advanced to the rank of Rear Admiral of the White.

Maps of India, showing European trade stations during the Seven Years War, and prevailing annual weather during.

Pocock sails for India in early 1755 aboard HMS Cumberland

The capture of Geriah, 12 – 13 February 1756, by Dominic Serres in 1771. Rear Admiral Watson’s flagship, HMS Kent is in the centre, with Pocock’s Cumberland to its right, facing backwards.

Cumberland reached Bombay on 10 November 1755. Watson and Pocock were soon engaged fighting the pirate Tugalee Angria, who sortied from his base at Geriah near Goa. Rear Admiral Watson in Kent, with Pocock as his second in command in Cumberland, transported a detachment of troops under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Clive to Geriah, arriving on 12 February 1756. Clive’s soldiers were landed in the evening while Watson’s force put Angria’s pirate flotilla to the torch and bombarded his base. Although Angria himself escaped, the pirate’s base and treasure (including £130,000 of spices, jewels, and other valuables) were captured. Watson returned to Madras at the end of April, and Pocock was promoted to Rear Admiral of the Red on 4 June 1756.

Almost two weeks later Suraj-ud-Daula, the nineteen year-old nawab of Bengal, deployed 30,000 men to surround Calcutta, where Britain’s Fort William was garrisoned by a mere 500 soldiers. The fort fell on 20 June, the captured British prisoners suffering their ignominious fate in the notorious Black Hole of Calcutta – more than half dying from suffocation.[xviii]

News of this disaster reached Madras on 16 August, where Watson and Pocock were stationed. A relief expedition was organised but it was unable to sail until October when the prevailing winds made progress tortuously slow. Pocock’s mission, working with C-in-C Watson, was to escort a landing force to Calcutta, but the squadron did not arrive until 8 December,[xix] while Pocock’s Cumberland had became separated from the attacking squadron and was running short on supplies. By the time Pocock reached Calcutta, in January, Calcutta and the surrounding forts had already been recaptured by Watson’s landing force of 700 regulars, 600 sailors and marines, and 1,200 sepoys, commanded once again by Colonel Robert Clive. Nevertheless, Pocock was promoted to Vice Admiral of the White in February 1757 (or possibly earlier on 8 December 1756).

Clive, after defeating Suraj-ud-Daula in open battle and securing his cooperation through a peace treaty on 9 February, was eager to advance on towards the French trade post at Chandernagore. Conveniently, it was now that news arrived from Europe that war had indeed been declared between France and Britain, so Clive and Watson set off upriver.[xx]

Rear Admiral Watson’s force – Kent, Tiger (under Pocock) and Salisbury – bombarding Chandernagore on 23 March 1757, by Dominic Serres, 1771

Pocock, arriving at Calcutta shortly after this, followed up the Hooghly river in a boat and barge flotilla. He arrived on 22 March 1757 and immediately took command of the warship Tiger (60), which along with Kent (70) and Salisbury (50) had managed to work themselves upriver. The bombardment was opened the following day. In this violent action Pocock himself was wounded when he was hit by flying splinters (Salisbury failed to get into position while Tiger suffered 13 killed and 54 wounded; Kent another 19 killed and 74 wounded).[xxi] Following the surrender of Chandernagore, Clive went on to defeat Suraj-ud-Daula – who had once again turned against the BEIC – in the famous battle at Plassey, 23 June 1757.[xxii]

On 15 or 16 August 1757 Rear Admiral Watson died of fever at Calcutta and Pocock assumed command of the entire East Indies squadron. Also at this time, Pocock learned of the court martial and execution of his cousin, Admiral John Byng, stemming from the latter’s failure to recapture Minorca (20 May 1756).

Royal Navy reinforcements arrive in 1757 & Pocock becomes C-in-C East Indies. Note the loss of Kent.

The Duel

Early in 1758 Pocock left Bengal for Madras, where he was met by Commodore Charles Steevens with reinforcements: four ships-of-the-line and a frigate,[xxiii] and on 5 February (or 31 January) Pocock was promoted to Vice Admiral of the Red.[xxiv]  The essence of fleet strategy in the Indian Ocean revolved around securing trade from the west coast of the sub-continent between April and September, before the monsoon season began, and no doubt the French would do what they could to interdict this trade.

Indeed, intelligence soon arrived that the French were sending reinforcements to counter-attack. A small force led by the skilled Anne Antoine Comte d’Ache de Serquigny had been despatched from Brest on 3 May 1757 (although three of d’Ache’s four ships-of-the-line had to be diverted to Louisburg).[xxv]

Build up of forces in the Indian Ocean during 1758, Pocock battles the Comte d’Ache for control of the East Indies.

Pocock’s East Indies squadron after being reinforced by Commodore Stevens in early 1758. Note Captain Richard Kempenfelt’s presence as Commodore Stevens’ flag-captain aboard HMS Elizabeth.

Pocock flew his flag from HMS Yarmouth (70) and put to sea on 17 April, passing Negapatam and Fort St. David, and on 28 April Pocock’s squadron of seven intercepted the Comte d’Ache’s squadron of nine (eight total owned by the French East India Company, some acquired enroute at Mauritius) near Cuddalore.[xxvi] D’Ache had previously arrived at Fort St. David where he forced two of Pocock’s detached frigates to run aground, whence the British crews torched the ships to prevent capture.[xxvii]

D’Ache was escorting 1,200 French reinforcements (four battalions) under the command of the Comte de Lally (Lieutenant General Thomas Arthur Lally, baron de Tollendal, descendent of an Irish émigré; a solider of fortune) destined for Pondicherry. While Pocock was preparing to close with d’Ache, the Comte despatched Lally-Tollendal in the Comte de Provence (74) to make for Pondicherry, leaving d’Ache with only eight ships to fight Pocock’s seven.

HMS Yarmouth (70), Pocock’s command in 1758-9

View of Pocock’s first action with d’Ache, 29 April 1758

Order of battle for Cuddalore/Gondelour

Between 2:15 and 3 pm on 29 April Pocock steered directly for d’Ache’s flagship, the Zodiaque, and although he was receiving incoming fire from the French line, did not return fire until within pistol-shot.[xxviii] At the decisive moment he signaled for close action. In the ensuing battle (known as the battle of Gondelour in French and Cuddalore or Sadras in English), only four of Pocock’s ships engaged (leaving Cumberland, Newcastle, and Weymouth behind, and generating court martials for the three hesitant captains), and by the time the three laggard ships had caught up the British had been badly damanged, allowing d’Ache to make good his escape, limping into Pondicherry, where the Comte de Lally had already arrived.[xxix] Although Pocock flew the signal for general chase it was clear the British, with many sails and masts shot away, could not pursue and thus only the frigate Queenborough was sent ahead to try to locate the French squadron during the night, but to no avail.[xxx] D’Ache later lost the East Indiaman Bien-Aime (58) when it crashed ashore.[xxxi]

Nevertheless, Pocock’s force had inflicted numerous casualties: 162 killed and 360 wounded (or near 600 killed and wounded), in particular aboard d’Ache’s flagship. D’Ache, however, had done well himself, having achieved his objective of getting through to Pondicherry and had inflicted casualties of his own, primarily on the Yarmouth. Total British losses were 29 killed and 85 (or 89) wounded.[xxxii]

Pocock refitted at Madras and was prepared to sail on 10 May. Lally-Tollendal was on the move, however, and with 3,500 Europeans and another 3,000 Indian troops first captured Cuddalore and then laid siege to Fort St. David.[xxxiii] Pocock intended to relieve the siege of Fort St. David, but was unable to reach the outpost before it surrendered on 2 or 6 June, along with its garrison of 1,000.[xxxiv] Pocock’s normally cool temper was by now enflamed and upon return to Madras for victuals and water he ordered the court martials of Captains Vincent, Legge and Brereton, whom he held responsible for failing to engage on 29 April. Captain Vincent was relieved of his command, Legge was cashiered and Brereton reduced a year in seniority.[xxxv] The incident had stung Pocock – a man not easily shaken from his serene demeanour – and in later years he acknowledged this fact, coming to believe that he had been overly harsh in handing out these sentences.[xxxvi]

British and French order of battle off Negapatam, 3 August 1758. Notice the change of British captains following the court martials held in July.

Pocock put to sea again on 25 July and made a half dozen merchant ship captures before scouting the harbour at Pondicherry on the 27th. D’Ache, realizing he was about to be trapped, and with few provisions remaining, took his force of seven and a frigate and fled to sea, once again alluding Pocock’s general pursuit.[xxxvii] Pocock was, however, able to capture and burn a French ammunition ship that had been approaching Pondicherry.

Pocock sighted d’Ache on 1 August, and, although d’Ache skillfully delayed with a series of maneuvers all of August 2^nd, Pocock was finally able to bring the Comte to action on the morning of the 3^rd near Negapatam.[xxxviii] At 1:20 pm d’Ache decided it was time; his fleet drawn up in a crescent, and signaled to engage. Pocock followed suit, but was temporarily frustrated as d’Ache pulled his squadron away, firing chain shot at the English line, carrying away signals and masts.[xxxix] Pocock was determined to fight, however, and at 2:25 flew the signal for close action.

Captain Kempenfelt in the Elizabeth furiously attacked the Comte de Provence, temporarily setting it ablaze, then moving on to attack the Duc de Bourgoyne. Meanwhile, Pocock, in the Yarmourth, once again made for d’Ache’s flagship, the Zodiaque, and engaged it with a heavy fire, destroying the ship’s wheel. A gun exploded aboard the French flagship and in the confusion the Zodiaque collided with the Duc d’Orleans.[xl] With Yarmouth and Tiger closing in, d’Ache could see that the battle was turning against him – once again the daring French commander effected his escape, making for Pondicherry at 2:08 pm. Pocock signaled for general chase but, again, it was too late and d’Ache, although shaken, limped back into harbour. Pocock’s squadron suffered 200 casualties (31 killed and 116 – 166 wounded, including a slightly injured Pocock and Commodore Steevens – who had been shot by musket ball in the shoulder)[xli] to d’Ache’s 800 (250 killed and 600 wounded, amongst the latter including d’Ache himself as well as his flag captain).[xlii]

The strategic situation was liable to worsen as the French, on 9 March, had despatched additional reinforcements from Brest: Minotaure (74), Actif (64), and Illustre  (64), as well as Fortune (54) from Lorient on 7 March. The Royal Navy was able to spare only Grafton (70) and Sunderland (60) sailing from England on 8 March.[xliii]

In the meantime, with the monsoon season set to arrive, Pocock made for Bombay to effect his repairs while d’Ache sailed for Mauritius (where he combined with Captain Froger de L’Eguille’s force of three-of-the-line). On 14 December Lally-Tollendal sieged Madras, but the siege was broken when Captain Kempenfelt, despatched by Pocock, arrived with frigates and several small craft loaded with stores and reinforcements, forcing Lally-Tollendal to raise the siege on 17 February 1759.[xliv]

Order of battle for Pondicherry

Battle of Pondicherry, 10 September 1759, the culminating battle between Pocock (top) and d’Ache (bottom), concluding with d’Ache’s flight from the Indian Ocean, securing India for Britain, much as Admiral Saunders and General Wolfe had done for Canada at Quebec (13 September), Commodore Moore had done for Guadeloupe in the West Indies (1 May), while Hawke destroyed the Brest fleet at Quiberon Bay (20 November) and Boscawen destroyed the Toulon fleet at Lagos (18 August): the string of victories that made 1759 Britain’s annus mirabilis.

Royal Navy casualties at Pondicherry

The situation remained a stalemate until 17 April 1759, when Pocock, with the weather once again favourable, sailed for Ceylon, hoping to intercept d’Ache at sea. For the following four months Pocock cruised, hunting for the French squadron.[xlv] Nevertheless, d’Ache was nowhere to be found and with provisions running low, Pocock set course for Trincomale on 1 September. However, within 24 hours of this decision, the frigate Revenge located d’Ache’s squadron at sea and hastened to inform Pocock. Hearing of this break of good fortune Pocock put about and signaled for a general chase. D’Ache, once again faced with his old nemesis, knew exactly what to do and proceeded to amuse Pocock at sea for three days, until the French commander disappeared into a bank of haze.

Pocock immediately made to blockade Pondicherry, hoping to intercept d’Ache should he try for that port – which was in fact d’Ache’s intention as he carried supplies for that critical base.[xlvi] Pocock arrived off Pondicherry on 8 September early in the morning; exactly eight hours before d’Ache. The French squadron was sighted at 1 pm and two hours later had been identified as 13 sail.[xlvii] Pocock continued ahead of d’Ache to prevent his escape and hounded the French squadron for 48 hours, finally closing on d’Ache’s line at 2:10 pm on 10 September. On this occasion (known as the battle of Pondicherry) Pocock had nine of the line against d’Ache’s eleven. D’Ache, with Yarmouth nearly within musket shot, saw that battle was now unavoidable and signaled for action, Pocock immediately following. An intense cannonade commenced until d’Ache pulled away not long after 4 pm. Once again Pocock’s ships were too badly damaged in their masts and yards to pursue. In the pitched battle d’Ache himself was again wounded (and his flag-captain killed), one amongst a total of 1,500 French casualties. Pocock’s forces had sustained 569 casualties (118 killed and another 66 dying afterwards, with another 385 variously wounded).[xlviii] Furthermore, Captain Michie of the Newcastle had been killed.[xlix]

Pocock ordered the frigate Revenge to follow d’Ache while the English made quick repairs at sea. The next morning the English sighted the French squadron but d’Ache again made sail, disappearing over the horizon. With Tiger and Cumberland under tow, Pocock made for Negapatam to repair, where he sent to Madras for reinforcements. At sea again on the 20^th, Pocock set course for Pondicherry, where he found d’Ache at anchor beneath the fortress guns on the 27^th – the French admiral had achieved his purpose and had landed his supplies. To Pocock’s frustration d’Ache proceeded to slip away, avoiding the still damaged English ships. Pocock returned to Madras. D’Ache, meanwhile, made for Mauritius, leaving the Royal Navy in control of the Indian Ocean, and clearing the way for the capture of Pondicherry itself, accomplished on 15 January 1761.

The East Indiaman “Pitt” engages St. Louis on 28 September 1758/9, by Dunn Lawson. St. Louis was a veteran of all three of d’Ache’s battles with Pocock. An artistic representation of the grand naval duel for India – if the exact particulars are perhaps imaginary.

Pocock, his health weakened by five years of relentless warfare in the East Indies, was ordered to hand-over his command to Commodore Steevens and return to London at the end of 1759. Pocock, however, felt his presence was still required and thus did not relinquish his command until April 1760. Back in London, he was rewarded with a marble bust commissioned by a grateful East India Company. Later that year, at the age of 54, Pocock was elected MP for Plymouth, and was subsequently knighted in March 1761. Pocock used his influence and his close relationship with Lord Anson to advance the interests of his commanders, being able to get James Hawker promoted, although not William Owen.[l] Pocock believed in rewarding those who had supported him, telling a follower that, “…if not too open and glaring an impropriety, I might rely on him.”[li]

Of Pocock’s actions in Indian waters Sir Julian Corbett wrote in 1907, “It is the fashion now merely to deride his battle tactics, which after three actions in eighteen months had failed to secure a real decision, though the tactics which would have secured a decision against a superior force determined to avoid one are never very clearly indicated. More just it would be to praise his vehement ‘general chases’, the daring and resolute attacks which in manner yielded nothing to Hawke’s, and above all for the strategical insight and courage which enabled him to dominate a sea which it was practically impossible for his inferior force to command.”[lii]

As for D’Ache, Pocock’s great antagonist in those distant waters, Pitt’s American strategy – culminating in the capture of Quebec while treating India as a holding action – had effectively terminated the threat from Mauritius. Clive now wrote that, “…this time the superiority of our force at sea, I take for granted, is beyond dispute, and of consequence our resources must be more than those of the French… A victory on our side must confine the French within the walls Pondicherry; and when that happens, nothing can save them from destruction, but a superior force at sea…”[liii] On 8 June 1760 news arrived at Mauritius informing D’Ache that the English were now preparing to shift their efforts to the Indies and thus that he should expect an operation with sizable forces against his island base, precluding any chance of further operations in Indian waters.[liv] D’Ache sent two frigates to inform Pondicherry of this unhappy fate and in January 1761 that last, all-important, French base in India capitulated.[lv]

Return of a fleet into Plymouth Harbour, Dominic Serres, 1766

Triumph: The Havana Operation of 1762

War was declared against Spain on 4 January 1762 when the British government learnt of a treaty signed between France and Spain in August the previous year. The Cabinet, once again under the Duke of Newcastle, reached the decision to strike Havana on 6 January (a project Pitt had proposed before his resignation in October 1761), and Pocock, promoted to Admiral of the Blue, was selected for overall command, with Lieutenant General the Earl of Albemarle commanding the land forces.[lvi] Lord Anson drew up the plan, part of a two-pronged assault against the Spanish empire’s key colonial outposts: the Philippines and Cuba. On 7 January the Navy Board issued its request for transportation for the project and by the end of January the transports had been prepared and supplied for seven months rations. Pocock’s final orders arrived on 18 February.[lvii]

Lord Anson by Joshua Reynolds

Caribbean during the Seven Years War, showing Pocock’s “Old Bahama” route to Havana.

Lines of HMS Namur, 90 gun second rate built in 1756, Pocock’s flagship for the Havana operation.

Pocock’s initial force as assembled (minus transports, etc) at Spithead.

By 26 February the entire force was prepared and assembled at Spithead (Albemarle described Pocock’s effort as “indefatigable”).[lviii] Pocock was to proceed with his forces to the Lesser Antilles, rendezvous with Major General Robert Monckton and Rear Admiral George Rodney, then sail to St. Domingue to collect additional forces for the landing before moving onto his objective. Pocock was to collect another four thousand regulars and American militia from New York, as well as a planned regiment of 500 blacks and 2,000 slaves from Jamaica, plus pilots from the Bahamas (who turned out to be inexperienced).[lix] Celerity was imperative as the onset of the hurricane season in August was bound to terminate operations, as was the prevalence of tropical disease, such as yellow fever.[lx]

Pocock, with second in command Commodore Augusts Keppel,[lxi] departed England with five sail, 67 transports, and 4,000 troops (four regiments – the 22^nd, 34^th, 56^th and 72^nd) on 5 March and arrived at Barbados on 20 April, before sailing to Martinique on 26 April, the latter island recently captured by Rear Admiral Rodney and Major General Monckton that January (St. Lucia had also been captured on 25 February under Captain Augustus Hervey). Rodney had already been informed by the arrival of the Richmond late in March that he was to prepare to join with Pocock – orders made difficult by an expected French assault on Jamaica, to intercept which Rodney had despatched ten ship-of-the-line under Commodore Sir James Douglas.

In the event, further intelligence confirmed that the French attack was not likely to take place and thus Commodore Douglas, aware of the all important nature of the Havana operation, decided to use his detached squadron to blockade the French base at Cape Francois, Saint Domingue, thus preventing the French and Spanish fleet from combining and possibly threatening the invasion force when it arrived.[lxii] Next Douglas despatched the Richmond to the Old Bahama Channel to prepare soundings and make sketches for the approach.

When Pocock arrived at Martinique he assumed supreme command and immediately requested Rodney (who was then ill) to provide him with all available intelligence. Orders were also sent to Commodore Douglas to join him on 12 May off Cape St. Nicolas (Douglas, however, did not receive these messages until 3 May, and although he quickly despatched orders to collect his squadron this still took a number of days).[lxiii] As Rodney and Monckton were on bad terms at this stage of the occupation of Martinique, Pocock and Albemarle were required to significantly re-organize the landing force, including the purchase of slaves from Martinique and elsewhere (as it was realized that Jamaica was unlikely to provide any) – and about 600 slaves were thus obtained.[lxiv] Pocock further upset Rodney by taking charge of the latter’s flagship, Marlborough, and consigning his staff to a smaller 64, before departing.[lxv] Rodney subsequently penned an agitated series of letters outbound, including one to the Prime Minister.[lxvi]

The Havana invasion force departing Martinique, 6 May 1762 (not showing frigates, sloops, transports, etc).

Commodore Augustus Keppel by Joshua Reynolds, 1749. Keppel, aboard HMS Valiant, was Pocock’s second in command.

Lt. General George Keppel, the Third Earl of Albermarle by Edward Fisher based on Joshua Reynolds, 1762

Pocock departed Martinique on 6 May and collected a trade convoy on its way to Jamaica, building the invasion fleet up to over 200 transports and 13 ships-of-the-line. The fleet arrived at Cape St. Nicolas on 17 May and collected what few of Commodore Douglas’ ships were in the area – the rest being still dispersed on blockade duties or re-victualing. The full squadron did not join Pocock until 25 May.[lxvii] Pocock’s complete force now consisted of 20 ship-of-the-line, a 50-gun cruiser, five frigates, three bomb vessels, a sloop, a cutter and the transports carrying 11,000 troops. Pocock allowed the merchants bound for Jamaica to depart (another indication of the powerful Port Royal merchant lobby’s influence) under the escort of HMS Centurion, with Commodore Douglas aboard.

Pocock, entrusted with a copy of Anson’s Spanish charts,[lxviii] and his own navigational experience from his time in the West Indies station, worked the invasion force around the dangerous north coast of Cuba, utilizing skilled navigators such as Captain Holmes in the sloop Bonetta and Captain Lindsay in the Trent, alongside the Lurcher to prepare the way. These vessels were in the process of scouting a route when they found Captain Elphinston of the Richmond on 29 May, who had completed his survey of the approach. A combination of sounding boats and coastal torch-fires to navigate allowed the fleet to sail through the Old Bahama Passage.[lxix]

Minor success occurred during this phase of the operation, such as on 2 June when Captain Alms in the Alarm captured the Spanish frigate Thetis and the storeship Phoenix.[lxx]

Havana force passing through the Old Strait of Bahama towards Havana, 2 June 1762

Map of Havana, showing location of Royal Navy operations: Pocock’s bombardment of the Chorea castle (left), the bombardment of the Morro fortress (centre) and Keppel and Albermarle’s landing (right); 1762.

Detailed map of the same from David Syrett’s Navy Records Society volume on the capture of Havana

Views of the harbour of Havana circa 1780, showing the harbour as entrance and exit.

El Morro Fortress overlooking the entrance to Havana harbour today.

Keppel covers Albermarle’s landing on 7 June 1762, by Dominic Serres.

Pocock arrived off Havana on 6 June and started the landing the following day, with Commodore Keppel – in fact Albemarle’s brother – in overall command. 3,963 soldiers and grenadiers, artillerymen and so forth were landed by 10:30 am. The light Spanish defences at the Coximar river delta were swept away by Keppel’s naval gunfire.[lxxi] While Keppel was carrying out this phase of the operation with his six of the line, Pocock moved with his 13 of the line past the harbour – where he identified 12 Spanish warships – and farther to the west, conducting a feint landing with the Royal Marines at his disposal. Meanwhile the Earl of Albermarle landed his complete force between the Boca Noa and Coximar rivers, supported by gunfire from Captain Harvey in the Dragon along with the sloops Mercury and Bonetta. On 8 June Pocock despatched frigates to scout for additional landing locations and to conduct soundings along the coast, in the process discovering that the Spanish had now sunk a blockship at the harbour entrance, followed by a second on 9 June.[lxxii]

The total Spanish force garrisoning Havana’s various redoubt and fortress environs was 2,800 – three regiments of infantry and a regiment of dragoons – regulars, marines and sailors (the Spanish Admiral in charge of the fleet in Havana harbour was one Hevia), 5,000 militia, 250 arsenal hands, and 600 freed slaves.[lxxiii]

Pocock’s diversion bombardment of the Chorrera batteries, 11 June 1762

The remains of the Terreon de la Chorrera today

After securing his position ashore, Albermarle informed Pocock that he intended to attack the La Cabana heights above the Morro fortress on the 10^th, and so Pocock provided a diversion in the form of Captain Knight in the Belleisle, which, along with Cerebus, Mercury, Lurcher and Bonetta bombarded the Chorrera (Terreon de la Chorrera – Cojimar) castle. On the 11^th at 1 pm Colonel Carleton, Albermarle’s Quarter-Master General, led the assault on La Cabana and carried the heights successfully. Major General William Keppel, the third Keppel brother, was now appointed to command the El Morro siege operation.

To follow up this success, Pocock ordered three bomb vessels and the sloops Edgar, Stirling Castle and Echo to attack the town of Havana. On 12 June the Spanish sunk yet another blockship, completely blockading the entrance to the harbour.

Havana: landing artillery, 30 June 1762, by Dominic Serres, c. 1770-1775

Another view of the 30 June landing

On the 15^th further landings were made, including 800 marines in two battalions, the first under Major Cambell and second under Major Collins. Another 1,200 troops were landed under Colonel Howe. A few days later mortars were landed from Thunder and Grenado, which began to bombard Morro on 20 June. Cannon were ashore and emplaced, adding their weight of shell to the attack.[lxxiv] In the meantime, Pocock tasked Keppel with deploying Dragon, Cambridge and Marlborough, together led by Captain Hervey, against the Morro, and their cannonade commenced on 1 July. The three ships suffered heavily from the fortress guns (of which there were 70), however, and were called off after six hours of shelling. Captain Goostrey of the Cambridge was killed.

For the remainder of July the Earl of Albermarle sieged the El Morro fortress – despite ever shortening supplies of water and ever increasing sick cases – but it wasn’t until 30 July that the exploding of a mine enabled the taking of the castle by assault, during which as many as 1,000 of the Spanish garrison were made casualties (130 killed, 27 wounded, 326 captured another 213 drowned while fleeing) and the Captain of the Morro fortress, Don Lewis de Velasco, was mortally wounded.[lxxv]

Dragon, Cambridge and Marlborough bombarding Morro Castle, Havana, 1 July 1762 by Richard Paton

Losses sustained during the shelling on 1 July.

Flatboats assault Morro Castle, 30 July 1762, by Dominic Serres. Alcide (64) shown.

Pocock for his part continued to carry out his theatre-level operation, constantly in touch with frigates carrying information about movements around Cuba and Florida, covering the Jamaica convoys, and watching for the approach of expected American reinforcements (who arrived 28 July – although reduced by 500 men who were captured in their transports by the Comte de Blenac’s detached flotilla) and simultaneously managing the supply situation of the siege itself.[lxxvi]

Havana was now surrounded, and the Spanish governor, Don Juan de Prado, asked for terms on 11 August, surrendering two days later. 12 warships were captured, eight line-of-battle ships being fit for sea (the other three being the sunk blockships), as well as £3 million in the process,[lxxvii] with Pocock and Albermarle split to the tune of 1/3 of the total treasure; Pocock’s take amounting to £123,000. Pocock handed out rewards as well, and the flagship’s purser, master and carpenter were respectively made the storekeeper, master attendant and master shipwright of Havana.[lxxviii]

British flatboats Entering Havana, 14 August 1762.  (note sunken blockship at harbour entrance)

The British fleet entering Havana, with HMS Namur, Pocock’s flagship, flying his pendent as Admiral of the Blue, 21 August 1762. Commodore Keppel leads his squadron in HMS Valiant at the left. By Dominic Serres, 1775.

Capture of the Spanish fleet at Havana by Dominic Serres, 1768

Spanish ships captured at Havana.

The central plaza at Havana under British occupation following the successful siege, by Dominic Serres, c. 1765-70

The operation, however successful and profitable, had been costly, in particular in terms of sick cases resulting from the temperate climate and difficulty of the extended siege (560 army killed, 86 Royal Navy; and 4,708 army sick cases and 1,300 sailors).[lxxix] Anson, the architect of the plan, had died in London of a heart attack on 6 June, and thus never learned of the success of the campaign.[lxxx]

Pocock sailed for home but lost two ships and 12 transports as a result of stormy weather during the Atlantic crossing, reaching Spithead finally on 13 January 1763.

Pocock at 56 as Knight of the Bath, Admiral of the Blue, & C-in-C Havana, October (25 March) 1762

George Pocock as international celebrity: Chevalier de l’ordre du Bain, et Admiral de la flotte Britannique, fameux par les Explois sur les Mers des deux Indes

Legacy: An 18^th Century Life

Pocock, now fabulously wealthy and internationally famous, purchased an estate at Mayfair, and, in 1764, bought the resplendent Orleans House at Twickenham. He married the widow Sophia Pitt Dent, together with whom he had a son, George (1765-1840; later the MP for Bridgwater and Baronet Pocock after 1821), and a daughter, Sophia (d. 1811), who married the Earl Powlet. Pocock retired in 1766 at the age of 60, returning to parliament where he notably voted against the repeal of the Stamp Act that February. Pocock, however, soon lost his seat in the 1768 election.[lxxxi] Pocock became master of Trinity House from 1786-1790, and was also vice-president of the Marine Society, his golden years noted for their public charity and serenity.

The Orleans House at Twickenham, painted by Joseph Nickolls c. 1750

The interior of the preserved Orleans House Gallery – the Octagon Room – as it stands today.

When Lally-Tollendal was captured – after the fall of Pondicherry – and sent to England, he pleaded that he might be introduced to Pocock, and, this request granted, is alleged to have spoken to the Admiral thus, “Dear Sir George, as the first man in your profession, I cannot but respect and esteem you, though you have been the greatest enemy I ever had. But for you, I should have triumphed in India, instead of being made a captive. When we first sailed out to give you battle, I had provided a number of musicians on board the Zodiaque, intending to give the ladies a ball upon our victory; but you left me only three fiddlers alive, and treated us all so roughly, that you quite spoiled us for dancing.”[lxxxii] Lally-Tollendal was traded back to France, where he was made a scapegoat for the failure in India, and executed at Paris on 9 May 1766.

Pocock outlived his erstwhile opponent of the East Indies, the Comte d’Ache, who died at Brest on 11 February 1780 at the age of 79.

Sir George Pocock, midshipman during the War of the Quadruple Alliance, commodore at the Leeward Islands during the War of Austrian Succession, master of the Indian Ocean and victor of Havana during the Seven Years War, Admiral of the Blue, died at Curzon Street, London, 3 April 1792 at the age of 86.

Sir George Pocock memorial at Westminster Abbey. Beneath Pocock’s coat of arms (two seahorses abreast a lion, topped by the crest of an antelope issuing from a naval crown, with motto, “Faithful to the King and Kingdom”), sits a majestic Britannia, confidently grasping a thunderbolt, her left arm resting on a profile showing Pocock’s distinctive Mona Lisa smile. Commissioned by George Pocock, esquire, and sculpted by John Bacon in 1796. Sir George is buried at St. Mary’s Church, Twickenham.

Notes

[i] James Stanier Clarke and John McArthur, eds., The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII, 2010th ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1802)., p. 442

[ii] Tom Pocock, “Pocock, Sir George (1706-1792),” The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004).

[iii] John D. Grainger, Dictionary of British Naval Battles (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2016)., p. 104

[iv] Pocock, “Pocock, Sir George (1706-1792).”

[v] List of Royal Navy Post Captains, 1714-1830, Navy Records Society online.

[vi] J. J. Colledge and Ben Warlow, Ships of the Royal Navy, The Complete Record of All Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy (Philadelphia & Newbury: Casemate, 2010)., p. 10

[vii] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 442

[viii] Colledge and Warlow, Ships of the Royal Navy, The Complete Record of All Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy., p. 390

[ix] Brian Lavery, The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War, 1600-1815 (London: Conway Maritime Press, Ltd., 1998)., p. 119

[x] N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006)., p. 412; Robert Gardiner and Brian Lavery, eds., The Line of Battle: The Sailing Warship 1650-1840, Conway’s History of the Ship (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2004)., p. 19

[xi] Richard F. Simpson, “The Naval Career of Admiral Sir George Pocock, K. B., 1743-1763” (Indiana University, 1950)., p.2

[xii] Richard Harding, “Legge, Edward (1710-1747),” The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004).

[xiii] Herbert Richmond, The Navy In The War of 1739-48, vol. 3, 3 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1920)., p. 70

[xiv] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 443

[xv] Grainger, Dictionary of British Naval Battles., p. 103; see also Hawke to Corbett, 17 October 1747, in Ruddock Mackay, ed., The Hawke Papers, A Selection: 1743 – 1771, Navy Records Society 129 (Aldershot, Hants: Scolar Press, 1990)., p. 51-55

[xvi] Richmond, The Navy In The War of 1739-48., p. 72

[xvii] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 443; Martin Robson, A History of the Royal Navy: The Seven Years War (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2016)., loc. 1272

[xviii] Robson, A History of the Royal Navy: The Seven Years War., loc. 1300

[xix] Robson., loc. 1300

[xx] Robson., loc. 1323

[xxi] Pocock, “Pocock, Sir George (1706-1792).” Robson, A History of the Royal Navy: The Seven Years War., loc. 1341

[xxii] A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 – 1783 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1987)., p. 306

[xxiii] Rodger, The Command of the Ocean., p. 275

[xxiv] William Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy, A History From the Earliest Times to the Present, vol. 3, 5 vols. (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1898)., p. 565

[xxv] Robson, A History of the Royal Navy: The Seven Years War., loc. 1347

[xxvi] Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War (University of Nebraska: Thomson-Shore, Inc., 2005)., loc. 1847

[xxvii] Robson, A History of the Royal Navy: The Seven Years War., loc. 1368

[xxviii] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 445

[xxix]  Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 – 1783., p. 307

[xxx] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 446

[xxxi] Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War., loc. 1847

[xxxii] Robson, A History of the Royal Navy: The Seven Years War., loc. 1401

[xxxiii] Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War., loc. 1847

[xxxiv]  Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 – 1783., p. 308

[xxxv] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 446

[xxxvi] N. A. M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London: Fontana Press, 1988)., p. 247

[xxxvii] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 447

[xxxviii] Clarke and McArthur., p. 448

[xxxix] Clarke and McArthur., p. 449

[xl] Robson, A History of the Royal Navy: The Seven Years War., loc. 1401

[xli] Clowes, The Royal Navy, A History From the Earliest Times to the Present., p. 181

[xlii] Sam Willis, Fighting at Sea in the Eighteenth Century: The Art of Sailing Warfare (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008)., p. 206

[xliii] Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War., loc. 1839

[xliv] Clowes, The Royal Navy, A History From the Earliest Times to the Present., p. 181

[xlv] Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 – 1783., p. 310

[xlvi] Julian Corbett, The Seven Years War, A Study in British Combined Strategy (London: The Folio Society, 2001)., p. 452-3

[xlvii] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 451

[xlviii] Willis, Fighting at Sea in the Eighteenth Century: The Art of Sailing Warfare., p. 207

[xlix] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 451-4

[l] Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy., p. 337

[li] Rodger., p. 289

[lii] Corbett, The Seven Years War, A Study in British Combined Strategy., p. 456-7

[liii] John Malcolm, Robert, Lord Clive: Collected from the Family Papers Communicated by the Earl of Powis, Kindle, vol. 1, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1836).

[liv] Corbett, The Seven Years War, A Study in British Combined Strategy., p. 461-2

[lv] Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997)., p. 43

[lvi]  Rodger, The Command of the Ocean., p. 285

[lvii] Corbett, The Seven Years War, A Study in British Combined Strategy., p. 546

[lviii] David Syrett, The Siege and Capture of Havana, 1762 (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., 1970)., p. xv, also #64 Albemarle to Egremont, Portsmouth, 22 February, p. 51

[lix] Syrett., p. xiv

[lx] Syrett., p. xiv

[lxi] Alexander Howlett, “Captain Charles Middleton and the Seven Years’ War,” Canadian War Studies Association (blog), December 31, 2016, https://cawarstudies.wordpress.com/2016/12/31/captain-charles-middleton-and-the-seven-years-war/.

[lxii] Syrett, The Siege and Capture of Havana, 1762., p. xvi-xvii

[lxiii] Syrett., #143, Pocock to Douglas, 26 April, p. 98-9

[lxiv] Syrett., p. xvi-xviii

[lxv] Corbett, The Seven Years War, A Study in British Combined Strategy., p. 553; see also David Syrett, ed., The Rodney Papers, Volume I, 1742 – 1763, vol. 1, Navy Records Society 148 (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005)., #876, Rodney to Clevland, 27 May 1762, p. 452-3

[lxvi]  Syrett, The Rodney Papers, Volume I, 1742 – 1763., #879, Rodney to Newcastle, 1 June 1762, p. 456-7

[lxvii] Syrett, The Siege and Capture of Havana, 1762., p. xix

[lxviii] Andrew Lambert, Admirals (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2009)., p. 153

[lxix] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 456

[lxx] Clarke and McArthur., p. 456

[lxxi] Syrett, The Siege and Capture of Havana, 1762., p. xxiii

[lxxii] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 457

[lxxiii] Corbett, The Seven Years War, A Study in British Combined Strategy., p. 562 fn

[lxxiv] Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 458

[lxxv] Pocock, “Pocock, Sir George (1706-1792).”; Clarke and McArthur, The Naval Chronicle, Volume VIII., p. 460

[lxxvi] Corbett, The Seven Years War, A Study in British Combined Strategy., p. 566-9

[lxxvii] Grainger, Dictionary of British Naval Battles., p. 222

[lxxviii] Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy., p. 287

[lxxix] Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946).

[lxxx] N. A. M. Rodger, “Anson, George, Baron Anson (1697-1762),” The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004).

[lxxxi] Pocock, “Pocock, Sir George (1706-1792).”

[lxxxii] George Godfrey Cunningham, A History of England in the Lives of Englishmen, vol. 5 (London: A. Fullarton and Co., 1853)., p. 412

Reflections on the 2017 McMullen Naval History Symposium

This year’s biennial McMullen Naval History Symposium, hosted by the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, was a total success. This world-class conference featured a plethora of fascinating panels on subjects ranging from contemporary Canadian naval policy to Julius Caesar’s appreciation of naval power. As always, with a conference of this scale involving hundreds of historians and participants, any one person is only able to see a fraction of the total panels, so individual experience does matter. The conference was not generally digitized, thus, reflections from the participants provide the only method for intersubjectively preserving the experience itself, and there have already been (David Morgan-Owen) several (Trent Hone) contributions (Matthew Eng) in that regard.

The conference was organized by the vigilant Commander Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong, one of the “New Young Turks” relentlessly in pursuit of greater historical appreciation amongst the cadets and midshipmen of the growing United States Navy, not to mention a senior editor with the all-star blog, War on the Rocks. The major themes at this years conference were the First World War (naturally enough considering the centenary), global and imperial history, seapower in the Age of Sail, the Asian and the Pacific theatres, the Second World War, naval education, and the evolution of naval technology in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Day One: September 14, 2017

From left to right: Panel Chair John Beeler, Louis Halewood, Alex Howlett, and David Kohnen (photo credit, Tim Choi)

I was a presenter on one of the first panels, along with Louis Halewood and David Kohnen. My paper on the Royal Naval Air Service and the development of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 1917-1918, examined the impact of changing administration during wartime, and the organizational learning that took place in an unprecedented and high-technology environment. Louis Halewood described his research on the development of the Anglo-American theory of geostrategy, raising the prospect of the pre-1914 “Imperial Superstate” concept, notably diagnosed by historians such as Carroll Quigley, and Ramsay Muir. Louis Halewood introduced the influential work of luminaries such as Hartford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, Spencer Wilkinson, and Lord Milner, theorists of naval and military power, strategy and imperial defence, who would all reappear with regularity in the politically charged panels and discussions to follow. Ultimately, the unity of the Wilsonian Anglo-American alliance broke down in the interwar period, in no small measure due to the challenge to British naval supremacy from the United States, in the process destroying the Anglo-Japanese alliance, with profound implications for Britain’s role in the Second World War.

David Kohnen discussed his research on the Knox-Pye-King report, a significant paper published in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings in 1920, bringing to the US Navy (USN) the strategic focus which had been raised in the British school, in particular, by the pre-war historians John Laughton, Julian Corbett, and Captain Herbert Richmond. Captains Ernie King, Dudley Knox and William Pye had been influenced by the irresistible force of Admiral William Sims, one of the significant contributors to the argument in favour of introducing trans-Atlantic convoys, a deciding factor in the victory over the U-boats in 1917-1918. David Kohnen argued that the modern USN had a worrying predilection for defaulting to technological dogma, with the result of the Navy utilizing the acronym saturated language of the Defense Department to stress uncritical “warfighting” instead of historical engagement and peacekeeping as the basis for doctrine.

Right to left: Panel chair Caitlin Gale, presenters Anna Brinkman, David Morgan-Owen, Paul Ramsey, and commentator Andrew Lambert (photo credit, Tim Choi)

With turn of the century grand strategy on my mind, I moved to the panel specifically examining British foreign policy, with the first paper given by Anna Brinkman (of Imperial Entanglements fame), on Britain’s strategy for managing Spain during the Seven Years War, a complex subject that relied on the interaction between significant stakeholders, Britain and Spain’s differing conceptions of the law of the sea, and the emerging balance of power in Europe. David Morgan-Owen, the brains behind the Defence-in-Depth blog, next brought the discussion into the 19th and 20th centuries by examining Britain’s evolving European and global situation, a subject that hinges on the the sticky topic of imperial and homeland defence, explored further in David’s new book. The creation of the Committee for Imperial Defence by Prime Minister Arthur Balfour in 1902 was a watershed moment, ultimately leading to the development of conflicting army and naval strategies during the government of Herbert Asquith. Lastly, Paul Ramsey examined Spenser Wilkinson’s debate with historian Julian Corbett about the proper relation of Britain’s foreign and military policy to national strategy, a historically and politically charged sparring played out in the popular press. Professor Andrew Lambert, who was the panel commentator, observed the intricate connections between the papers, with Corbett, a scholar of the Seven Years War and Russo-Japanese War, visualizing Britain’s naval role as a component of an integrated system that only made sense once the land dynamic, with a debt to Clausewitz and Jomini, was integrated.

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson announces the winners of the CNO’s inaugural Naval History Essay Contest (photo credit, Tim Choi)

With this auspicious start, the conference was on a sound footing. I enjoyed lunch in the beautiful Bo Coppedge Room, at the Alumni Hall, where I had an enjoyable conversation with a young officer and naval scholar on the fascinating subjects of Athens versus Sparta, US Marine Corps culture, and the recent Graham Allison book, The Thucydides Trap, concerning the possibility of American conflict with China in the 21st century. I was impressed with the student’s insight, candor, and breadth of knowledge, all of which I found refreshing (as was the key-lime cheesecake). Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson then presented the awards to the winners of the inaugural Naval History Essay Contest, which promised to raise the bar for scholarly research amongst historians and practitioners alike.

After lunch we headed to the final panel for the first day, again focused on British naval policy in the 19th century. By this point the conference was beginning to resemble a choose your own type of adventure. This was both an advantage and disadvantage of the conference’s scale and international reach. Breaking out of my own area of interest was certainly possible, with simultaneous panels taking place on American, South American, and Second World War naval history, all of which would have been fascinating to attend, if not especially related to my research focus. The conference organizers did the attendees a service by arranging the panels in such a manner that overlap was minimal and it was a fairly straightforward process to figure out which panel was the best choice for my own preferences.

This panel was chaired by John Mitcham, and the first paper was presented by John Beeler, the editor of the Navy Record Society’s Milne papers, on the subject of the Liberal party’s naval policy during the late 19th century. Beeler, who literally wrote the book on the subject, argued that the questionable choices of the Liberal party in terms of naval policy were an indication of a lack of clear strategic thinking, compared to Salisbury’s vision. The nuances of the political situation was emphasized by Peter Keeling, who followed this thread by specifically expanding on the Liberal party’s 1889 Naval Defence Act with original research that examined who voted for and against the Act, and why. Presenting the last paper of the day, Rebecca Matzke, in a fascinating paper reminiscent of the work of Michael Neiberg, discussed the efforts of British propagandists to influence American public perception of the Royal Navy’s war effort, in particular, as it related to the Royal Navy’s blockade and Germany’s counter-blockade (the unrestricted U-boat campaign). Taken together, this panel explored the interrelation of optics, how public support is galvanized by policymakers and NGOs, and the realities of budgetary and geostrategic constraints, firmly recognizing that military policy is never formed in a vacuum, and more often than not, is the result of a complex patchwork of influence.

James Goldrick delivers the 2017 McMullen Sea Power address in Mahan Hall, (photo credit, Tim Choi)

Thus we adjourned for day one. The next event was the McMullen Sea Power address to be held later that evening in the appropriately named Mahan Hall. Taking advantage of the warm evening air while moving between buildings, I stopped the always approachable James Goldrick for a brief discussion that touched on wide-ranging concepts such as Britain’s anti-submarine defence in the First World War, Germany’s strategic bombing campaigns in two world wars, and the origins of aircraft carrier strike doctrine. I was impressed as always by Professor Goldrick’s erudition. In this spirit of historical reflection, the conference participants made their way over to the fantastic US Naval Academy Museum. After touring amongst the excellent warship models and artifact displays, discussing defence policy with friends, I was stunned into a moment of clarity by news which spread like fire between the attendees that North Korea had launched yet another long-range missile, dramatically bringing home the importance of the subjects we had discussed, in otherwise academic detachment, throughout the day.

Not much more than an hour later I was sitting on the balcony of Mahan Hall watching Rear-Admiral (retired) Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy, deliver the formal 2017 Sea Power address. Professor Goldrick delivered his keynote directly to the young midshipmen sitting across from me on both wings of the balcony, and strove to reconcile the need for thorough professionalism within military education, transcending technological determinism, while also avoiding the other end of the spectrum, ivory tower detachment, a synthesis rare enough amongst long-time scholars yet also essential to the future of service culture: the next generation of young scholar-officers.

Day Two: September 15, 2017

From left to right: Trent Hone, Wes Hammond, and John Miller, USN.

With three excellent panels on Anglo-American and imperial naval history behind me, I decided to start off day two on a slightly different tact. There would be four panels to see, and I felt it was time to broaden the discussion by revisiting some areas of interest from my previous academic work. Easing into things I visited the panel highlighting some of the winners of the CNO’s essay contest, starting with Trent Hone’s analysis of operational learning by the USN at Guadalcanal in 1942. Hone argued that the Navy, with a strong foundation in historical education and doctrine, derived from the inter-war period and First World War, was well situated to adapt to operational disasters such as the Battle of Savo Island, enabling the Navy to reverse-course and ultimately out think the Imperial Japanese Navy. Lieutenant John Miller then read his case-study analysis of training failure, notably looking at the USS Stark, USS Panay, and USS Chesapeake incidents, concluding that readiness can only be achieved by a thorough understanding of not only ship and crew capability, but also, significantly, environmental awareness, the multifaceted elements of which can only be mastered through carefully cultivated experience and preparation, frequently missing in a high-tempo, rapid deployment situation. Wes Hammond then expanded on this subject by observing the importance of mobile basing, stressing the element of fleet logistics, repair and salvage, upon which all other elements are reliant. An important theme uniting these papers, explored in the panel discussion, was the recognition that contemporary naval affairs are defined by questions with historical antecedents. The notion of having, “been here before” was startling, and a clear reminder of the importance of historical investigation prior to framing naval policy.

From left to right: Dr. Nicholas Lambert, Alan Anderson, James Smith and G. H. Bennet

The fifth panel was chaired by the Naval Academy’s own Dr. Nicholas Lambert and featured papers by G. H. Bennet, Alan Anderson and James Smith. This panel took a sweeping look at the Admiralty as a political and educational organization in the 20th century. Plymouth University’s Bennet presented on the unique subject of ship and naval station libraries, a critical component in naval education that at first glance might appear parochial, yet, like many of the papers presented, once explored in detail provided rich insight. Bennet’s research explored the organic knowledge networks that developed aboard ships as crew and officers traded and circulated books, while providing a warning evidenced by the decline of these networks during the transformation of the Royal Navy as budgets tightened in the 20th century. Alan Anderson followed up by examining the seemingly bizarre decision of the Admiralty to promulgate the Declaration of London in 1909, and the implications this would have for Britain’s blockade strategy in 1914. Anderson, who has been critical of Nicholas Lambert’s work on British blockade theory, argued that in fact the Admiralty gained significant concessions from the Declaration, notably including affirmations on the illegality of shipping “absolute contraband” in times of war, while simultaneously shoring up neutral shipping rights, essential components of the Royal Navy’s historical mission as safeguard of the seas. James Smith (of the Seapower Thinker blog) built upon these papers with his criticism of the introduction of the Ministry of Defence by the Earl Mountbatten, who was Chief of the Defence staff for six years, starting in July 1959. Smith argued that Mountbatten’s personal ambitions led him to undermine Britain’s traditional maritime focus, relegating the senior service to equality with the RAF and Army, thus stripping the Navy of its institutional power, which had been carefully built up over hundreds of years.

The Battle of Virginia Capes, 1781

Controversy continued to abound in the two finals panels, both of which I attended out of interest. The first was focused on the Battle of Virginia Capes, 5 September 1781, and second on Japanese naval policy in the 20th century. This was a trip back in time for me, as I had previously written my Masters thesis on the culminating naval battle of the American Revolution, as well as my undergraduate thesis on the only decisive naval battle of the ironclad age, the Battle of Tsushima, 27 May 1905. The first of these panels was known colloquially as the Naval War College panel, featuring papers drawn entirely from that fine institution. Chaired by the College’s John Hattendorf, James Holmes presented the first paper, an insightful strategic analysis of Britain’s naval policy during the Revolutionary War. Holmes argued that Admiralty decision-making ultimately led to the abandonment of the American colonies in favour of protecting the more profitable imperial territories in the Caribbean and India, and seen from the perspective of grand strategy, was reflective of the concept of “antifragility” which helped to explain the Admiralty’s thinking. Holmes provided a broad framework that was then detailed by Jim McIntyre’s paper, examining the egodocuments of Hessian mercenary Johann Ewald, who witnessed the siege of Yorktown. The presentation of Stanley Carpenter flowed naturally from this point, providing a thorough analysis of the Royal Navy’s tactics at the Battle of the Capes itself, with particular attention to the Graves-Hood controversy that emerged. I was pleased to see, eight years after completing my thesis on the subject, Lord Hood receiving the criticism he rightly deserves for failing to bring battle decisively against the Comte de Grasse’s fleet when ordered so by Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves. The discussion after this panel was particularly insightful, with John Hattendorf moderating a lively debate about the vagaries of timing, strategic movements, and the many “mistakes” made, for example, by Lord Cornwallis, who should have known better than to allow his Carolina offensive to become locked up in a position from which the only possible escape was by sea.

Dr. Alessio Patalano presenting on Japan’s Cold War submarine policy, (photo credit: Tim Choi)

The final panel I attended was presented by Andrew Blackley, covering the lessons of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, in particular the Battle of the Yalu, followed by presentations from Masashi Kurarni, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, looking at the Japanese contribution to the Mediterranean in 1917, and finally, by Alessio Patalano, who introduced the Self Defense Force’s submarine policy during the early Cold War. Andrew Blackley argued that Japan’s naval doctrine of rapid-fire close attack proved decisive in two major naval wars, indeed, demonstrating significant flexibility when faced with technical faults or warship losses. Flexibility was further indicated by Masashi Kurarni’s paper, showcasing Japan’s significant international alliance contribution to the anti-submarine war in 1917-1918, providing insight into the under-examined U-boat campaign in the Mediterranean. In keeping with these themes, Alessio Patalano presented the final paper, kindly aware of his duty to move quickly prior to the conference’s conclusion. Patalano observed that Japan’s strategy of core-competency paid dividends when the submarine began to take on a more significant role in Japan’s defence planning. The JMSDF was able to retain capability despite political, budgetary, and strategic transformation on an unprecedented scale.

The conference concluded back at the official symposium hotel where the 2017 Knox Awards Banquet was held, during which Dr. Edward J. Marolda, Commander Paul Stillwell and Dr. Jon T. Sumida were presented with Lifetime Achievement Awards for their stellar and dedicated contributions to naval history.

In conclusion, I was struck by the inspiring collegiality of this professional, academic conference. It serves the historians well to leave their monk-like confines to engage with the free-flow of ideas that historical symposiums inculcate. Between the brilliant and inspiring papers it was a real pleasure to be included in debate that frequently involved world-class subject experts and naval practitioners. In short, this was a transformative experience I highly recommend to anyone considering attending the next Symposium in 2019.

Captain Charles Middleton and the Seven Years’ War

Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, the Seven Years’ War, and Naval Administration

HMS Barham presentation badge in 1914.

The Royal Navy career of Charles Middleton spanned three wars, from the Seven Years’ War, to the American Revolution, through the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. During the first of these, Captain Middleton was engaged in trade protection and anti-privateering duty in the Leeward Islands. The future Comptroller of the Navy, then a lowly frigate commander, sailing in the 28 gun HMS Emerald, spent four years countering French commerce privateers. Middleton was considered somewhat of a disciplinarian and social climber, but also a promising administrator in a far-flung but crucial colonial posting in the Caribbean during the Seven Years’ War. Middleton’s early career has been described as a typical RN officer’s career.[i]

The Right Honourable Sir Charles Middleton, 1st Baron Barham, Admiral of the Red, “>engraving by Marie Anne Bourlier, 12 October 1809, from a drawing by John Downman.

This post examines Admiral Charles Middleton’s career and achievements during the early phase, primarily concerning Captain Middleton’s role as a frigate commander during the Seven Years’ War, leading up to his appointment as Comptroller of the Navy in August 1778.

After the Seven Years’ War, Middleton seemed to have fulfilled his duty, and was prepared to retire.[ii] Fate, as it would have it, ensured that Middleton would yet return to the centres of power and play an unexpected, but decisive, role in the Royal Navy’s history. After his service in the Caribbean as a frigate commander and station administrator, Middleton went on to become a reformer and modernizer during the American Revolution, as Comptroller of the Navy. Rear-Admiral Middleton, raised to the peerage as Lord Barham, returned to power as Senior Naval Lord and eventually First Lord of the Admiralty at the time of Trafalgar in 1805.

London in 1751 by Thomas Bowles 

Career of Charles Middleton until 1778

The Navy

Charles Middleton was born at Leith, Edinburgh, on 14 October 1726, the second son of Robert Middleton and Helen Dundas. Helen was the great-granddaughter of Robert Dundas, Lord Arniston, while Robert, the father, was a descendant of Alexander Middleton, the brother of John, the Earl Middleton, and made his living as a customs official in Bo’ness, West Lothian, Scotland. Charles Middleton joined the Navy at a young age, credited with service aboard the merchantman Loyal June (1738-41), starting when he was eleven- although this could have been a ploy, as was often the case with young officers. Middleton joined his first warship, prophetically, HMS Sandwich (90), in April 1741 at the age of 14, and shortly afterward he followed its Captain, Mead, to the Duke (90), then joined the 20 gun frigate Flamborough under Captain Joseph Hamar on 21 November 1741, for service in North America and the West Indies.

Cape Corso fortress, Gold Coast, as it appeared in 1745, not long before Lt. Charles Middleton, while serving aboard HMS Chesterfield, was stranded there by mutineers in October 1748,

Just shy of four years of apprenticeship as a captain’s servant, midshipman and master’s mate aboard HMS Flamborough, and only ten days before his 20^th birthday, Middleton passed his Lieutenant’s examination on 4 October 1745, and, the following month, was appointed to the 5^th rate HMS Chesterfield (40), patrolling the channel and the coast of Sierra Leone.[iii] Middleton, 22 years old, was there in 1748, when on 15 October, at the notorious slave trading site, the Cape Corso fortress in Ghana, Middleton, along with the Chesterfield’s Captain (O’Brien Dudley), Master, 2^nd Lieutenant, purser, surgeon, and 11 other men, were stranded by a mutiny amongst the ship’s crew and remaining officers. The mutineers were led by a buccaneering carpenter’s mate named John Place, with help from the supposedly drunken 1^st Lieutenant, Samuel Couchman (neither of whom survived the conclusion of the court martial that was to follow). The loyal boatswain retook the ship and arrested the mutineers. The boatswain was able to bring the Chesterfield to English Harbour, in Antiqua, where it was reunited with the stranded officers on 7 March 1749.[iv] Middleton and company aboard, now under Captain James Campbell, Chesterfield returned to England, and arrived at Spithead on 14 June 1749.

US President Barack Obama visits the former slave trading outpost at Cape Corso castle, Ghana, 11 July 2009, the site where Lt. Middleton first experienced the disreputable connection between Royal Navy seapower and the slave trade.

Middleton was put on half-pay and sent ashore the following month.[v] There he remained until transferred to a dockside assignment aboard HMS Culloden (74), in June 1752. Back on half-pay in November, he was subsequently transferred to what would become a familiar ship, HMS Anson (Captain Charles Holmes), a 4^th rate, 60 gun ship of the line built in 1747; In January 1753, Middleton, 26 years old, was thus acting in the capacity of second lieutenant aboard a large ship of the line. Anson’s first lieutenant at this time was one Richard Kempenfelt, later Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt.[vi]

Aboard HMS Anson, the first lieutenant in 1755 was Richard Kempenfelt, later Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt as painted by Tilly Kettle in 1782, prior to his drowning aboard HMS Royal George on 29 August of that year, tragically, at least partly the result of the Middleton – Sandwich coppering method which produced electrolytic degradation on warship rivets. Middleton and Kempenfelt exchanged letters on the subject of signalling during 1779 – 1782.

Middleton was briefly transferred to the Monarch (74), but was then back again aboard Anson in July 1754. Middleton succeeded Kempenfelt as 1^st Lieutenant aboard Anson in January 1755. In March of that year Lt. Middleton was to be found recruiting sailors in the Bristol Channel, while aboard Princess Augusta.[vii] With Britain’s relations with France deteriorating, Middleton, aboard Anson (Captain Robert Man), was dispatched as part of Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen’s fleet of 11 of the line to blockade the St. Lawrence, although, it being the spring of 1755, war had not yet been declared.[viii] Boscawen intercepted a detached French squadron of three and captured two 64 gun ships, Alcide and Lys, but missed a third, Dauphin Royal in fog off the Newfoundland Banks, June 8 – 9.[ix]

Vice-Admiral Edward Boscawen, who commanded the English squadron in which 29 year old Lt. Middleton served as first Lieutenant aboard HMS Anson (60), at the outbreak of the Seven Years War. Joshua Reynolds, 1824.

Admiral Boscawen’s action against Admiral de le Motte’s separated squadron 8 June 1755. In the foreground, Captain Andrews aboard the Defiance (60), engages Lys (64) while Captain Richard Howe, commanding the Dunkirk (60) attacks Captain de Hocquart’s Alcide (64) in the distance. This is an artistic compression: Defiance, along with Fougueux, were sent to chase Lys which was actaully captured the next day. Lt. Charles Middleton, the XO, under the command of Captain Robert Man, was aboard Anson (60), one of Boscawen’s eleven warships.

HMS Defiance of 60 guns, 5th rate when built in 1744.

Admiral Lord Richard Howe, then Captain HMS Dunkirk, who fought together with Lt. Middleton as part of Boscawen’s fleet. Depicted here as C-in-C Channel Fleet, print made by James Whittle and Richard Holmes, 1794

Royal Navy warships, as of June 1755, showing second Lt. Middleton’s appointment in red. From Jonathan Dull’s The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War.

Anson cruised off Louisbourg and Halifax, then returned to England in October 1755, and was eventually stationed in Portsmouth in March of 1756. Anson, along with Bristol (50) and Harwich (50) were now dispatched to the West Indies as part of the outbound convoy with 17 merchant ships, departing England on 27 April and arriving at St. John’s Road, Antigua on 12 June 1756. That same month, Minorca fell as a result of Admiral Byng’s failed relief attempt resulting from the battle of Port Mahon, 20 May 1756.

Commander RN, & The Seven Years’ War

During 1755-6, relations soured between England’s North American colonists and the French settlers in Canada and their Native American allies. A struggle for control of the Ohio River valley soon revealed the tenuous nature of the status quo peace. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which had ended the War of Austrian Succession in 1748, was tested on a number of occasions, such as in 1755 when General Braddock’s force was ambushed. In India, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Clive and the British East India Company continued their swashbuckling campaign of conquest, capturing Calcutta in January 1757, and winning the decisive battle at Plassey on 23 June 1757, further antagonizing French interests. War in Europe was renewed when Prussia invaded Saxony in 1756, prompting Austria to declare war on Frederick II in 1757. Britain declared war against France on 18 May of that year, pushing Prussia into coalition with Britain, for the Austrians, who counted amongst their allies Russia and Sweden, were also allied with Louis XV’s France.[x]

The <a style="color:#00aadc;" href="http://”>World colonial situation prior to the Treaty of Paris, 1763 <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/&gt;

European political situation 1740 – 1757, maps.

Considering that the British monarchy originated from the electorate of Hannover, England joined Prussia and Portugal against the powerful coalition of France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Poland, and after 1762, Spain. The war began with a series of British reversals, notably at Minorca, where Admiral Byng was unable to win the victory at Port Mahon, 20 May 1756, to the great detriment of his personal fortunes. France’s Louisbourg citadel, in present day Nova Scotia, however, was captured in July 1758. These tremendous events were followed by the capture of Quebec itself, after the victory at the Plains of Abraham on 13 September 1759. These military victories were accompanied by suitable naval victories, at Lagos, 18 – 19 August (Boscawen), and Quiberon Bay, 20 November (Hawke), during the victorious Annus Mirabilis.

French siege and capture of Fort St. Philip, Minorca, 29 July 1756. Admiral Byng’s defeat, on 20 May 1756, shortly after the outbreak of war, enabled the Marquis de la Galissonniere’s fleet to support the siege of the Mediterranean fortress.

Global conflict: The Seven Years’ War.

Frederick the Great won his major maneuver victories against overwhelming enemy coalition forces at Rossbach and Leuthen in November and December 1757, followed by the victory against Russia at Zorndorf in August 1758, dealing a serious repulse to the initial Grand Alliance war effort. As a result, Britain’s funding of the Prussian effort increased between 1757 and 1758 by nearly a factor of ten, to 1,860,000 pounds sterling. Frederick’s reversals against the Russians in 1759 at Kunersdorf led to Berlin’s capture, but Frederick maintained his defence against France and Austria, defeating the Austrians at Liegnitz in August, and again at Torgau in November, 1760. Britain, for its part, eventually abandoned the alliance, seeking a separate peace in 1762 to consolidate its colonial gains, a move that Frederick would not forget when Britain came looking for European allies during the American Revolutionary War.

First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord George Anson as painted prior to 1748 by Thomas Hudson. The architect of Britain’s naval strategy during the Seven Years’ War, Anson was First Lord from 1751-56 and 1757-62.

Cartoon celebrating Captain Howe and Vice-Admiral Boscawen’s victories over the French in Canada, including the capture of Louisbourg in the summer of 1758.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward Hawke, painted by Francis Cotes in 1768.

Admiral Sir Edward Hawke’s victory at Quiberon Bay, 20 November 1759, painted by Nicholas Pocock. This decisive battle by the Channel squadron prevented the planned invasion of England and Ireland, thus freeing Royal Navy forces for deployment to other theatres, including the Caribbean.

With the major struggle taking place in Canada and Europe, the Caribbean was at first a sideshow. The Royal Navy’s defence of its Caribbean trade had been arranged as a layered blockade and interdiction operation: the two station commanders, based at Jamaica and Antigua, were provided with small squadrons of 50 or 60 gun ships for blockading the enemy’s naval bases at St. Domingo (Spain) and Martinique (France). Heavy RN frigates of 30 to 40 guns sailed windward of Antigua and Barbados, seeking privateers. Lastly, 20 gun frigates and all lesser sloops, brigs and corvettes covered the inter-island communications, primarily around the Leeward Islands.[xi]

The Leeward Islands from NASA Terra satellite.

In 1756 the Jamaican station was under the command of Rear-Admiral George Townshend with three of the line and four frigates. The Leeward Island station was commanded by Rear-Admiral Frankland, with an additional three of the line and four or five frigates.[xii] When the Elder Pitt took power during his brief 1756-7 term under the Duke of Devonshire, he re-shuffled the Admiralty, using Boscawen to offset Anson, who at that time was the First Lord of the Admiralty, and doubled the size of the Caribbean fleets while appointing new commanders: Rear-Admiral Thomas Cotes, now with seven of the line and ten or so frigates, to Jamaica; and Commodore John Moore was ordered to the Leeward Islands with three of the line, two 50s, three 40s and five frigates.

Political situation in the Caribbean, 1756, from Sir Julian Corbett’s The Seven Years War. The islands of St. Lucia, Grenada and Dominica were at this time declared as neutrals under the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, although nominally under French control. The major French naval bases were at Guadeloupe and Martinique.

British Caribbean commands in June 1756, Lt. Middleton’s position in red.

Control of territory in Caribbean <a style="color:#00aadc;" href="http://”>during 1756.

English Harbour, Antigua today.

It was with Commodore Moore, that Middleton, still aboard the Anson, was ordered to Antigua. Middleton, now thirty years old, continued aboard Anson until 26 February 1757 when he was promoted Commander, appointed to the sloop Speaker (12), to cruise in the Leeward Islands. There is some confusion regarding his command at this point, as he was simultaneously listed as commander of the Blandford, as acting captain (26 February to 28 March), while also having commanded of the sloop Saltash, briefly.[xiii]

<a style="color:#00aadc;" href="http://”>Model of a 200 ton burden, 14 gun sloop, circa the 1740 pattern, similar to HMS Barbados commanded by Captain Middleton in 1758

<a style="color:#00aadc;" href="http://”>Model of a 12 gun sloop on the 1752 pattern, ketch-rigged (note the mizzen mast and absence of a fore mast)

It is clear from the sources, however, that Commander Middleton’s position would involve dockyard work, and appreciating the administrative aspects of running a trade defence operation. In the event, Middleton was promoted Captain in July 1758, and took command of the newly constructed Barbados (12). Middleton’s role during this time was a small but critical part of the Admiralty’s vast world system: based at English Harbour, Antigua, Captain Middleton was left in charge of anti-privateering operations while Commodore Moore conducted amphibious landings against Martinique and Guadeloupe.

<a style="color:#00aadc;" href="http://”>Plan of English Harbour, Antigua, 1782: base of operations for the Leeward Island station in 1758.

English Harbour in 1800, by Nicholas Pocock

Middleton, a natural administrator, thus oversaw trade as it massed at Antigua in preparation for its biannual convoy across the Atlantic. These large convoys, sailing at the beginning of June and July, of which the first, in June 1757, totalled 170 ships, were valued at least £2,000,000, and although fairly secure from interception, were generally uninsured. Individual merchant ships, however, not to mention the inter-island and coastal trade, indeed, were potential prey for French privateers sortieing from Guadeloupe and Martinique or crossing the Atlantic from the windward: over 1,400 trade ships were captured by French privateers in the West Indies over the course of the war.[xiv]

Order of battle for Leeward Islands and Jamaican stations, June 1757. Notice the significant increase in ships of the line attached to these two stations at this point. Middleton had been made Commander and appointed to the sloop HMS Speaker in February, a ship too small to be counted amongst the heavier warships, and thus does not appear on this list.

John Frazer’s painting of a frigate with full sail.

“Sloop” signed W. Van der velde, with English colours flying.<>

Captain Middleton thus found himself in a similar position to Captain Horatio Nelson, who, 27 years later, would likewise be appointed to Antigua and the Leeward Islands as a frigate commander.[xv] While captain of Barbados, in October 1758, Middleton wrote to a merchant representing the local chamber of commerce at St. Christopher’s (St. Kitt’s), regarding a proposed scheme for the defence of the islands. The plan involved two warships of 40 guns, two of 20 guns, and eight brigs of 16 guns, supported by two sloops of 10 guns each.[xvi] According to Middleton’s recommendations, these warships would be split between Barbados and Antigua, with two frigates stationed at each, and three brigs at the former, five brigs plus two sloops at the latter.

Nelson boards a captured ship, showing Nelson leaving HMS Lowestoft (32) to board a captured American privateer, 20 November 1777, by Richard Westall, 1806.

Captain Middleton’s detailed summary of the defence scheme identified what he believed to be the optimum arrangement for trade defence, observing that the area around Barbados could be relatively easily protected, although “…Antigua, St. Christopher’s, Nevis, Montserrat, Jamaica, &c.,” were more difficult to protect considering the numerous sailing routes between the islands.[xvii] In December 1759, writing from his new command, Arundel, Middleton believed the entire station could be covered by two ship of the line, four frigates, three brigs and two sloops, with reserves to relieve these forces as needed.[xviii]

Leeward Islands and Jamaican commands, 1758, showing only four heavy warships on station at Commodore Moore’s station.

Middleton was keen to use the heavier frigates to cover the routes to and from Martinique, Marie-Galante and Guadeloupe, so as to interrupt French prize captures there. Middleton was executing a portion of Commodore Moore’s scheme, which, based on his predec